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THE MAJOR INFLUENCE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DOCTRINES 
ON THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The life of the law has not been logic, it has been 
experience ... 
The law embodies the story of a nation's development 
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as 
though it contained only the axioms and corollaries of 
a book of mathematics. 
In order to know what it is, we must know what it has 
been, and what it tends to become. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 1881 
Motivation and the PUrposes of the Study 
The year of 1997 might be the most dramatic turning 
point of modern Korean history. Thanks to the result of the 
Election for the Fifteenth President of the Republic of 
Korea, the ruling party whose power originated from the 
military regime during the last five decades finally 
replaced by the long time opposition party, which has been 
recognized as more democratic or liberal party, for the 
first time in modern Korean history. The new President, Kim 
Dae-Jung, who has been known as the symbol of Korean pro-
democracy movement, declared that "[W]e inaugurated the 
"Government of the People" through a peaceful transition of 
power from the ruling to an opposition party for the first 
1 
time in the history of the Republic of Korea" in his address 
for commemorating the 50 th Anniversary of the Republic of 
Korea. 1 Kim Dae-Jung has devoted his life for Korean 
democracy and human rights protection. Many Korean people, 
therefore, expect him to generate the human rights situation 
and also, more importantly, to reform our nation politically 
and economically. 
Needless to say, he has stressed the necessity of 
nation's reform. Unlike the former presidents, who had 
urged more importance of economical development rather than 
political development, he emphases the importance of 
harmonious development of both political democracy and 
economical success in parallel. 2 In addition to this 
transition of political environment, one of his sensational 
campaign promises was the amendment of Constitution that is 
to replace the current Presidential government to the 
Parliamentary government. 3 
1 Kim Dae-Jung, Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Republic of 
Korea, Chongwadae, Aug. 15, 1998 <http://www.chongwadae.com>. 
2 D.J. Kim, supra note 1, He urged that "[T]he governing philosophy of 
the current government is to develop democracy and a free market economy 
in parallel." 
3 
He has agreed earlier with Kim Jong-pil of the United Liberal 
Democrats (ULD) that they will pursue the Cabinet system of government 
if he wins. See the Korean Politics Web-Site at 
<http://www.koreanpolitics.com/1997/election/front.html>. 
2 
Since the end of World War II, the United States has 
affected constitutionalism in many countries of Asia. The 
United States occupied the Philippines (1898-1946, except 
1943-1945), Japan (1945-1952), and South Korea (1945-1948) 
and encouraged democratic revolution there, with different 
polices and results. 4 The U.S.A. Military Government in 
Korea ("USAMGIK") directly governed southern part of Korean 
Peninsula from its liberation in 1945 until the 
establishment of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea 
with declaration of beginning of independence in 1948. 
Although Americans did not participate in drafting the 
Constitution, USAMGIK gave its essential backing to the 
autonomy of Korea's constitution-making process with making 
series of ordinance. Moreover, with relatively short 
consti tutional history, the Constitution has been amended 
nine times during last five decades. In the course of this 
transition, the influence of American constitutional law 
doctrines has been enormous. 
Wi th all the above respects, the primary purpose of 
this research is to find how the United States' 
constitutionalism has influenced on the interpretation and 
application of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. 
4 
Lawrence W. Beer, Introduction: Constitutionalism in Asia and the 
United States, in Constitutional Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia, 
3 
Through attaining this purpose, one might be able to find 
the development of human rights situation as well as the new 
judicial environment in South Korea, which is the secondary 
purpose of this research. 
Methodology of the Study 
Primary legal methodology in the civil law countries 
has been the statutory analysis whose ideas are based on 
legal philosophy. While the student in Common law tradition 
has been trained by case law, namely judge-made-law case 
study, the student in Civil law tradition has been taught by 
scholar-made-law study. Even though, therefore, the primary 
method of this study has been employed by comparative 
approach, which is mainly concerned about more empirical way, 
I could not escape from theoretical analysis. 
In modern society, laws are the products of the conflict 
between different social classes where the people have 
counter-interests. Any law could not exist by itself but it 
premises the existence of a nation and a society. There is 
no doubt why recently the study of society of law has had a 
great attention from legal scholars. Furthermore, the 
35 (Lawrence W. Beer ed. 1992). 
4 
Constitution of a nation is recognized as more influential 
and also instrumental law to the society and people's 
political life than any other legal discipline. 
Since the primary goal of this study has been to find 
how the United States Constitutional doctrine has influenced 
on Korean Constitution, it appears that historical and 
diplomatic events between two countries have given a great 
deal of profound sources for this research. 
Hence, although the primary method for my study will be 
ct. 
the comparative law analysis which might be more empirical 
/\ 
and practical way, I will also employ the theoretical 
analysis in order to examine the decisions of Constitutional 
Court ln Korea and also to introduce the basic 
consti tutional doctrines in Korea. Moreover, this study 
will be applied the functional analysis as the secondary 
methodology. The public law system involves all three 
branches of government as well as a number of other agencies. 
There must be underlying extra-legal factors in practice of 
public law system such as political, social, cultural, 
economic and personal influences, interacting together. 
5 
Organization of the Dissertation 
In order to attain the purposes described so far, I 
will start this study from the introduction to the early 
diplomatic events between two countries and the early 
Korean-U.S. relations with historical perspective. In 
Chapter II, I present brief diplomatic history of two 
countries from the moment of the opening Hermit Kingdom by 
the West in the late 19 th century to the end of Japanese 
Annexation and the beginning of the U.S. Military Government 
in Korea (USAMGIK) in 1948 with chronological approach. In 
doing so, I examine the early influences of the American 
Constitutionalism including the Declaration of Independence 
on the Constitution of Kingdom of Korea and the Constitution 
of the de facto Korean Government in Shanghai, China during 
the Japanese Annexation. 
After three years of administration of USAMGIK in South 
Korea, the Republic of Korea was inaugurated with the 
establishment of its first Constitution in 1948. During the 
last five decades, the Constitution of South Korea has been 
amended nine times. In the course of transformation, the 
influence of the U. S. Constitution on the Korean 
Consti tution has been enormous. Such constitutional 
6 
,.... 
I 
I 
t 
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transitions with an analysis of the impact of u.s. 
constitutionalism will be discussed in Chapter III. 
The current constitution was adopted in 1987 after a 
nation-wide protest against Chun Doo-Hwan's regime when 
Korean people went out on the street and called for 
constitutional reform. One of the most significant changes 
in the Constitution of 1987 is the initiation of the 
Constitutional Court. Although the basic system and 
organization of the Constitutional Court followed the German 
system of judicial review; however, in practice, it appears 
that Korean Constitutional Court has been willing to follow 
the model of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court. In Chapter IV, 
therefore, I will compare the judicial review systems in 
both countries. In doing so, I will examine several 
important decisions of the Constitutional Court with as 
illustration of how the Court is to interpret and apply the 
u.s. Supreme Court's decisions to such cases. 
South Korea has ratified two major International Human 
Rights Covenants and the role of these Covenants on the 
human rights situation in South Korea has increased since 
ratification. Even though this particular issue may be 
7 
peripheral of the main subj ect of this study, that issue 
might be conveniently discussed so far as there have been 
the human rights issues as well as the Justices' concern 
regarding the Covenants. In Chapter V, I will present the 
history of ratification of the Covenants: the current view 
of the Constitutional Court toward the Covenants: and the 
development of human rights situation in South Korea. 
In Chapter VI, I will examine the presidential system 
of Korea, which has been the hottest as well as never-ending 
issue of Korean Constitution since its establishment, 
particularly after last year Presidential Election. 
8 
"The United States of America and the Kingdom of Korea, 
being sincerely desirous of establishing permanent relations 
of ami ty and friendship .... " 
_ In the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation 
Between the United States and the Kingdom of Korea 
May 22, 1882 
II. THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN IMPERILISM ON THE KINGDOM OF 
KOREA ("CHOSUN") IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It was the late 19th century that the Kingdom of Korea 
entered into the turmoil of the world competition of the 
modern imperialism as a victim where the Western imperialist 
countries including Japan and Russia sought their colonies. 
After the Hermit Kingdom, Choson (literally means "the 
country of morning glory"), and Japan finally concluded the 
Kangwha Treaty, which opened ports in Korea, the real 
competition for sei zing the Kingdom as their colony just 
began. It was the United States of America that had great 
but somewhat unorthodox efforts, for establishing diplomatic 
relations with the Kingdom. 
9 
What happened to the Kingdom in this so called "Opening 
Period" has been recognized the most important period in 
modern Korean history as well as Korean legal tradition 
because the Kingdom finally met the more modernized legal 
institution than traditional Chinese legal institution which 
the Kingdom had adopted and used for entire history until 
this period. Furthermore, the field of legal study was 
finally recognized as new academic area instead of Ethics or 
Confucian moral philosophy. Therefore, the Korean legal 
tradition finally formed the new and modernized institution 
in terms of the meanings and contents. 5 
In this Chapter, as I mentioned earlier, I present a 
brief history about what happened to the 19th century Korea, 
from the beginning of the Westerners' encroachment to the 
inauguration of the Republic of Korea in 1948. In doing so, 
more importantly, I will examine the early influences of the 
American constitutionalism on that of Kingdom of Korea and 
the Constitution of the First Republic in 1948. 
5 Jong-go Choi, History of Legal Thoughts in Korea, 179 (1993) 
10 
B. THE OPENING OF THE KINGDOM OF KOREA 
In 1864, the boy Yi Myoung-bok duly ascended the throne 
(posthumous title Kojong) and his father Yi Ha-hung was made 
regent and given the title Tgaewongun (Prince of the Great 
Court) . The Taewongun turned out to be one of the most 
powerful personalities in the history of Kingdom of Korea. 
He represented all the virtues of the Confucian traditions. 6 
He was uncompromising, honest, and dedicated to the creation 
of a society upon the lines prescribed by the great sage. 7 
However, unfortunately, he also represented the defects of 
Confucian thought-the rigidity of mind, resistance to change, 
refusal to face realities which conflicted with his 
beliefs. 8 
From early in the nineteenth century, Korean peninsula 
appeared to have become a potential economic colony for 
Western powers, such as Germany, France, the Great Britain, 
Russia, and the United States, and they persistently 
demanded the Hermit Kingdom to open trading ports. As was 
the case in all Western encroachments on East Asian Nations, 
l t started with peaceful and religious overture, but it 
6 Woo-kyun Han, The History of Korea, 362, (1978). 
7 Id 
8 More about Taewongun, see Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewongun, 
1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea (1972). 
11 
ended in bloody battles. In 1832 an English merchant ship 
appeared off the coast of a western port in Korea seeking to 
trade, and in 1845 an English warship spent more than a 
month in Korean waters, surveying the island stubbed sea 
around the west coast of Korea. In 1846 three French 
warships dropped anchor off the west coast, left a letter 
for forwarding to the court and departed, while in 1854 two 
Russian vessels sailed along the East coast, causing some 
deaths and injuries among the Korean they encountered. 
In 1866, the German adventurer Oppert twice asked 
permission to trade, and after his request was denied it was 
he who came ashore two years later to rifle the tomb of the 
Prince of Namyon, the Taewongun's father, in Toksan county 
of Chungcheon province. In 1866 a French squadron of seven 
warships and 600 men invaded the Korean island of Kanghwa 
not too far from Seoul and demanded satisfaction for the 
execution of several French missionaries who had earlier 
entered the forbidden land in disguise. The expedition 
failed to accomplish any of its objectives and withdrew. In 
1871 a similar expedition of five American warships whose 
intention was to protest the destruction of an American 
trading ship in an inland river of Korea was equally 
12 
unsuccessful, despite more elaborate diplomatic and military 
preliminaries. 9 
1. The Laws and Cul tural Background of the Kingdom of 
Korea 
The law of a society or a nation can be understood from 
the perspective of its history and its broadest cultural 
context. 10 If we assume that law and legal institutions 
deri ve ultimately from a variety of political and social 
insti tutions, it would be pertinent to find what political 
or extra-legal underpinnings there are for law and the 
growth of a legal system. 11 Due to the these aspects, the 
cultural .or historical approach to Korean legal tradition 
including constitutionalism, democracy, and human-rights 
issues has been discussed by many legal scholars (i.e., Hahm 
Pyong-Choon's enormously influential book, The Korean 
Political Tradition and Law (1967), Norma Jacob's The Korean 
Road to Modernization and Development (1987) , Dae-Kwon 
Choi's Development of Law and Legal Insti tutions in Korea, 
9 C.l. Eugene Kim & Han-kyu Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 
1876-1910 13 (1967). 
10 " Yo un Dae-Kyu, Law and Political Authority in South Korea,S, (1990). 
11 D . anlel S Lev, Islamic Court in Indonesia, 2-3, (1972). 
13 
Dae-Kyu Youn's Law and Poli tical Authori ty in South Korea 
(1991), and William Shaw's Human Rights in Korea (1991)). 
According to Professor William Shaw, in order to 
understand the legal tradition during the Nineteenth Century 
Chosun, one must be aware a couple of historical facts: 
first, "the decline of Confucianism as living philosophy 
(despite residual strength in interpersonal relations) that 
began in the 1880s and sharply accelerated after the loss of 
Korean independence in 1910"; secondly, "the growing 
strength, during the same period, of alternative 
philosophical, religious, or political traditions and forms 
of organization, including Catholic and Protestant 
Christianity, the Chondogyo or "Heavenly Way" Movement, 
Western liberalism, and Marxism.,,12 
The Neo-Confucianism, established by Chu-Hi, the 
Chinese Confucian scholar, was adopted as the Kingdom's 
ideology, and it had a great influence on politics, culture, 
and society. It was the Kingdom of Korea who had taken Chu 
Hi's teaching more seriously than any other Asian countries. 
As Professor Dae-kwon Choi indicated, "Confucianism is to 
12 William Shaw, Introduction, in Human Rights in Korea: Historical and 
Policy Perspectives, 4 (William Shaw ed., 1991). 
14 
traditional law what natural law, individual freedom, 
equality, the market system, liberalism, democratic 
revolution, and market economy, all combined, are to modern 
Western law." 13 The classic expression of Confucius' 
thought on law is the belief that desirable behavior and 
social harmony can be obtained, not by strict regulation or 
severe punishment, but by the rule of good men, whose 
virtuous examples are the most effective form of 
persuasion,14 as Confucius philosophized that: 
"If the people are guided by the written law [bup ~ in 
Korean and fa i.! in Chinese], and order among them is 
enforced by means of punishment, they will try to evade 
punishment, but have not sense of shame, but if they 
are guided by virtue, and order among them is enforced 
by rule of propriety [ye ~ in Korean and li f~ in 
Chinese], they will have a sense of shame and also be 
reformed. ,,15 
The term ye, therefore, came to be used as a word 
interchangeable with morality. Ye were perceived as 
preventing moral transgressions, and bup as punishing the 
offenders should they commit such violations. 16 In 
13 Dai-Kwon Choi, Development of Law and Legal Institutions in Korea, in 
Traditional Korean Legal Attitudes, 59 (Bong Duck Chun & William Shaw, 
et la eds., ). 
14 Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan, Law in the People's Republic of 
China: Commentary, Readings and Materials, 3 (1989). 
15 Id. 
16 V' lpan Chandra, Korean Human-Rights Consciousness in an Era of 
Transition: A Survey of Late-Nineteenth-Century Developments, in Shaw 
ed., supra note 21 at 30-31. 
15 
homogeneous societies like Korea, social norms become more 
effective means of social control and integration than 
law. 17 Confucian morality always favored the man of virtue 
over law and institutions - an essential characteristic of 
the idea of "rule-by-men" rather than "rule-by-law."18 Due 
to these reasons, that the persistence of Confucianism in 
Korean society led the disappointing record of Korean 
constitutionalism has been discussed as the main cause of 
the underdevelopment of the democracy and constitutionalism 
in Korea. 
Although this kind of "cultural determinism" was a 
popular way to explain the underdevelopment of Korean 
society, however, this cultural approach neglects the 
importance both of history and historical change. Therefore, 
taking a broader perspective on society, such as social, 
political, economic factors, or the role of humans in 
changing society must be a better approach to explain the 
constitutionalism and democracy in Korea. 19 Thus, as 
mentioned in Chapter I Introduction, these historical and 
17 Dae-Kyu Yoon, New Developments in Korean Constitutionalism: Changes 
and Prospects, 4 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 395, 397 (May, 1995). 
18 Yoon, supra note 19 at 20. 
19 Yoon, supra note 26 at 399. 
16 
socio-political approaches have been taken the primary 
methodology for this study. 
One of the Taewongun's cultural achievements was his 
compilation of legal and ritual works. The Ninth King of 
the Kingdom, Song-jong, established a legal compilation, the 
Kyoungkuk Taejon (Great Code of State Governance), which had 
used as its basic legal guide to administration. The code 
was divided into six sub-codes in accordance with the 
departmental divisions of the government: I (~: personnel) , 
Ho (P:revenue), Ye (f~:Rites), Pyoung (~:military), Hyoung 
(m: criminal law), and Kong (I: public works) .20 Since there 
had been no amendment after 1785, the Taewongun believed 
that those old laws were obsolete for his reformation policy. 
Due to this reason, the Taewongun personally directed the 
compilation of a series of important codes. Completed in 
1866, the Taejon hwoetong (the New Comprehensive Code of 
Administration) was an ambitious attempt to incorporate into 
20 Chin Kim, Korean Law Study Guide, 2-3 (2 nd ed., 1995). The code had 
been supplemented by three major compilations: the Taejeon songnok 
(Early Supplement to the Great Code) in 1492, the Taejeon husongnok 
(Late Supplement to the Great Code) in 1543, and the Suk taejeon 
(Supplementary Great Code) in 1744. In 1785 another code called Taejeon 
tongpyoun (Comprehensive Code of Administration) was enacted. 
17 
a single work all new laws issued after 1744 and all 
previously enacted laws. 21 
Although the Kingdom appeared to have a highly 
satisfied system of Confucian society and government to be 
accepted both by the rulers and the ruled, it had been from 
time to time shaken by peasant unrest and riots internally 
and the Westerners intrusions externally as mentioned. One 
of the most intimidating threats to the Kingdom was, for 
example, the impact between the traditional Confucianism and 
the Western thoughts that had flowed into the yangban 
intellectuals, one of main ruling class in the Kingdom 
society. A number of yanban intellectuals began to question 
the values of the existing sociopolitical system, and their 
ideas eventually sparked a minor intellectual movement known 
as Sirhak (Practical Learning). 22 These savants not only 
learned a great deal about Catholicism and Western science 
and technology but also something of Western law, politics, 
and society. In the early 1860s, another challenges to the 
Kingdom's Confucian system arose in the form of new religion, 
21 Id. Other compilations were the Yanjonpyongo (Manual for the 
departments of appointment and war) in 1866, the Yukchonchorye 
(Regulations of the six departments) in 1867, the Smabanyesik (Rules of 
etiquette for the three classes) in 1866, and the Oryepyongo (Manual of 
the five rites) in 1868 (?). 
22 Chandra, supra note 25 at 39. 
18 
which formed itself Tonghak (Eastern learning) , as 
distinguished from Suhak (Western Learning or Catholicism). 
This new thought drew elements from Confucianism, Taoism, 
Buddhism, and even Catholicism, and proclaimed itself in 
favor of class equality as well as sexual equality.23 
2. The Seclusion Policy 
Before 1880, the seclusion policy [Shae-Kook Policy] 
was accepted as the fundamental diplomatic policy of the 
Kingdom of Korea. In the early years of the Kingdom, Korea 
considered herself the center of a little universe of 
Confucian civilization and wealth. This little universe, as 
opposed to the greater universe with Ming China at its 
center, comprised many lands and peoples. The traditional 
Korean thought pattern identified the West with evil, and 
the ruling circles of Korea staunchly upheld the idea of 
rejecting evil, Chuksaron. 24 Another important factor in 
Korea's isolation, due to her geographical position, was her 
lack of direct contact with Western thought and 
23 Chandra, supra note 25, at 40. 
24 Dae-Sook Suh, The Centennial: A Brief History, in Korea and The 
United States: A Century of Cooperation, 4 (Youngnok Koo & Dae-Sook Suh 
ed., 1984). 
19 
; 
, ; 
't t' 25 instl u lons. There was another reason for the Kingdom's 
rejection of Western demands for trade relations: that is, 
the fear of the spread of Catholicism. Catholicism was 
regarded as the Western Evil by the Taewongun and Confucian 
scholars because its idea was opposed to traditional 
Confucian teachings. Therefore, it is not difficult to 
understand how the seclusion policy had become part of the 
national philosophy, character, and life. 
3. The Initial Contact with America 
Before the Kingdom of Korea and the United States 
entered into the diplomatic relations in 1882, there had 
been very unusual and also cruel incidents that made the 
Kingdom unfavorable to America. There were a number of 
American ships around Korean Peninsula at that time because 
of the growing American trade with China, Japan, and Russia. 
In August 1866, an American schooner, The General Sherman, 
sailed up the Taedong River toward the city of Pyongyang 
where she hoped to exchange her goods for Korean paper, rice, 
gold, ginseng, and leopard skins. When The General Sherman 
25 Choe, supra note 8, at 91. 
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refused to heed the advice to leave the port and to release 
the kidnapped local official of the authorities in Pyongyang, 
the Koreans retaliated by burning the ship and massacring 
the officers and men of the General Sherman. Needless to 
say, the General Sherman incident became a hot diplomatic 
issue, and finally the cause of an American expedition. In 
1871 the U. S. government decided to use the incident as a 
pretext to force Korea to open its ports to trade. The U.S. 
Minister at Peking, Frederick F. Row, and the Commander of 
the U.S. Asiatic Squadron, Rear Admiral John Rodgers, were 
ordered to proceed into Korean waters with a detachment of 
fi ve warships. By this time, however, in the aftermath of 
the French reprisal expedition, the "Foreign Disturbance of 
1866 [Shin-mi Yang-yo]," the Taewongun had repaired the 
fortifications , built new gun emplacements and cast more 
cannon. The Row-Rodgers expedition of six ships stormed the 
Korean forts in Kanghwa, burned the buildings and houses, 
and killed the Korean soldiers who tried to repel the 
unprovoked American attack. It was one of the bloodiest 
battles that Koreans have fought to defend their country. 
Exultant at his victories over the attacking American 
warships, the Taewongun now further hardened his exclusion 
21 
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policy. To demonstrate his resolve to rej ect all contact 
with the Western nations, he had monument stones set up on 
the Chongno main thoroughfare in Seoul and at points 
throughout the country, incised with this admonition: 
"Western barbarians invade our land. If we do not fight we 
must then appease them. To urge appeasement is to betray 
the nation. ,,26 
As mentioned earlier, the efforts to open the Kingdom 
with armed forces were not successful and even worse it made 
the Kingdom become more secure and be hostile to the West. 
However, we cannot say that it was entirely failed but even 
had some influenced to Koreans as well as Americans due to 
the following reasons: 
1) Koreans finally acknowledged the Westerners who 
seemed more powerful and more advanced than China 
and Japan; 
2) Some Koreans became more interested in the Western 
ideas such as class equality as well as gender 
equality; and 
3) Finally, the Westerners tried some other approaches 
to open the Kingdom which seemed more moderate 
ways27 
26 Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, 266 (1984). 
27 Most Western countries during this period regarded the Kingdom as very underdeveloped one. However, 
after their encounters, they finally acknowledged that the Kingdom was not the barbarian nation that they 
thought. Therefore, the West finally employed more moderated and diplomatic approaches to the 
Kingdom after those military encounters. 
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Therefore, needless to say, it was very clear that the time 
for opening the Kingdom had been come and it was the most 
crucial turning point of Korean history. 
4. The Treaty Period: 1882-1905 
The Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation 
between the United States and the Kingdom of Korea was 
concluded on 22 May 1882 at Inchon. It was signed by 
Commodore Shufeldt and Sin Hon, President of the Royal 
Cabinet, representing two independent and sovereign nations. 
The interest of the United States in opening the 
Kingdom was primarily commercial, but the Kingdom's interest 
in concluding a treaty was more political than commercial. 
The Kingdom's officials seem to have placed heavy emphasis 
on the interpretation of the treaty's first article 
concerning good offices and mutual assistance. 28 The Treaty, 
however, did not obligate the United States to protect the 
political independence of Korea. 
28 Article I of the Treaty provided that "There shall be perpetual peace 
and friendship between the President of the United States and the King 
of Korea and the citizens and subjects of their respective Governments. 
If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, 
the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, 
to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly 
23 
The U. S. State Department had been irreconcilable with 
American envoys' enthusiasm for the Korean Kingdom and 
concerned over the performance of their assigned duties in 
their attempt to save the Kingdom.29 For instance, when Dr. 
Horace N. Allen who was the American envoy and the personal 
physician to the king at the same time took it upon himself 
to protect the king and his court officials from political 
intrigues and he agonized in frustration over the Japanese 
and Russian struggle over Korea, he was reminded that 
intervention in Korean political affairs was not one of his 
assigned duties by the State Department. 3o 
Secretary of State Hay repeated American policy by 
stating that United States interests in Korea were "rather 
commercial than political." The United States acquiesced in 
Japanese domination of Korea in the Taft-Katsura memorandum 
on 29 July 1905. By this agreement, the United States gave 
its approval to Japan's suzerainty over Korea in return for 
Japanese disavowal of any aggressive intention toward the 
Philippines. The desperate King Koj ong called upon the 
Uni ted States to honor its repeated assurances of concern 
feelings." Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation, May 22, 
i9882 , U.S.-Korea, 23 Stat. 720. 
3 
Suh, supra note 10, at 7. 
o Id. 
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for Korean independence, but both President Roosevelt and 
his Secretary of State refused to see the King's emissary, 
Homer B. Hulbert. 31 The treaty of 1882 was terminated and 
Secretary of State Elihu Root ordered Edwin Morgan, the last 
American minister to Korea, to close up the legation in 
Seoul in November 1905. 32 
5. Introducing the Western Ideas: Catholicism and 
Protestantism 
Since the introduction of Catholicism in 1784, followed 
by the arrival of Protestant missionaries in 1884, 
Christiani ty has proceeded to become--after Buddhism--the 
largest religion in the country. Today about one third of 
South Korea's 45 million people are Christian--11 million 
Protestants and 3 million Roman Catholics. Since the early 
1960s, when South Korea's Christians scarcely topped the one 
million mark, the number of Christians, particularly 
Protestants, has increased faster than in any other country, 
doubling every decade. By 1994, moreover, there were over 
35,000 churches and 50,000 pastors, making the South Korean 
church one of the most vital and dynamic in the world. 
31 
32 ~~~' supra note 10. at 7 
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Needless to say, many of the Western ideas imported to 
the Kingdom through the missionary works. It happened two 
different ways; 1) direct import from American missionaries 
and indirect import from Koreans who had opportunities to 
study in the United States during this opening period. 
When those Korean students went back to the Kingdom after 
their study in the United States, they organized new 
political group such as "Independent Group"; published 
papers; taught young Koreans; and tried to reform the 
Kingdom to the modernized nation. Some groups even tried 
political uprising such as Kapshin Chongbyon (Coup d'Etat of 
1884)33 
I will examine how this new religion, Christianity, 
influenced to the Kingdom during this opening period. 
a. Catholicism 
During Chosun Dynasty, particularly beginning of 16th 
Century, Koreans began to expose themselves to the West 
while they visited China for business purpose as well as 
diplomatic reasons. Led by their own curiosity, Korean 
33 
Suh, supra note 10. at 7 
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visitors to the capital city of China were often drawn to 
the strange men from the West. It was not until the latter 
part of the eighteenth century that a small number of 
Koreans were first introduced to Catholicism. Around 1770, a 
Korean envoy to China, Chong Tu-won, brought back to Korea 
Matteo Ricci's Tianzhu [The True Doctrine of the Lord of 
Heaven] They were fascinated not only by the Western 
scientific instruments found among the strangers' 
possessions, but by the personalities of the men 
themselves. 34 
Choson sent tributary emissaries to China, the Middle 
Kingdom annually. According to the Cheng-chiao-feng-pao, 35 
as early as in 1644 a Jesuit missionary, Johannes Adam 
Schall von Bell of Germany, approached for the purposes of 
evangelism the Chosun Prince Sohyeon who had been detained 
in China at that time. 
In the first year of Shun-chin, a Korean prince, the 
son of the King Hyoj ong, was detained in the capital 
city. He heard of Tang -jo-wang (Johannes Adam Schall 
von Bell). So the prince paid him a visit when 
possible at the church where the priest resided. The 
prince questioned him about astronomy and other Western 
science. Jo-wang also came to repay the prince his 
34 D ' aVld Chung, Syncretism: The Religious Context of Christian 
Beginnings in Korea, 5(2001). 
35 Peter Hwang, Chen-chiao-feng-pao, 1904. 
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visit on several occasions at the Hall of the prince. 
They had long talks and they understood each other 
deeply. As Jo-wang often explained the truth of 
catholicism, the prince was glad to hear of it and 
asked detailed questions. When the prince went back 
home to his country (as a free man), Jo-wang gave him 
many kinds of books in translation on astronomy, 
mathematics and the Truth of Catholicism. A globe and 
a portrait of God (Jesus) were included among the gifts. 
The prince complimented him with a letter written by 
himself. 36 
However, the prince died soon after his return without 
achieving anything Jo-wang had hoped for. 
The introduction of Christianity to Korea was nothing 
short of a miracle. Koreans had organized a church in their 
capital city by the 1770s before any missions had even begun 
to direct their organized efforts toward this "Hermit 
Kingdom." 37 It was a spontaneous birth, marked by the 
special character of human wisdom guided by divine wisdom. 
The earliest converts were ones who had made themselves 
Christians. They were united in an organism, a cell-a 
living cell- that could respond, suffer, and grow. It was 
this underground cell that met regularly at Kim Pomu's 
36 Y' l Nyonghwa, Choson Kidokyyo Kop Waekyo Sa (History of Korean Church 
and Diplomacy), 51 (1928). 
37 Id at 3. 
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Myongryedong panggol Street, Seoul in 1770s. 
38 A 
representative of this group, Yi Seunghun was sent over the 
forbidden border to China and was baptized by the bishop who 
resided there and thereby lined the isolated member to the 
main body. 
Alexandre de Gouvea, the bishop of Beijing at the time, 
who was chiefly responsible for the cultivation of this 
newborn church, expressed in his letter, which was published 
later under the title: De Sta tus christianismi in Regnum 
Coreae Mirabiliter Ingressi (On the Status of Christianity 
Miraculously Entered into the Kingdom of Korea), that 
"within short period of time, the believers in a 
Christiani ty had increased .... Within five years, the number 
of Christians had grown to about four thousand."39 
However, before the official foundation of Korean 
Catholic Church, specially during the Regent Taewongun's 
rule, no less than ten thousand Christians paid the supreme 
price. The new Christians had no pastor to lead them for 
ten long years after they were accepted into the world of 
Catholic fellowship. Even before the first decade was over, 
38 y' l, supra Note 26, at 51. 
39 . Reprlnted in Id. at 4. This document was translated into Portuguese 
and French from the Latin text and published respectively in Lisbon and 
in Paris. 
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they had paid heavy prices for their new faith. Thomas Kim, 
Paul Yun, and his cousin Jacques Kwon became Korea's first 
martyrs for the church. 40 
As a result of the repeated request, the bishop in 
Beij ing finally sent a Chinese priest Chou Wen-mo (Jacques 
Tsiou) to the forbidden land secretly in 1794. Priest Chou 
Wen-mo became the first ecclesiastical official in Chosun 
and was beheaded as a martyr in 1801 after some six years of 
secret ministry. 
In short, Catholic evangelism was a success from the 
very beginning. It began "miraculously" and accidentally, 
and was carried on heroically by the native converts under 
their own initiative. 
b. Protestantism 
In 1900, only sixteen years after the opening of 
missionary work in the Kingdom, the factors of the success 
were already discussed and heatedly debated at the 
Ecumenical Council, which met in New York that year with 
representatives of no fewer than forty-eight countries. 41 
40 Chung, Supra note at 6. 
41 
Id at 13. 
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The first evangelistic agencies to begin missionary 
work in Korea were the Board of Foreign Missions of the 
presbyterian Church and the Foreign Missionary Society of 
the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States. These 
two organizations started their work simultaneously in Korea, 
operating their missions side by side and cooperating to 
some degree. In 1884, the Presbyterian Church appointed Dr. 
Horace N. Allen as the first missionary to Korea, while the 
Methodist Church appointed Dr. and Mrs. W.B. Scranton, his 
mother Mrs. Mary Scranton and the Rev. and Mrs. Henry 
Appenzeller as the first missionaries to Korea in the same 
year. 42 
In September of 1884, Dr. Allen arrived in Seoul, 
thereby becoming the first Western missionary to enter Korea. 
Soon after Dr. Allen arrived in Korea, a s igni f icant event 
took place which would have a profound impact on the 
missionary work in Korea. The Kapshin Chongbyon (Coup d'Etat 
of 1884) left Prince Min near death when he was set upon and 
brutally slashed. Dr. Allen was called in when Min was near 
death and his meticulous care over three months saved the 
prince's life. 
42 Chung, Supra note at 6. at 13. 
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This incident gave the royal court great confidence in 
western medicine and trust in an American alliance, 
prompting the court's greater hospitality towards the 
missionaries. As a consequence, Dr. Allen's petition for the 
establishment of a hospital using Western medicine was 
readily granted by the Korean government. The first general 
hospital was opened on April 10, 1885, bearing the name 
Kwanghyewon. 43 
Over the next decade, missionaries from several mission 
bodies arrived in Korea --Presbyterian (Northern branch) in 
1884, Methodist Episcopal (North) in 1885, Canadian Baptists 
in 1889, Church of England in 1890, Presbyterian (Southern 
branch) in 1892, Canadian Presbyterian in 1893, and 
Methodist Episcopal (South) in 1896--adding to both the 
physical and spiritual presence of Christianity.44 
Because of such lingering restrictions against the 
teaching of the "evil learning," therefore, direct 
evangelization of the populace was not possible; hence, 
institutional work--i.e. medical and educational work--
preceded evangelism. The missionaries provided many vital 
43 Chung, Supra note at 6 at 13 
44 rd. 
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medical services which would not have been available 
otherwise, particularly for the poor and women. 
The missionaries were also quick to get involved in 
education. Knowing the Koreans' zeal for education and their 
openness to Western ideas, and hoping to enable illiterate 
Koreans to read the scriptures and religious tracts, the 
missionaries, of whom Mr. Appenzeller was the first and most 
prominent, set about the establishment of schools. The fact 
that even the King endorsed their plan made them all the 
more eager. The demand for education was so overwhelming 
that schools had to be established allover Korea. By 1910, 
in fact, missionaries had founded about 800 schools of 
various grades, accommodating over 41,000 students, which 
was about twice the total enrollment in all Korean 
government schools. 45 It is not an exaggeration to claim 
that the church was in charge of the only complete 
educational system in Korea at the time--only the church 
provided education from primary to college level. 
Complementing the importance of the missionaries' 
iL'lolvement in education was the latter's intimate link with 
4S Chung, Supra note at 6 at 13. 
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Korean nationalism, particularly in light of the impending 
d ' , 46 Japanese omlnatlon. 
The Korean churches entered a new era when the Japanese 
annexed the nation in 1910. Although the Japanese 
administrative policy toward the churches was seemingly 
friendly at first--precipi tated, at least in part, by the 
government's recognition of the importance of Christian 
support to the success of Japanese rule--it gradually 
developed into an open policy of oppression and hostility.47 
A more compelling reason for the change in its policy, 
however, was the prominence of Christians in the 
independence movement and Christianity's association with 
the rise of Korean nationalism. Two events that forged the 
link between Christianity and Korean nationalism were the 
Conspiracy Trial of 1911 and the Independence Movement of 
1919 or Samil Undong. 
The Conspiracy Trial involved the outlandish claim by 
the new government that it had uncovered a plot to 
assassinate the Japanese Governor-General in Korea at the 
cime. In early 1911, Koreans were arrested--all of whom were 
46 
Andrew E. Kim, History of Christianity in Korea: From Its Troubled Beginning to 
Its Contemporary Success, Korea Overseas Information Service, See Web-site at 
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suspected of involvement In the independence movement and 
were brought to trial. Although most of them were acquitted, 
the fact that ninety-eight of the men were Christians left a 
strong impression in the minds of the Korean people, 
establishing the Korean churches and Christian leaders as 
defenders of Koreans' national aspiration. 48 
The Independence Movement of 1919 was also noted for 
the prominent role of Christians, especially Protestants, as 
its organizers and leaders: nearly half of those who signed 
the Declaration of Independence--15 of 33 signers--were 
Christians. 49 The salience of Christians in the movement was 
further noted in the figure of those imprisoned for 
participating in the demonstration: over 22 per cent of the 
total or 2,087 out of 9,458 were Christians. 
This was all the more astonishing given the fact that 
Christians comprised only about 200,000 or 1.3 per cent of 
the total population of 16 million at the time. As a leading 
organization of the demonstration, churches became special 
targets of Japanese military reprisals. Forty-seven churches 
were burned down, and hundreds of Christians perished in the 
demonstration, thousands, including ~ I j 
were women, while 
subjected to imprisonment and torture. The brutal 
47 K' 1m, Supra note 46, 
35 
suppression of this demonstration and the prominence of 
Christians among those persecuted thus produced a strong 
link between Christianity and Korean nationalism. 
6. American Educated Elite in Korean Society 
Many Koreans have come to the United States for study 
during the past hundred years. During this opening period, 
many Korean elite who had a vision for new world were eager 
to visit the United States. 
Since their study In the United States seems to have 
caused changes in their value systems, behavioral 
orientations, or level of knowledge, it is necessary to 
inquire into the characteristics of the American culture 
which they absorbed. The characteristics frequently quoted 
by Koreans on American cultures can be itemized as follows: 
1) Democracy (emphasis on individualism, freedom and 
equality, decentralization of power, responsibility, respect 
for law, cooperation and education) 
2) Capitalism 
3) Pragmatism 
4) Puritanism 
5) Respect for experience and science. 5o 
48 K' un, Supra note 46, 
49 rd. 
50 Dong Suh Bark, The American-Educated Elite in Korean Society, 265 in Korea and the United States: A 
Century of Cooperation, edited by Youngnok Koo & Dae-Sook Suh. 
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Korean leaders who studied in the United States during 
the opening period include Jae Phil So, Chi Ho Yun, Syngman 
Rhee and Kil Jun Yu. 
Kil Jun Yu was the first Korean to study in America. 
He traveled extensively to Japan and European countries and 
was active as a leader of the enlightenment movement upon 
returning to Korea. 51 Even though the enlightened thoughts 
had already been imported from China and Japan long before 
Koreans began to go to the United States, Yu contributed to 
a systematization of enlightened thought. 
Enlightened 
thought was characterized as "Western skills based on 
Eastern values." 52 Although Yu did not stay in the United 
States long enough to obtain a university degree, his role 
and achievement on the enlightenment movement must be 
recognized as one of the prominent elite during this period. 
Upon returning home in 1895, Jae Phil So began to 
publish a newspaper, the Tongnip sinmun ( I ndependen t 
Newapaper), which was instrumental in promoting Korea's 
national interest while under Japanese oppression. 
Published entirely in hangul (Korean) , the newspaper 
inspired Koreans with the spirit of national independence, 
51 
Bark, Supra note 50 at 265. 
37 
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nationalism, and democracy. While promoting enlightenment 
through the newspaper, they organized the Independence club 
(composed private citizens and officials) in order to 
achieve their national goals , built the Independence Gate, 
and insisted on founding a national assembly.53 
The Koreans who studied in the United States toward the 
end of the Choson period belonged to the school of 
enlightenment. They were friendly to the United States and 
absorbed the American cultural influence. Upon returning 
home from the United States, their activities were centered 
on political problems, since Korea's national sovereignty 
was then being unstable. 54 
The number of people who studied In America at that 
time was extremely small. But their contribution to the 
development of Korea was remarkable. If they had compromised 
with the conservative group that opposed their acti vi ties, 
Korean history would have turned in another direction.
55 
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7. First Appearance of American Constitutionalism in 
the Nineteenth Century Korea: The Era of 
Enlightenment Movement 
The outcome of all those developments was an impetus to 
the further import of liberal ideas and values from the West, 
and that seemed to settle into the Enlightenment Movement 
[Kaehwa] . The first stirrings of the Enlightenment Movement 
occurred very early in the 1880s. The leaders of the 
Enlightenment Movement had similar background; all had been 
exposed to some knowledge about the West through their 
common study of a few elementary books imported into the 
Kingdom during the 1870s: all had also had some experience 
to the scholarly works of the Sirhak School. 56 
More importantly, however, through learning over the 
Western liberal ideas and Sirhak, they eventually recognized 
the necessities of the nation's reform to a modern nation-
state, which could protect the Kingdom from the 
imperialists' intrusion and, more importantly, eliminate the 
Confucian class system. To achieve these goals, Kim Ok-kyun, 
who was one of the leading figures of the Movement and had 
hE::i1vily influenced by Japanese "Civilization and 
Enlightenment (bummei kaika) Movement" and Meiji Revolution, 
56 
Chandra, supra note 25 at 47-49. 
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led a coup and seized control of the palace and the 
government on 4 December 1884. Although the new government 
lasted barely three days, this newly set up "reform" 
government undertook to work for the elimination of all 
class distinctions and the establishment of equal rights for 
all, for the firm abolition of the tributary system, raising 
Korea's status to that of the truly sovereign state.
57 
The failure of this attempt at radical reform did not 
mean that all progressive forces and figures were destroyed 
in Korea. After the suppression against 1894 coup, the 
survivals escaped to exile in Japan and America and those 
included Pak Young-hyo and Suh Jae-pil, who eventually 
exposed to American ideas of democracy during residing in 
America. 
During this last period of the Kingdom of Korea, there 
had not been any direct constitutional influences by the 
United States: however, sporadic references to American 
constitutionalism are found in late nineteenth century 
PUblications. 58 The first reference that was found at that 
57 
58 Chandra, supra note 2S at 47-49. 
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period of the Kingdom among American constitutionalism was 
the Declara tion of Independence. 59 
In 1883, with the encouragement of Pak Young-hyo and 
with assistance of Yu Kil-chun and Yun Chi-ho, other young, 
progressive government officials, had started the 
publication of Hangsung sunbo, a newspaper. This newspaper 
had played a significant role to spread progressive ideas 
among the Korean people until its demise, due to financial 
reasons, in 1888. In 11 February of 1885 edition, the 
Declaration of Independence appeared under the title, "About 
America. ,,60 That article introduced the first paragraph and 
the first part of the second paragraph of the Declaration of 
Independence: for instance, it was written that " all Men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty, and the Pur sui t of Happiness." 61 The author of 
this article emphasized the inalterability of those rights, 
59 Tscholsu Kim, Mikuk Hunbopee Hankuk Hunbope Michin Younghyang Susul 
[The Introduction to the Influence of the Constitution of the United 
States on the Constitution of the Republic of Korea], in Hankukesu Mikuk 
Hunbopei Younghyangkea Kyohun [Influence and Lessons of the U. S. 
Constitution in Korea], 9,10 (Hankuk Kongbup Hakhoi [Korean Public Law 
Association] ed., 1987) . 
60 F ' or details, see Bonduk Chun, Hankuk Gundaebup Sasangsa [Hlstory of 
Modern Korean Legal Thoughts], 82 
61 K' lm, supra note 34 at 10, 11. The quotation for the Declaration of 
Independence from, Kermit L. Hall et aI, American Legal History: Cases 
and Materials, 66 (2 nd ed., 1996). 
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expressing that "no one can restrict those inherent 
liberties and even the Ghost can not steal those inherent 
. ht ,,62 rlg s. Although most articles wrote anonymously, it had 
been believed that the articles might be written by the 
leading members of the Enlightenment Movement. They argued 
that the state's main role was to protect such "Heaven-
bestowed" rights: "A state that does not fulfill this role 
is not a state, and a government that betrays this 
responsibility is not a government." According to Professor 
Chandra, the articles in this newspaper showed the American 
Declaration of Independence through the vision of the book 
"Condi tions in the West", by Fukuzawa Yukichi, a leader of 
Japanese "Civil and Enlightenment" Movement. 63 Thus, due to 
this reason, Professor Chulsu Kim asserted that the direct 
influence of American constitutionalism did not find in 
those references. 
After failure of 1884 coup, Pak Young-hyo did not 
accept his exile in Japan but rather honed his progressive 
ideas further by visiting the United States. In 1888, he 
pul his ideas together and sent them in the form of a long 
62 Kim, supra note 34 at 11. 
63 Chandra, supra note 25 at 52. 
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memorial to the Korean King. Professor Chandra indicated 
two basic ideas of the memorial, so called "Ku ui sangso": 
First, Pak wrote of all human beings as equal in the 
eyes of the Creator; hence all have the same rights to 
life, liberty, and the pur sui t of prosperity. These 
are inalienable endowments of all. Second, he said 
that it was the people who initially created all 
governments. Their aim was to seek ways in which to 
protect their rights. Government is nothing, but a 
trust and, if the government fails to live up to its 
duty as a trust, the people have a right to compel it 
to do so or alter it or replace it. 64 
Pak also wrote of the need for "a joint rule of 
government, shared by the monarch and the subj ects," and 
suggested the setting up of a system of elected Assembly and 
elected officials at the local and regional levels as a 
concrete measure for popular participation in government. 65 
He also called for the encouragement of newspapers and 
political parties as forum for the expression of public 
opinion. 66 In addition to these, he also argued the concept 
of equality of classes and between the genders, and proposed 
the banning of concubinage, freedom of choice in marriage, 
and the remarriage of widows. 67 More importantly and more 
related to this study, he mentioned about the role of law in 
64 Chandra, supra note 25 at 50: more details about Pak's memorial, see 
Chon Bong-duk, Pak Young-hyo wa ku ui sangso susul [An Introduction to 
Pak Young-hyo and his memorial] (1978) and also, Young-ick Lew, The 
Reform Efforts and Ideas of Pak Young-hyo, 1894-1885, in Korean Studies, 
Vol. 1 (Honolulu Center For Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, 1977). 
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a limited monarchy. According to Pak, the purpose of law 
was to "regulate the interrelationship of human beings with 
a view to creating a just society and preventing evil." 68 
He also called for open, fair and speedy trials; and for the 
right of all accused to have access to attorneys and to all 
evidence helpful to their case. 69 Al though he did not go 
into detail, he also asserted equal rights and equal 
education for women. 
Meanwhile, during 1883-1884, Yu Kil-jun, was in the 
united States, studying, traveling, and developing his 
insights about the world. Upon his return to Korea, he 
decided to write a book on the uses of an enlightened spirit. 
His book titled "Seoyu kyunmun [Observations from a Journey 
to the West] contains much about political systems, 
international law, commerce, technology, education, and so 
on, advocating that Korea strive for modernization on the 
model of Western civilization. 7o 
In Chapter IV People's Rights of Seoyu kyunmun, he 
a~)serted that "individual's freedom and rights were 
66 Chandra, supra note 25 at 50. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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unalienable; all men should be allowed to enjoy such freedom 
and rights equally; and such freedoms were unalterable, 
undeniable, and unrestricted." 71 He listed the content of 
the inherent rights, such as right to enjoyment of life and 
liberty, property rights, right to assembly and religion, 
right to freedom of speech, and right to reputation. 72 
Furthermore, he mentioned about the presidential system of 
which he was not in favor, insisting that "the real purpose 
of the establishment of a government must be in favor of the 
people's will; therefore, that government must exist for the 
people, on itself of the people and by the people.,,73 
Upon returning home in 1895 after majoring in medicine 
and obtaining American citizenship, Jae-pil Suh (Philip 
Jasion) began to publish a newspaper, the TongNip Shinmun 
[the Independence Newspaper], which was instrumental in 
promoting Korea's national interest while under Japanese 
oppression. 74 The Tongnip Shinmun inspired Korean with the 
spirit of national independence, nationalism, and 
democracy. 75 with writing series of articles in that paper, 
70 Lee, 
71 
supra note 11 at 297,298. 
72 
Kim, supra note 34, at 12. 
Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Suh, 
75 
supra note 9, at 266. 
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Jae-pil Suh insisted upon the adoption of the Western style 
of democracy: for instance, general election, local autonomy, 
national parliament, separation of powers, and right to due 
process of law. 76 In 1896, Jae-pil Suh founded the 
Independence Club, which was the first and most active 
organization to secure the nation's independence and the 
rights of the people. The leading figures of the 
Independence Club included Kil-jun Yu and Chi-ho Yun, and 
with Jae-pil Suh these three leaders seem to have developed 
a friendly attitude toward American culture because they 
studied in America and received support from Americans. One 
of the main goals of the Club was to initiate a popular 
rights movement as a means of bringing about wider 
participation in the political process. 77 For this, the 
Club called for the right of the individual to the security 
of his person and property, the rights of free speech and 
assembly, the full equality of all people, and doctrine of 
the sovereignty of the people. Furthermore, the Club 
proposed the King to convert the Privy Council [ChungChu 
Won] into a parliamentary assembly. 78 In these respects, 
the Independence Club in effect had started a movement for 
political democracy for the first time in Korea. 
76 K' 77 lID, supra note 34, at 12, 13. 
Lee, supra note 11, at 304. 
46 
There had been also some Americans who had traveled to 
Korea and devoted themselves to work for the development of 
the Korean legal culture during this period. These advisors 
include Judge Owen N. Denny, Charles W. LeGendre, and 
General Clarence W. Greathouse. 79 
8. Summary 
During the forty-four years of King Kojong's reign 
including the period of the Taewongun's regent, the Kingdom 
drifted from an isolated "Hermit Kingdom" into a modern 
state by establishing treaty relations with Japan and the 
Western powers. The United States was the first Western 
country that established diplomatic relations with the 
Kingdom. As mentioned earlier, the primary purpose of the 
United States in the Treaty 1882 was commercial rather than 
political which was more important to the Kingdom, because 
the King and his followers believed that they needed the 
political ally who could protect the independence of the 
78 
Lee, supra note 11, at 304. 
7q K' lm, supra note 34, at 14; Ahn, supra note 33 at 71. For details 
about these advisors' activities, see Yur-Bok Lee, Korean-American 
Diplomatic Relations, 1882-1905, in One Hundred Years of Korean-American 
Relations, 1882-1982, 31-34 (Yur-Bok Lee & Wayne Patterson ed., 1986) ; 
Chong-Ko Choi, On the Reception of Western Law in Korea, Korean J. Compo 
L. 122 (1981); Young I. Lew, American Advisor in Korea: 1885-1894; Young 
I. Lew, The United States And Korean-American Relations, 1866-1876 
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Kingdom from the Western or Eastern imperialists, 
particularly from Japan's intrusion. 
In addition to this sovereignty issue, many young 
progressive intellectuals, like Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Young-hyo, 
Yu Kil-jun and Suh Jae-pil, who learned the western values 
of democracy that eventually they admired so much for the 
nation's reform, had great efforts to plant those ideas into 
the very resistant soil, the Hermi t Kingdom. After they 
learned the Western ideas of democracy from Japanese 
references which Japanese intellectuals had translated into 
Japanese, some of them had actually been to America and 
exposed them to new and pioneering ideas that the Kingdom 
might import as quickly as she could. 
Even though their efforts seem to have less influenced 
than they expected, it might be considered as the first 
endeavor to adopt the western version of democracy, 
particularly that of American's, and, more importantly, 
their efforts had played very valuable roles to link the 
ancient Confucian Monarchy to the modernizing democratic 
nation in spite of the Japanese interruption. 
(1979); Robert Ray Swartout, Madarins, Gunboats And Power Politics: Owen 
Nickerson Denny And The International Rivalries in Korea (1980). 
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C. THE DARK ERA: Under Japanese annexation (1910-1945) 
In 1910, when Japan finally annexed 
the Korea, 
influence of America on Korea started to decrease, and 
because of its ties with Japanese Empire, the United States 
did little to give political support for the people of 
Korea's independence movement. However, the Korean movement 
for independence often combined nationalist preoccupations 
with American notions of 
constitutionalism and 
Christianity. 80 Although official government 
envoys 
retreated from Korea, American missionaries, educators, and 
philanthropists remained, and their works were 
very 
successful. During this period, even though Korea did not 
look to American law, Korea's legal system had developed for 
Japan's exploi tati ve purposes, two important instances of 
influences of American constitutionalism are found: that is, 
Korean Declaration of Independence of March 1, 1919 and the 
Constitutional Charter of the Provisional Government. In 
this part, therefore, the above two constitutional documents 
will be discussed. 
80 
. Lawrence W. Beer, The Influence of American Constitutionalism in Asia, 
In American Constitutionalism Abroad: Selected Essays in Comparative 
Constitutional History, 127 (George Athan Billias ed., 1990). 
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1. The March First Movement and the Korean 
Declaration of Independence 
In August 22, 1910, Prime Minister Yi Wan-yong and 
Japanese Resident-General Terauchi Masatake formulated the 
terms of the annexation treaty and secured the Prime 
Minister's signature on it. 81 Finally, on August 29, 1910, 
sunjong, the son of the King Kojong, was forced to issue a 
proclamation giving up both his throne and his country. 
Thus, the Korean nation, against the will of its entire 
people, was handed over to the harsh colonial rule of Japan. 
a. The March First Independence Movement 
After Japanese annexation of Korea, patriotic Korean 
launched an independence movement against Japanese colonial 
rule. Their organized activities were strengthened in 1919 
with the outburst of the March First Independence Movement 
against Japanese colonial rule, which led to the birth of 
the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, China. 
Koreans in the United States gathered at Independence Hall 
in Philadelphia to declare Korean independence. The 
ideological underpinning of the March First Movement was the 
principle of "self-determination of peoples" proclaimed by 
50 
American President Woodrow Wilson. 82 On 11 February of 1918 
Wilson clarified his thoughts of "self-determination of 
peoples" in his notes to the German and Austrian Foreign 
Ministries, in which he said: "National aspirations must be 
respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by 
their consent.,,83 Unfortunately, however, it just intended 
to liberate the people who had been victimized by the 
Germans; thus, it was a fatal flaw in the otherwise 
reasonable expectation of Korean patriots that 
their 
country's independence was to be restored.
84 
The March First Movement began with the promulgation of 
Independence, which also called "Kimi Toklip Suneun [The 
Korean Declaration of Independence 1919]," signed by the 
thirty-three representatives of the Korean people. Of the 
thirty-three leaders of the March First Movement, sixteen 
were Christians, fifteen were followers of Chundoism, and 
two were Buddhists. Thus the majority of the leaders were 
Christians, who apparently were influenced by American 
81 Lee, supra note 11 at 313. 
82 Suh, supra note 9 at 9; The Korean independence movements were 
s rongly influenced by World War I and the Russian Revolution. " t 
Inspiration was provided by the calls for "self-determination of 
peoples" by Woodrow Wilson and by Lenin and Trotsky, in a new era that 
presumably was to be marked by brotherhood, justice, and peace." Robert 
T. Oliver, A History of the Korean People in Modern Times, 1800 to the 
Present, 126 (1993). 
83 Id. 
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missionaries.8s The opening lines of the Korean Declaration 
of Independence read as follows, in a translation made 
shortly after the event: 
We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the 
liberty of the Korean people. We tell it to the world 
in witness of the equality of all nations and we pass 
it on to our posterity as their inherent right. We 
make this proclamation, having back of us five thousand 
year of history and twenty millions of a united loyal 
people. We take this step to insure to our children, 
for all time to come, personal liberty in accord with 
the awakening consciousness of this new era. This is 
the clear leading of God, the moving principle of the 
present age, the whole human race's just claim. It is 
something that cannot be stamped out, or stifled, or 
gagged, or suppressed by any means. 86 
The Korean Declaration of Independence declared the 
principles of the right of a people to its own national 
existence and of the equality of all mankind. The Korean 
Declaration of Independence called for "freedom and equality 
in words echoing the American Declaration of 
Independence. "87 The March First Movement with the Korean 
Declaration of Independence became a national ideology, 
namely Sam-I] Minjok Jungsin [National Spirit of March 
B4 Suh, supra note 9 at 9. 
B5 
Dong Shu Bark, The American Educate Elite in Korean Society, in Suh, 
supra note 9 at 268. For more details about American missionary's 
activities in Korea during Japanese colonial rule, see Wi Jo Kang, 
Relations between the Japanese Colonial Government and the American 
Missionary Community in Korea, 1905-1945, in One Hundred Years of 
Korean-American Relations, 1882-1982, 68 (Yur-Bok Lee & Wayne Patterson 
ed., 1986) B6 • 
Lee, Supra note 11 at 342. 
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First J • Not only did this Movement intend to achieve the 
independency of Korea, but also it aspired the nation to 
transform from the ancient status into the modernizing state. 
Thus, this movement must be also recognized as the national 
movement for the creation of a modern state,88 because the 
Declaration did not call for restoring the old Monarchy but 
for establishing the modernizing system of a democratic 
republic. Through the organizational framework of the 
Independence Movement, the former leadership classes were 
more or less excluded, and this was a development of genuine 
promise for the founding of a pluralistic society. 89 The 
movement was a new channel to the leadership. It had the 
advantages of the fluid society: new men, new ideas, and new 
forms moving up in a period of modernization. 90 
The ideas of the March First Movement were those of 
Korean independence, nationalism, and democracy, but these 
ideals can be traced to the ideas which Kil-jun Suh and the 
Independence Club had brought from America in the later 
Chosun period. 91 Dr. Gregory Henderson noted: "The Movement 
marked the first national response to a Western idea and, 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------87 
88 Beer, supra note 55 at 127. 
Young-Sao Kim, Daehanminkuk Yimsijoungboo Hunbopron [A study for the 
~onstitution of the Korean De-facto Government] 183, 184 (1980). 
Gregory Henderson, Korea The Politics of the Vortex, 84 (1968). 
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Bark, supra note 62 at 268, 269. 
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to Koreans, it is the cornerstone of their national politics 
one of the few events of their history in which pride is 
shared and closely felt. For the first time they were 
united behind an idea, not fragmented by competition for the 
" 92 same power. He also indicated that "because of the role 
of Christianity in education and in the Movement, girl 
students and women played their parts in the organization, 
taking their places popularly for the first time on the 
national political stage.,,93 
Al though suppression and complete failure to achieve 
independence led to a sense of disappointment, the movement 
remained in many ways a success. Most importantly, the 
spirit of the March First Movement with the Declaration of 
Independence symbolized the Korean democracy and had great 
influence on the creation of the Republic of Korea and its 
Constitution. The primary ideas of the Declaration of 
Independence, such as the theory of inherent rights, 
equali ty, and ideology of democratic republic, which were 
apparently the influences of the Western democratic ideas -
mostly from the American constitutionalism -, still remained 
92 Henderson supra note 64 at 82. 
93 Id. ' 
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the current Constitution of the Republic of Korea as 
fundamental Korean constitutionalism. 94 
b. The Creation of the Exile Provisional Government 
of the Republic of Korea 
Since it is recognized, particularly by those leaders 
of the March First Movement, that it was urgent for Korean 
people to establish a unifying organization for the 
independency, several different provisional governments were 
established both inside and outside Korea in the immediate 
wake of the March First Movement: those are, Daehan Kukmin 
Hoei [the Assembly for Korean People] in Russia, Chosun 
Minkuk Imsi Chungbu [De-facto Government of Korea] in China, 
SangHae Imsi Chungbu [Shanghai De-facto Government] in 
Shanghai, China, Shinhan Minkuk Chungbu [New Korean 
Government] in China, and Hansung Chungbu [Government in 
Seoul] in Seoul. Daehan Kukmin Hoei was joined into 
Shanghai De-facto Government with amending the 
Constitutional Charter of the Shanghai De-facto Government, 
and then, in April 1919, the latter and Hansung Government 
94 The Preamble of the Constitution states that "[W]e the people of 
~orea, proud of a resplendent history and traditions dating from time 
~mmemorial, upholding the cause of the Provisional Republic of Korea 
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united into the Taehan Minkuk Imsi Chungbu [the Provisional 
Government of the Republic of Korea, hereinafter "the 
provisional Government"] in Shanghai, China. Thus, since 
then the year of 1919 was called "the first year of the era 
of the Republic of Korea," and the Provisional Government 
had represented the Korean people until 1945 when Korea 
restored its independency. The Provisional Government 
consisted of a deliberative organ and an administrative 
organ, and, importantly , it was formed in accordance with 
the principles of democracy for the first time in Korean 
history. 
As mentioned in the preceding Part, the Provisional 
Government of the Republic of Korea was established with the 
amendment to the Constitutional Charter of Shanghai De-facto 
Government in April 1919, and that Constitution became the 
First Constitution of the Provisional Government. The 
Constitution of the Provisional Government was amended four 
times, until Korea restored its independency and established 
the First Constitution of Republic of Korea in 1948. 
Government born of the March First Independence Movement of 1919 and 
Gisbert H. Flanz ed, Constitutions of The Countries of the World, Vol. X, 
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III. OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTON OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA WITH 
INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
A. BRIEF REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLES 
In order to understand the influence of United States 
constitutionalism to Korea, one might first find out what 
the United States' constitutional doctrines have been 
recognized and further how theses doctrines have spread many 
countries. Each country has a distinctive constitutional 
history and culture, but the Untied States is the 
contributor to constitutionalism in many countries specially 
those who liberated from colonial rules after World War II. 
As mentioned earlier, the Declaration of Independence, the 
Constitution of the United States, other documents such as 
Federalist Paper, and judicial decisions have been affected 
modern statecraft and legalism. 95 
What are American constitutional doctrines or 
characteristics? And what specific doctrines have been 
planted in Korea? According to Professor Lawrence W. Beer, 
American constitutional doctrines include the following: (1) 
a single (written) document national constitution, usually 
95 
Beer, Supra Note 55 at 113 
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with a preamble of guiding principles, as a means of fusing 
ideas with law and governmental institutions; (2) a listing 
of constitutional rights defended by independent courts; (3) 
the idea of a constitution as "the supreme law of the land"; 
(4) a constituent or constitutional assembly with authority 
to develop a basis law which legitimizes independent 
statehood, a revolution, or some other form of major 
sociopolitical change; and (5) the concept of the separation 
of powers. 96 
In addition to the above five elements, the followings 
also recognize American constitutional influences to Korea; 
(6) presidential government system which always adopted as 
government system during the changes of Korean constitution 
except for only the Second Republic Constitution; (7) a 
rigorous amendment process; and (8) presidential election 
process, popular and competi ti ve election. However, the 
above eight elements have not been always adopted for nine 
Korean Constitutions. 
96 Beer, Supra Note 55 at 114. And also see, Ahn, Supra Note 34 at 73, 
Professor Ahn adds more elements to this list including follows: a 
rigorous amendment process; and free, popular and competitive elections, 
decided through secret balloting by all citizens. 
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In this chapter, therefore, I present the changes of 
Korean constitutional law from the establishment of the 
Republic of Korea that also established the first 
consti tution to the current constitution which amended in 
1987 with the aspect of political changes as well as social 
changes. 
B. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA 
(USAMGIK) AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTION OF 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
After World War II, when Japan surrendered to the 
Allies and many colonial Asian countries liberated, the 
United States has affected constitutionalism in these Asian 
countries and South Korea was one of them. The United 
States occupied South Korea and encouraged democratic change 
by their consultation of America's constitutional experience. 
However, in fact this America's efforts and encouragement 
were not carrying out according to what American expected 
because of the heavy influence of Japanese legal 
institutions on Korea during 35 years of occupation period, 
the resistance against USAMGIK's policies from left-wing and 
struggle between the left and right-wing. Furthermore, 
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since America only occupied South Korea not North Korea, the 
desire of Korean's unification was also the key factor of 
this unsatisfied American's effort. 
The main reason of Korean division after liberation 
from Japan was due to the several decisions of the Allies' 
meeting, and particularly due to President Roosevelt's two 
aims as the leader of the Allied coalition which were to 
win World War II and to establish postwar conditions that 
would lead to lasting peace. 97 Moreover, after Pearl 
Harbor attack, President Roosevelt sought a plan that would 
bring the Soviet Russia into the Pacific War and for that 
he felt it was necessary to accept Russia's entrance into 
both Eastern Europe and Korea. 
A result of the meeting in Cairo, in late November 1943, 
President Roosevelt, the British Prime Minister Churchill, 
and Prime Minister of China Chiang Kaishek proposed that 
they issue a promise that "Korea shall be free and 
independen t . " 98 In February 1945, when the three leaders 
met at Yalta, President Roosevelt offered a policy guide 
97 Robert T. Oliver, Transition and Continuity in American-Korean 
Relations in the Postwar Period in Korea and The United States: A 
Century of Cooperation, edited by Youngnok Koo & Dae-Sook Suh, 91 
(1984 ) 
98 Id. 
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which include the startling proposition: "The position of 
the Soviet Union n the Far East is such that it would seem 
advisable to have Soviet representation on an interim 
international administration of Korea regardless of whether 
or not the Soviet Union enters the war in the Pacific." 99 
Later, at the Potsdam Conference, in July 1945, President 
Harry Truman agreed that northern Korea might be occupied by 
Russian troops and that a four-power trusteeship should be 
established over the peninsula. 100 Two months later, when 
the Allied leaders met in a conference in Moscow, the 
discussion concerning Korea erupted in bitter disagreement. 
Nevertheless, the trusteeship plan was announced, on 
December 27. Korean nationalists regarded the trusteeship 
announcement as "a shocking fact that stems from an 
erroneous perception of Korean realities and ignores the 
people's will.,,101 It was so obvious that this trusteeship 
plan was not acceptable for Korean because it regarded as 
another colonial rule and historically this trusteeship plan 
tUrned out to be fatally flawed. 102 Through sturdy 
resistance its patriot leaders defeated the trusteeship plan, 
99 01' lver, Supra note 97 at 91 
100 Id 
101 Id 
102 Id 
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but they were not able to end the division of Korean 
peninsula. 
On September 7 , 1945, General Douglas MacArthur 
proclaimed that the areas below 38 degrees North and the 
people residing there were under the military administration 
of the United States. On the very next day, the United 
States Army landed on the Korean peninsula below the 38 th 
parallel to disarm the Japanese armed forces while the 
Soviets already entered northern Korea for the same purpose. 
From that moment, even if Korea did attain liberation from 
Japan, another colonial period started under the direction 
and control of the United States of America. 
1. The Period of the United States Military 
Government in Korea (1945-1948) 
From 1945 to 1948, United States Military Government in 
South Korea (hereinafter "USAMGIK") ruled the southern part 
of Korean peninsula directly through ordinances, while the 
Soviet Union controlled the northern part of Korea through 
Kim Il-Sung. Dr. Robert T. Oliver, who was a counselor for 
the First President of Korea and personally involved in 
63 
Korean affairs during the USAMGIK period, noted about 
USAMGIK's activities as follows; 
The American Military Government in South Korea 
was marked by goodwill and good intentions but also by 
futili ty and ineffectiveness. Very evident was the 
determination of the United States to end the USAMGIK 
as soon as possible and to withdraw from the peninsula, 
and from involvement in Korean affairs, ... The feelings 
and attitudes of its personnel were strangely mixed, 
ranging from "We like you and want to help you" to "We 
dislike being here and we want to leave you as soon as 
we can." The result was confusion and uncertainty.l03 
As Dr. Oliver's notes, Koreans reactions toward 
USAMGIK's attitudes were also strangely mixed, ranging from 
"We like you and want you to help us" to "We dislike you 
being here and we want you to leave as soon as possible." 
This confusion was mostly due to the struggles and tensions 
between left-wing and right-wing, Communists and Anti-
communists. 
During the period of the USAMGIK, essential values of 
American democracy were introduced to Korea. The USAMGIK 
sought to "nurture a political democracy in South Korea 
modeled after the United States." The American Occupation 
led by Lt. General John R. Hodge had four goals: to remove 
the Japanese, to prepare the Koreans for self-government, to 
103 
Oliver, supra note 57 at 169. 
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rebuild the economy, and to establish an effective 
. t 104 democratlc governmen . 
Once USAMGIK was set up on September 7, 1945, it 
started issuing the ordinances which had same legitimate 
authority as the legislation. One hundred forty one 
ordinances had been issued before the South Korean Interim 
Government was established and. the Korean Interim 
Legislative Assembly (hereinafter "KILA" ) given the 
legislative function. However, even though KILA passed only 
12 pieces of legislation, USAMGIK still continued to issue 
the ordinances and it totaled 211 by the end of Military 
Government. 105 
On October 9, 1945, the USAMGIK promulgated Ordinance 
No. 11, providing that "As of today all the laws and decrees 
with legal authority shall be rescinded if their judicial 
and administrative applications result in discriminations 
because of race, nationality, creeds, or political 
104 
Beer, supra note 55, at 128: The State Department declared at August 
1946 that "The fundamental objectives of occupation policy ... aim, simply, 
toward '" the eventual reconstruction of political life ... on a peaceful 
and democratic basis." Reprinted in E. Grant Meade, American Military 
Government in Korea 7 (1951). 
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l ' f ,,106 be le s. To achieve this, USAMGIK tried to de-Japanize 
Korean law by replacing Japanese influences with American 
law. As a start, USAMGIK administration repealed many 
notorious colonial laws, such as the Sedition Law, the 
Poli tical Crimes Law, the Preventive Arrest Law, and the 
publication Act, promulgated by the Japanese regime. 107 
The USAMGIK contributed to the introduction of basic 
ideas of American democracy and constitutionalism. As 
mentioned earlier, although American constitutionalism such 
as the theory of inherent rights and equality already had 
been brought into the late nineteenth century Korea by 
Koreans educated in America, American missionaries, and 
teachers, most Koreans learned the meaning of constitutional 
democracy and the doctrine of separation of powers for the 
first time in history during the Occupation. lOB However, the 
American influence over Korea's constitutional fate had been 
limited. As Lawrence W. Beer indicated, there had been two 
inhibited factors over occupation efforts at democratic 
reform from the beginning of the occupation. First, "[TJ he 
assumption that, unlike Japan, Korea was a liberated ally 
106 , Ordlnance No. 11 § II. 
107 
Tscholsu Kim & Sang Don Lee, The Influence of U.S. Constitutional Law 
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303,304 (Lawrence Bed., 1991) . 
66 
and therefore had to bear the onus for creating a new 
democracy, however impossible that task might be under the 
circumstances; and secondly, the lack of planning, personnel, 
knowledge, and political stability, and the absence of a 
unified and complaining populace and a preexisting 
indigenous government." 109 For instance, regarding the 
second factor, "a severe shortage of legal professionals 
further exacerbated the difficulties of developing a 
coherent tradition of rights protection and constitutional 
government under law." 110 Furthermore, not one Korean law 
specialist who might be able to serve for the USAMGIK 
existed in the U.S. 
In spite of those obstacles, the USAMGIK did attempt to 
establish habeas corpus and other fundamental rights, 
promulgating series of ordinance which had a strong flavor 
of American constitutionalism. 111 For example, on March 20, 
1948, the USAMGIK amended the Criminal Procedure Act, 
providing that no one could be arrested without a warrant 
issued by a judge, and that the accused persons were 
1(8 Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 304. 
109 Beer, supra note 55 at 128. 
110 Id. "In 1945, only eight out of 120 prosecutors, 46 out of 235 
judges and an estimated 195 qualified lawyers in the South were 
K1oreans." See, Henderson, supra note 64 at 17. 
11 For details about those ordinances, see Kim, supra note 34 at 22-28, 
in Korean; see, Kyu Ho Youm, Press Law in South Korea, 37-44 (1996) in 
English: Henderson, supra note 64 at 151-162. 
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guaranteed the right to legal counsel. 112 Moreover, the 
USAMGIK promoted gender equality in political and family 
affairs, which led to give women right to vote before the 
national election held on May 10, 1948. 113 Ordinance No.126 
provided that "[A]ll public officials and Members of 
National Assembly shall be elected by universal and equal 
ballot by the citizens regardless gender. ul14 
However, the most important proposition taken by 
USAMGIK for Korean democracy and civil rights was the 
"Ordinance on the Rights of the Korean People u on April 4, 
1948, near the end of its three-year rule. Professor 
Tscholsu Kim, a leading constitutional law scholar, wrote: 
Probably the most significant measure taken by the 
U. S . Military Administration for Korean civil rights 
was "The Ordinance on the Rights of the Korean People u 
issued by General Hodge on April 7, 1948. The 
Ordinance consisted of twelve Articles guaranteeing the 
freedom of religion (Article 10) , assembly and 
association, expression and publication (Article 8), 
and the rights to legal counsel, to speedy and fair 
trial (Article 6 & 7), and to equal protection under 
the law (Article 1). It also prohibited torture and 
deprivation of freedom or property without due process 
of law (Article 3 & 4). These precious principles were 
obviously derived from the basic doctrines of the 
Consti tution of United States. The principles 
enumerated in this Ordinance had a consequential impact 
upon the political leaders of Korea who were preparing 
112 K' lID & Lee, supra note 73 at 304. 
113 
1 Id.; Ordinance No. 126, 
14 0 d' 
26. 
r lnance No. 126. Reprinted and translated in Kim, supra note 34 at 
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the nation for independence. 115 [the number of Article 
added. ] 
It included major liberties found in the American Bill 
of Rights, but the exercise of those rights was limited by 
the Article 12, providing that "those rights may be 
restricted temporary only when necessary for national 
emergency or for public welfare. ul16 However, "it was meant 
to be an American gift to the Koreans legal system. u117 
2. The Establishment of the Constitution of Republic 
of Korea 
On June 30, 1947, a special committee for drafting the 
laws for preparing the inauguration the Republic of Korea 
was organized and then in the autumn of that year a 
Subcommittee started his job to draft a constitution for the 
new republic. Since the Constitution Drafting Committee 
lacked much expertise, it relied heavily on Dr. Chin-o Yu's 
Draft. 118 Dr. Yu preferred European to American law and 
115 
Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 305. 116 
Reprinted in Kim, supra note 34 at 28. 117 
118 Ahn, supra note 33 at 73. 
It is also known that Colonel Emery J. Woodall, the legal officer of 
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constitution for guidance, but it seems that "The Ordinance 
on the Rights of the Korea People" was very helpful for him 
d ft the provl' Sl' ons for l' ndl' Vl' dual rl' ghts. 119 to ra In Dr. 
Yu's original version of the Draft, a bicameral 
parliamentary system with cabinet responsibility was 
considered as the governmental system for new republic, but 
during the deliberation of the new Constitution, Syngman 
Rhee, who was at that time virtually the only candidate for 
President, force the cabinet-centered system to be changed 
to a presidential system and unicameral legislature. 12o 
Therefore, the draft Constitution of the subcommittee 
featured a unique mixture of the presidential and 
parliamentary systems of government. It provided for a 
bicameral legislature, and for a president elected by the 
legislature. As the prime minister under the parliamentary 
system, the president was given the power to dis sol ve the 
legis la t ure, and on the other hand, the legi s la t ure could 
cast a vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet headed by the 
Premier. 121 Also, the Supreme Court had the power to declare 
unconstitutional and void laws found to be in conflict with 
tbr:: Constitution. 122 But as it turned out, bicameralism and 
119 I d, 
Youn, supra note 19 at 96, 97, 
Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 305, 
Id, 
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judicial were not adopted by the National Assembly, and a 
strong presidency became the basis of the government's 
structure at the insistence of Syngman Rhee. 
Professor Dae-Kyu Youn indicated two problems of this 
unique deliberation "first, the shift from parliamentary 
system to presidential system was based not on any 
consideration of principles or any long-term effect, but on 
short-term interest of ensuring the presidency for one 
individual; second, the first Constitution failed to 
accommodate the views of political forces favoring a 
government whose purpose was to unify the North and 
South. ,,123 
On May 10, 1948, for the first time in Korea history, 
national elections for the unicameral National Assembly were 
held under the auspices of the United Nations. On July 12, 
1948, the National Assembly finally passed the draft 
Constitution, and the Constitution of the Republic of Korea 
took effect on July 17, 1948. The National Assembly also 
elected Dr. Syngman Rhee as the first President of the 
Republic of Korea. 
123 
Yoon, supra note 19 at 97. 
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As the record of American Constitution represents the 
American history, the record of Korean Constitution portrays 
the unstableness and complexity of modern Korean history. 
Since the establishment of the first constitution in 1948, 
the Constitution of the Republic of Korea has been changed 
nine times, an average of almost once every five years. 
This frequent constitutional changes recognize as one of the 
most negative characters and have come about largely through 
abnormal extensions of the presidential term of office, 
often In conj unction with the exercise of martial law. 124 
Those constitutional changes have usually accompanied with 
major political incident (i.e., Coup or nation-wide protest). 
As Dr. Gregory Henderson indicated, despite of an 
accompaniment to her sensational economic and kaleidoscopic 
social revolutions, "the search for constitutional and 
political identity of Korea still lurches" on fifty years 
later. 125 
124 
Yoon, supra note 26 at 400. Professor Yo on also summarizes other 
facts of constitutional changes in Korea: Executive Dominance over the 
Legislature; Passivity in Judicial Review; and Neglected Civil Rights. 
125 Gregory Henderson, Consti tutional Changes from the First to the Sixth 
Republics: 1948-1987, in Political Change in South Korea, 23 (Ilpyoung J. 
Kim & Young Whan Kihl ed., 1988). 
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This Chapter analyzes the record of constitutional 
changes with several historical facts since the inauguration 
of the Republic of Korea, as follows: 
(1) the rapid economical development and 
underdevelopment of constitutionalism; 
(2) the tension between the authoritarian regime and 
peoples' pro-democracy movement; 
(3) the "Red Threat (anti-communism)," as the pretext 
of the neglected Civil Rights; and 
(4) the continuing influences of American democracy in 
theory, but America's silent approval of the military 
dictatorship in reality. 
a. Influence of the U.S. Constitution on Individual 
Liberties 
As mentioned earlier, "The Ordinance on the Rights of 
Korean People" issued by General Hodge had a very strong 
infl uenced on the drafting of the individual rights 
provisions of the Constitution of 1948. Thanks to this very 
significant contribution of American concepts of individual 
rights to the drafting process, the constitutions of the 
Republic of Korea have conserved precious principles of 
individual liberties, such as the freedoms of religion, and 
the freedoms of speech and assembly, the right of habeas 
Corpus, the right to a fair trial, and equal protection of 
all citizens under the law. 
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Rights were listed in Chapter II as equality before the 
law, freedom of domicile, freedom from trespass and unlawful 
search, freedom of private correspondence, the freedom of 
speech, press, assemble and association, the right of 
property, equal opportunity of education, the equality of 
men and women and so on. 126 Listed liberties were guaranteed 
"except in accordance with law," and "with the provisions of 
law." Article 28 provided that "laws imposing restrictions 
upon the liberties and rights of citizens shall be enacted 
only when necessary for the maintenance of public order or 
the welfare of the community." A problem of this 
restriction was that such "necessaries leave to strong 
executi ve opinion. 127 This restriction always adopted in 
Korean constitutional amendments in more severe ways or more 
relaxed ways. Hence, I will discuss this issue in later of 
this chapter. 
b. Presidential Government and Legislature 
The discussion about which governmental system might be 
appropriate to Republic of Korea has always been a 
Controversial issue in politics as well as in the 
126 
Gregory Henderson, Human Rights in South Korea 1945-1953, in Shaw ed., 
supra note 21 at 148. 
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constitutional academia. It has been suspicious whether the 
adoption of the American style of the presidential system in 
the Constitution of 1948 caused only by Syngman Lee's 
obstinacy. However, it is not difficult to understand why 
syngman Lee and USAMGIK preferred the presidential system. 
Professor Tscholsu Kim explained about Syngman Rhee's biased 
ideas toward the United States as follows; 
"Syngman Rhee had been educated at Princeton University 
and had spent a long time in Hawaii; as a result, he 
became a staunch believer in American constitutionalism. 
He was , quite simply, more comfortable with a 
presidential government like that of America than with 
a parliamentary system. As he did not have many 
followers in Korea at that time, he surely might have 
thought he had no chance to be an effective leader 
wi thin the framework of parliamentary government 
favored by most Korean politicians. Dr. Rhee was 
finally successful in getting the support of the U.S. 
Government in early 1948, and thus he could pressure 
the National Assembly to adopt a Constitution for the 
presidential government. ,,128 
However, in order to compromise between Syngman Rhee 
and those politicians who preferred the parliamentary 
government, the actual Constitution of the First Republic 
had several features of cabinet-responsibility system: for 
instance, (1) the Prime Minister was appointed by the 
President upon approval of the National Assembly; (2) the 
National Assembly could request the Prime Minister and 
127 Id. 
128 Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at307. 
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Cabinet Ministers to be present at National Assembly 
sessions for questioning; and (3) the Executives could 
introduce bills in the National Assembly. 
Although the President had relatively strong powers 
under the Constitution of 1948, the legislature was awarded 
considerable powers, including that of overriding a 
presidential veto by two-thirds of a quorum and instituting 
impeachment proceedings against the president and vice-
president, Cabinet members, judges, and other officials 
designated by law when they violated constitutional 
provisions. 129 
c. Judiciary 
USAMGIK promulgated the "Judiciary Organization Law," 
providing that "Courts shall adjudicate civil actions, 
criminal actions, administrative litigation and all other 
legal actions." Hence it appeared that USAMGIK might want 
the new republic to follow the model of American judicial 
system rather than of France or Germany, where the separate 
special court have authority to review the administrative 
litigation. During constitutional drafting, USAMGIK seems 
------------------------129 
Henderson, supra note 93 at 148. 
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to have wanted the Constitution to establish judicial review 
like that in the Oni ted States. However, the Consti tution 
of 1948 adopted French style of constitutional review which 
a special court, namely the Constitutional Commi t tee, had 
the power to review the constitutionality of laws. 
According to Professor Henderson, due to the consistent 
with "Sino-Korean-Japanese tradition, the Judiciary was 
considerably less powerful and independent that the 
legislature. 130 chief For instance, the Justice was 
appointed by the president with the consent of the National 
Assembly for unspecified terms, and other judges were 
appointed by the president for 10 years term. Hence, such 
an unstable situation of judges made them amenable to 
presidential direction. 131 
3. Summary 
Although the influences of American values and ideas of 
democracy and constitutionalism on Korea started from the 
nineteenth century Korea with various ways, the more 
re3listic and practical impact have been found during 
USAMGIK period. Promulgating series of laws and ordinances, 
---------------------130 
Henderson supra note 93 at 148. 
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the U. S. constitutionalism had constructive effect on 
drafting the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. 
Due to the lack of official documents of that period In 
both Korea and the United States, it is considerably 
difficul t to say whether USAMGIK played any important and 
acti ve role in the process of drafting of the Constitution 
of 1948. Nonetheless, however, it is very obvious that the 
American constitutional principles have had a great 
influence on the constitutional development of Korea since 
1948 although Korean consti tutional democracy is "not yet 
mature as its American counterpart. ,,132 
In order to understand Korean constitutional democracy, 
one must be aware of noticeable factors of modern Korean 
history, as Professor William Shaw indicated as follows; 
(1) The decline of Confucianism as a living political 
philosophy (despite residual strength in 
interpersonal relations) that began in the 1880s and 
sharply accelerated after the loss of Korean 
independence in 1910. 
(2) The growing strength, during the same period, of 
alternative philosophical, religious, or political 
traditions and forms of organization, including 
Catholic and Protestant Christiani ty, the Chondogyo 
or "Heavenly Way" Movement, Western liberalism, and 
Marxism. 
(3) The strength in the postwar period of the model of 
mili tari zed government and social control the 
Japanese exercised for thirty-five years to 1945. 
(4) The effects of national division, civil war, and 
the accompanying military tension on the Korean 
-------------------------
132 Kim & Lee, supra note 75 at 309. 
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peninsula since 1945, necessitating large, often 
politically significant military establishments on 
both sides of the 38 th parallel. 133 
In addition to the above historical facts, which I have 
reviewed in this Charter, now we must turn to look at the 
following historical facts in order to understand the 
underdevelopment of constitutional democracy in Korea; 
(1) Korean War and the roles of United Nations; 
(2) In spi te of persistent pro-democracy movement by 
Korean people, how the Military regime in South Korea 
could last for the last five decades; 
(3) The threat of the North Korea's intrusion and 
anti-communism as the primary national policy of 
South Korea; 
(4) Continuing influences of American democracy in 
theory, but its ignorance by military dictatorship's 
arbitrary rule in South Korea in reality; 
(5) Most recently, the inauguration of the first 
democratic government and economic crisis In South 
Korea; and 
(6) Most important ly, the Uni ted States' roles of the 
above modern Korean historical facts 
In the following Charters, the above facts will be discussed 
in order to explain the development of Korean 
Constitutionalism with analyzing the influences of American 
constitutionalism doctrines. 
133 William Shaw, Introduction, in Human Rights in Korea: Historical and 
POlicy Perspectives, 4 (William Shaw ed., 1991). 
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C. The Constitution of the First Republic (1948-1960) 
Syngman Rhee's Regime 
1. First Amendment (July 7, 1952)- "the Excerpt 
Amendment" 
Even though Syngman Rhee preferred American style of 
consti tutionalism and democracy that considered much more 
modernized and even progressive idea, his own ideology and 
thought still seemed that remained the traditional Confucian 
ideology. He preferred the more centralized governmental 
system which he believed it was the presidential government 
with unicameral legislature. He might regard himself as a 
powerful leader of a nation like a King not as a political 
leader in a modernized democratic society. Wi th these hi s 
belief and his strong personality led him to unfortunate and 
imprudent attempt to amend constitution for prolonging his 
time in office. 
In addition to the above, one of the most crucial and 
tragic historical incident happed at June of 1950. It was 
the Korean War that mainly caused the anti-communism even 
though it already started after division of Korean peninsula. 
During next five decades until recent period probably 
until two Koreas reuni te-, this anti-communism has been a 
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dominating national ideology and unfortunately, it has used 
as the pretext of the delayed democracy in South Korea. 
On January 28, 1950, the opposition party introduced a 
constitutional amendment which would have changed the 
presidential system to a clear-cut cabinet responsible 
system. Soon after the bill was barely defeated on March 13, 
1950, President Rhee attempted to pass another amendment 
which would have allowed the President to be elected by 
direct popular vote. The first Constitution in article 53 
provided that the President be elected by the National 
Assembly. However, since the majority in the Assembly at 
that time did not support President Rhee; for instance, the 
Assembly reacted not only by turning down one prime minister 
appointment but by twice passing resolutions for the 
resignation of the cabinet, this proved to be the high-water 
mark of constitutional and Assembly rebellion against 
executive excesses In South Korea. 134 This amendment bill 
also defeated. This unpleasant experience gave the 
President a lesson on how important it was to have the 
majority In the legislature. Rhee reacted by arresting 
sixteen Assemblymen (over 7 percent of the body) and on May 
------------------------
134 Shaw, Supra note 133, at 28 
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14, 1950, he convicted thirteen of them on trumped-up 
charges of communist conspiracy after an outrageously unfair 
. 1 135 trla . Thus the captive judiciary was used to emasculate 
opposition politics and the powers of the legislature. 
popular reaction to Rhee, however, came two weeks later in 
the elections of May 30, 1950, when many Rhee opponents won 
seats, only to be tragically removed into North Korean 
capti vi ty soon afterwards. 136 
Rhee reluctantly decided to form the Liberal Party in 
December 1951. On April 17, 1952, the opposition party 
submitted an amendment bill introducing a parliamentary 
system; the bill already carried 123 signatures, exceeding 
by one the required two-thirds majority. In a countermove 
President Rhee reintroduced its defeated bill, wi th some 
slight revisions - mandating an "easily manipulable popular 
election of the president" combined with a bicameral 
legislature. 137 Since Rhee expected that the opposition 
would have rej ected, the government urged the people to 
recall their representatives, thugs (usually called the 
"Political Mob") were sent to dissenting Assemblymen, some 
of whom were placed under police custody on false charges, 
135 Shaw 
136 ,Supra note 133, at 28 
Id. 
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and martial law was declared and enforced to repress all 
political activity. 138 Finally, at July 4, 1952, Rhee 
submitted an excerpt amendment bill that selected from 
previous Rhee's bill and the opposition's new bill. In this 
sense, the first amendment was called the "Excerpt 
Amendment" as a nickname. The vote was taken in the middle 
of night, in all 166 members standing, under presence of 
military. The amendment was passed without a dissenting 
vote all this at the height of Korean War and in a 
temporary capital where the government had taken refuge in 
Busan. 139 Syngman Lee was reelected the following year. 
The new constitution included several important changes 
as follows; (1) the president elected by the direct popular 
vote not by the Congress; (2) bicameral legislature; and 
(3) the prime minister as a leader of the cabinet appointed 
by the president (but Rhee never appointed one) Since the 
main purpose of this amendment solely was to prolong 
President Rhee's tenure in office, the government barely 
concerned regarding 
constitution. 
Shaw, Supra note 133 at 28. 
Yoon , supra note 19 at 98. 
Id. 
any other provisions in the 
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The process of First Amendment involved a number of 
illegalities and irregularities and, more importantly , it 
must be recognized as unconstitutional procedure itself. 
First, the opposite Assemblymen were forced to vote under 
the presence of military in and outside of the Congress 
without any debate. Second, the mandatory 30 day public 
announcement of a constitutional amendment before it was 
introduced under the Constitution (article 98) was not held. 
It was just a starting-point which the government abused the 
Constitution and democracy for its own stake. 
2. Second Amendment (November 29, 1954) - So called, 
the amendment of "Sleight-of-hand rounding off" 
In order to run for a third term, Syngman Rhee needed a 
consti tutional amendment one more time. In 1954, looking 
ahead to 1956 when his second term was to end, Rhee again 
proposed a constitutional amendment removing the barrier 
against more than two presidential terms. Its defeat by 
two-thirds of a vote was announced on November 27, 1954, but 
reversed the next day by eliminating the fraction through a 
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sleight-of-hand rounding off. 140 The unlimited term for the 
presidency in this amendment was to apply only to the first 
President, Syngman Rhee. Thus, this contradicts the 
principle of democracy, which is the equal rights before the 
law. In constitutional and democratic viewpoint, the 
amendment process was unconstitutional because first, it 
violated the principle of not deliberating the same measure 
twice during the same session of the Assembly and secondly, 
the ruling party applied a mathematical formula that was not 
supposed to use for legal process or constitutional 
amendment process in order to pass the bill when they failed 
to meet the quorum. 141 It literally violated a simple 
democratic rule and Rhee's regime arbitrarily used such a 
rule for prolong their ruling period. 
The Second amendment adopted more American style of the 
presidential system. In the previous constitution, the 
President elected through the direct popular vote appoints a 
prime minister instead of the vice president. However, in 
140 
Henderson, supra note 102 at 28. The day after the defeat the 
government party made a surprising announcement: "It turns out that 
Vice-speaker Choi's announcement that the amendment bill failed to pass, 
Was erroneous. An error was made in counting the votes. The exact 
figure for a two-thirds majority for 203, the total member, is 135.33 .. 
Since a human cannot be a decimal, the required figure should be 135, an 
integer closest to 135.3 ... with the fraction rounded off. The amendment 
is accordingly considered to have passed. See Yoon, supra note 19 at 99. 
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the second amendment, both the president and the vice 
president are elected through the popular vote. Therefore, 
all articles of the prime minister were deleted. The 
articles of economical system that were prescribed as the 
more planned and closed market system changed to the free 
market system. In addition to the extension of term for the 
presidency, the Second Amendment also abolished the local 
autonomy reluctantly implemented from 1952-1958. Since then, 
official down through township chiefs had been appointed 
rather than elected by the local people until 1993 when the 
elections for local autonomy i.e., elections for the 
governors and the representatives for the local legislature 
- were held in almost 30 years. 
As a result, after commencing in 1948 with considerable 
democratic ideals which had already inspired previous 
Koreans drafts from 1919 to 1947, the Korean constitution 
soon was "laid under siege by amendments,. evasions and 
repressive legislation which continued, solidified, extended, 
or centralized the increasingly autocratic power of the 
executive position. If 142 Since the primary purpose of those 
two amendments was to prolong the term of the presidency, it 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------141 
Tschols u Kim, Hunbophakgaeron (The Introduction of Constitution), 52 
(1988) . 
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was generally understood that there had not been any 
significant changes in the other provisions of the 
constitution except for the presidency. As we saw the 
proceeding Chapter, the adoption of American style of the 
presidential government was due to the Syngman Rhee's own 
political covetousness. Therefore, instead of following the 
presidential election process of the U.S., he and his 
followers forced the Constitution Drafting Committee of the 
National Assembly to establish the indirect presidential 
election by the National Assembly. However, when Syngman 
Rhee and his followers found the Assembly was not in favor 
of Rhee, they started abusing the Constitution and democracy. 
Therefore, the main purpose of the First and Second 
Amendment were solely to extend President Rhee's term of the 
presidency and to become more centralized government and 
gradually dictatorial government. 
Since these two acquisitive amendments by the 
authoritarian regime, the following amendments also aimed to 
prolong the rule of the authoritarian regime except for the 
latest amendment which the process and the primary purpose 
of the amendment was relatively more democratic. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------142 
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In diplomatic perspective, the relationship between 
Rhee's regime and the United States government gradually 
changed while Rhee had become authoritarian regime. Since 
Korean liberation from Japanese occupation in 1945, the 
united States did not hesitate to use its enormous influence 
over South Korea for many purposes. 143 The U.S. 
Administration, both Republic and Democratic administrations, 
intervened on a number of occasions to press the autocratic 
Syngman Rhee' s regime. In March 1950, Secretary of State 
Dean G. Acheson reminded the Rhee regime that "u. S. aid, 
both military and economic, to the Republic of Korea has 
been predicated upon the existence and growth of democratic 
institutions within the Republic. ,,144 
However, such pressures could not change the nature of 
Rhee's regime because Rhee might have strong belief in his 
followers and more importantly he could not recognize how 
badly Korean people, particularly students, wanted to enjoy 
freedom and democracy and to remove his regime. Furthermore, 
the O.S. administration did not attempt to act against 
Rhee's regime in order to give them more bona fide pressure. 
--------------------------143 
Cohen & Baker, 173 
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As I discussed above, the oppQsition and many Koreans 
called for amending the Constitution with European style of 
parliamentary system because they strongly believed the 
reason that Rhee became a dictator was due to the 
presidential system. A number of constitutional scholars 
have been skeptical about the success of American style of 
presidential government in Korea, as Professor Tae Yeon Han 
wrote: 
"The American system of presidential government has no 
virtue at all except for the stability and authority of 
the Executive.... Especially in the less-developed 
countries, it surely develops into severe corruption as 
has already been shown in the experience of Latin 
American states. ,,145 
As mentioned earlier, the effort of the presidential 
system of government in Korea had been totally failed: 
however, the constitutional provisions for political and 
civil rights were reinforced and American constitutional 
doctrines on court decisions were frequently mentioned in 
discourse on the Constitution. 146 American constitutional 
law theories also exerted influence in the making of the 
COnstitution of the Second Republic. 
145 
. Tae Yeon Han, Tendency of the Constitution of the Second Republic, in 
SaSangkye [The World of Philosophy], 165-173 (June 1960). 
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D. The Constitution of the Second Republic: The Turn to 
Democracy 
1. Third Amendment (June 15, 1960) 
Between the Second and the Third Amendment, there had 
been significant changes in Korean society. First of all, 
the war was over. The society started a process of 
urbanization and centralization which has proceeded 
relentlessly ever since. 147 Seoul, which had 1,446,000 in 
1949, had 2,445,400 in 1960. Urban population, which had 
been 11.4 percent in 1940, became 33.2 percent by 1960. 
Internal and external communication sort boomed with 
urbanization. The number of college enrollment increased 
almost quadrupling from 1948 to 1960, and an overall 
Ii teracy rapidly was boosted. Seoul became - and remains 
today one of the largest and most violent educational 
centers in the world. These new and rapid social changes 
raised grievances, while sharpening ambition and desire for 
social and pol i tical change. 148 
The presidential election under the Second Amendment 
Were so systematically rigged that popular protest flared in 
146 K' lm & Lee 147 ' 
Henderson, 
supra note 73 at 311. 
supra note 102 at 29. 
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April, 1960 (the April Student Revolution), which eventually 
led to the resignation of the President Rhee. His party and 
Government were also dismantled, it was the end of the First 
Republic of Korea. As a result of the experience with the 
Rhee presidency, it was generally recognized that the 
presidential system of government had been a complete 
failure in Korea. Like Dr Chin-O Yu, who wrote the original 
draft of Consti tut ion in 1948, recalled, "it is the common 
feeling among the people that we should escape from the hell 
of a presidential system and adopt a democratic 
parliamentary system of government. ,,149 
Therefore, the introduction of a parliamentary system 
became the most significant issue during the process of the 
Third Amendment. After several months of interim government, 
the Constitution was amended and the general election was 
held under new constitution on July 29, 1960. 
The Constitution of 1960, the "Constitution of Second 
Republic," adopted a typical cabinet system of government. 
A full cabinet system of government was erected in clauses 
making the President simply "head of State," elected to a 
five-year term by a tow-thirds vote of a now newly-created 
148 
149 Hendersonk, supra note 102 at 29. 
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senate meeting in joint session with a far more powerful and 
numerous House of Representatives. Executive power was 
vested iB a state council headed by a Prime Minister, 
responsible as a body to the House of Representatives. The 
Prime Minister was to be nominated by the President but 
approved by majority vote of the House, which could elect 
him or her in case of a deadlock with the President. The 
stated council had either to resign en bloc if a non-
confidence resolution was passed or it had to dissolve the 
House and call for new elections. All presidential acts 
required prime ministerial countersignature. A majority of 
cabinet members had to be selected from the National 
Assembly. The power to decide on the constitutionality of 
statutes was given to a newly established Constitutional 
Court, a special tribunal modeled after the Federal 
Constitutional Court of West Germany. 
In reaction against the long and extensive violation of 
basic civil rights during Rhee's rule, the 1960 
constitution's rights were made unconditional, all "except 
as provided by law" escape clauses being removed. It must 
be recognized as one of the biggest constitutional 
in Korean history, because that provision, 
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namely the "general restriction of fundamental rights," had 
a great potential to be abused by the authoritarian regime 
for its own political greed. New constitution also 
prescribed the provision for the impartiality of officials 
and police. 
Although the Government of the United States welcomed 
the revival of constitutional democracy in South Korea, an 
American-style governmental structure the Presidential 
system of government was denounced as the origin of 
authoritarianism. However, the constitutional provisions 
for political and civil rights were reinforced and American 
constitutional theories and court decisions were frequently 
mentioned ln discourse on the Constitution. The United 
States' constitutional law doctrines also exerted influence 
in the making of the Constitution of the Second Republic. 
2. Fourth Amendment (November 29, 1960) 
In a much more liberal atmosphere, Korean people 
more freedom and called for a punitive law against 
" . 
• natlonal traitors" (i.e., high ranking officials in the 
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Rhee's regime who had responsible for the fraudulent 
election and the brutal repression against the "April 
student Revolution) Under the pressure of popular demand, 
the new government undertook a constitutional amendment 
allowing legislation for retroactive punishment of those 
guilty of election irregularities, corruption and 
appropriation of public property under the inclusive 
designation of "anti-democratic" acts. Lawyers and legal 
scholars took exception to the proposed amendment on the 
principle prohibiting ex post facto penalty. But the 
people's demand was overwhelming. The Fourth Amendment had 
some virtue in consolidating the results of the "April 
Student Revolution" by tracking down crimes committed under 
the auspices of political power in the past. 150 
.. 150 
E. The Constitution of the Third Republic (1962-1972) 
System based on u.S. Constitutional Principles 
1. Post-war U.S.-Korean Relations To 1972 
Americans not only played the key role in liberating 
from Japanese colonial oppression at the end of World 
Yoon , supra note 19, at 100. 
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War II but also agreed to the Soviet occupation of the 
northern part of the peninsula while U. S. forces occupied 
the southern part. While the Soviet and its Korean 
sympathizers converted the north into a totalitarian 
communist system, the American occupiers taught people 1n 
the south as much about authoritarian practices as about 
democratic principles in the process of bringing order out 
of chaos and creating a government that would be responsive 
to both American interests and ideology. 151 When postwar 
attempts to establish a united government for the entire 
peninsula failed, it was the United States took the 
initiative in establishing the Republic of Korea under U.N. 
auspice in the south while the Communists established the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) in the 
north, thus perpetuating the novel and tragic division of 
the Korean people. 152 
When, following the 1948 withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
the R. o. K., its Communist rival sought to unify the 
peninsula by force in 1950, the United States led the 
foreign coalition that under the UN banner went to the 
------------------------151 
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defense of the R.O.K. At the end of that bloody battle, the 
united States concluded the Mutual Security Treaty of 1954 
with the R.O.K., obligating the United States to corne to the 
defense of South Korea "in accordance with its 
consti tutional process." 153 The United States thereafter 
continued provided military and economic aid to South Korea. 
Moreover, because South Korea was alienated from all its 
neighbors - the Communist regimes that controlled China, the 
Soviet Union and North Korea, and the detested former 
colonial ruler, Japan - and largely isolated from the rest 
of world, the overall American impact upon South Korea was 
immense. 154 Americans not only became the defenders of South 
Koreans but, in trade, investment, politics, cultural life, 
and education, also became their mentors and big brothers. 
From 1948 to 1965, the United States did not hesi ta te 
use its enormous influence over South Korea for many 
Although government under the AMG, 1945-1948, had 
offered only a flawed and ambiguous model of democratic rule, 
after the Republic of Korea established, Washington, under 
Democratic and Republican administrations, intervened 
number of occasions to press the autocratic Syngman 
& Baker, supra note 152 at 172. 
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Rhee to curb some of the worst excesses of his of ten-
arbi trary presidency. 155 However, such pressures could not 
alter the nature of Rhee's government, but they at least 
made clear to the Korean people that the United States did 
not endorse his authoritarianism: hence, the U.S. position 
was surely not an irrelevant factor in the calculations of 
those who overthrew Rhee and gave Korean the only year of 
unrestricted political freedom they had ever known. 156 
With the above respects, it has been very essential for 
the political leaders in South Korea to get a positive 
support from Washington. Neither General Park Chung Hee's 
overthrow of Korea's short-lived democratic government in 
1961, nor the two-stage coup of General Chun 000 Hwan in the 
1981 case, had the legitimately elected President Yun Po Sun 
asked his American ally to suppress the usurpers, the United 
States would probably have done so. Yet, in both instances, 
once the new leaders seized power, the American attitude 
toward them gradually changed from suspicion and hostility 
to unenthusiastic acquiescence to strong support, despite 
th ' , I 157 elr increasingly represslve ru e. Unfort una tely, this 
relationship between two countries has had negative effects 
ISS 
Cohen & Baker, supra note 117 at 173, 
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on South Korea because American support has been 
indispensable to the survival of any government. 
2. Fifth Amendment (December 26,1962): The Turn to 
Military Authoritarianism 
The Second Republic lasted less than a year, as the 
Government led by Prime Minister Myon Chang was fragile. 
Governmental and political processes under the new 
constitution - particularly under the parliamentary system -
were democratic, but they were barely capable to maintain 
social stability. Although the previous opposite party won 
the rnaj ori ty, the party divided the two almost equal 'Old' 
'New' Democratic factions against each other. The 
leader, Dr. Chang Myon, barely emerged prime 
with three votes over the majority. The two 
finally then split two parties with 86 'old' (New 
Party) and 95 'new' (Democratic Party) 
Ssernblymen. 158 This factional split caused instability, 
lays in decision-making and public disenchantment. People 
ent out street again and called for prosecuting the former 
supra note 102 at 31-2. 
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government officials who involved in corruption. Robbery 
and gang terrorism increased citizen apprehension. College 
student attempts in the spring of 1961 to debate North 
Korean students at Panmunjom provoked a conservative 
military group to be ready to pounce on new government. 
The reaction came with a vengeance in the May 16, 1961, 
coup by Maj or General Park Chung-hee, his nephew, Colonel 
Kim Jong-pil, and some 250 officers and 3,500 men from the 
600,000 man armed forces. 159 The Government intimidated and 
overthrown without resistance - was replaced by a military 
junta of 30 colonel and brigadier generals under Maj or-
General Park. 160 A junta, the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction, was set up under martial law to take the 
place of the National Assembly which was immediately 
dissol ved. The Law for Emergency Measures for National 
Reconstruction was formulated to be the highest guidelines 
for the revolutionary regime to manage affairs of state. 161 
The Constitution was allowed to stay in force so far as it 
did not conflict with the emergency law. The entire state 
authority came under the command of the Supreme Council. 
159 
Henderson, supra note 102 at 31-2. 
160 Id. 
99 
On August 12, 1961, General Park, then the Chairman of 
the council, released a statement to the effect that the 
Army would return to the barracks after establishing 
civilian government in the spring of 1963, and that the new 
constitution would provide for a presidential government 
wi th unicameral National Assembly. On July 11, 1962, a 
special Constitution Drafting Committee [consisting of nine 
members and twenty-one advisors] was organized under the 
Supreme Council. The final draft of the Constitution was 
prepared in October 1962, and was submitted to the Council. 
draft was approved of the voters in a special referendum 
December 17, 1962. Professor Tscholsu Kim indicated 
unique points about the process of making the 
Constitution of 1962 as follows; 
"First, professors of constitutional law, 
administrative law and political science played a 
dominant role. Second, as is well known, the Kennedy 
Administration of the U.S. was not very happy with the 
military regime in Korea and wanted a swift transfer of 
political power to a new civilian government. T0ird, 
the U.s. government was very interested in the nature 
of the new Constitution. Indeed, invitations extended 
to two American scholars, Professor Emerson of Yale 
University and Professor Frantz of New York University, 
to visit Korea were taken as a sign that the Korean 
military leaders were sincere In their expressed 
intention to build a democratic regime. It is also now 
known that the eminent diplomat, Philip Habib, then 
Political Attache of the U. S. Embassy at Seoul, was 
1 
: Yoon , supra note 19 at 101. 
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deeply concerned about the nature of the soon-to-be-
born Constitution. ,,162 
Two notable changes, which substantially adopted from 
American Constitutional principles, must be noticed: that is, 
first, the presidential system based on the American 
presidential system was retained, and secondly, a judicial 
review system on the United States model was adopted. These 
are among the most distinctive characteristics of American 
Constitution; hence, it would be fair to say that the 
Constitution of 1962 had more of an "American flavor" that 
its predecessors. 163 
Though the new Constitution aimed to have been followed 
after a democratic principle of the separation of powers, it 
conferred on the executive inordinate powers over the other 
branches. 164 Therefore, there was a risk that the president, 
as head of the ruling party at the same time, would be able 
to manipulate the legislature whenever the ruling party was 
in the majority. 165 However, despite all its problems, 
162 Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 313. 163 Id. 
164 
Yoo n , 165 supra note 19 at 102. Id. 
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according to Professor Youn Dae-kyu, on the whole the new 
constitution was the best so far in the postwar years. 166 
a. The Presidential Government System 
Most constitutional law scholar involved in the 
drafting of the new constitution preferred the presidential 
government. Al though they clearly knew that an American 
style presidential government system was never successful in 
foreign soil, as shown in the Latin American countries, they 
believed South Korea had no other alternative, since the 
prerequisites of parliamentary, such as a tradition of party 
politics and bureaucracy, was not yet established. 167 
The new Constitution called for the election in 1963 of 
a President heading a strong presidential system with power 
to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and the cabinet 
without legislative consent. The Assembly was downgraded to 
a weak, unicameral body reduced from 233 to 175 members 
unernpowered to revise the ?upreme Council for National 
Reconstruction legislation that had been decided by military 
166 
rd. Ironically, Professor Youn presumed "because the military was 
more prudent and circumspect in the new political experiment than 
generally believed, ... and they may well have desired democratic 
development,U it was possible to establish better constitution. However, 
there have not been any reliable evidence or witness for this 
102 
men arguing in secret. As a reaction against what the 
military regarded as 'chaotic' or 'corrupt' politics, 
candidacy for the Assembly as an independent was forbidden 
and "a person shall lose his membership ... when he leaves or 
changes his party or when hie party is dissolved. ,,168 For 
these reasons, unlike Professor Youn's presumption, the Coup 
Constitution turned out to be a politically more restrictive 
form of the later Syngman Rhee Constitution. 169 
b. Judicial Review 
The Third Republic (1962 1972) adopted the Amer ican 
style of judicial review. Article 102 of the Constitution 
of 1962 provided: 
(1) The Supreme Court shall have the power to make 
final review of the constitutionality of a legislation 
when its constitutionality is prerequisite to a trial. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to make a final 
review of the constitutionality or legality of 
administrative decrees, regulations or dispositions, 
when their constitutionality is prerequisite to a 
trial. "l70 
presumption, and more importantly, General Park's' regime must be 
~~cognized undemocratic and authoritarian regime. 
168 Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 312. 
169 Henderson, supra note 102 at 32. 
Id. 
170 
Honbup [Constitution], amended in 1962, art. 109 (1), translated in 
Laws of the Republic of Korea 1-7 (Korean Oversea Information Center 
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Onder the new Constitution, the Supreme Court had the 
final authority to review the constitutionality of 
legislation as well as other government acts. As mentioned 
earlier, one of the most significant aspects of the 
consti t ution of 1962 was the inclusion of consti t utional 
review by the ordinary courts. However, it was not clear 
whether judicial review was also granted to lower courts. 
In 1966, the Supreme Court ruled that all the courts have 
the power to determine the unconstitutionality of a 
legislation regardless of the level of the court. Yet only 
the Supreme Court can make a final decision about the 
constitutionality.171 
According to Professor Tscholsu Kim, it is not known 
how judicial review came to be incorporated into the 
Constitution of 1962. 172 Indeed, one of the most 
controversial issues during the drafting process was where 
to locate the power of constitutional review. 
Constitutional law scholars were generally inclined to 
establish a special tribunal like the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany. Judges and practicing lawyers maintained 
that constitutional adjudication is only an aspect of 
litigation and that declaring legislative acts 
171 Yoon, supra note 19 at 159. 
172 Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 313. 
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unconstitutional should be an ordinary part of the judicial 
function. Inside the Constitutional Drafting Committee, the 
constitutional law scholars clearly wanted to establish a 
constitutional Court. Justice Young Sup Lee of the Supreme 
Court, the only member from the judiciary, showed careful 
interest in giving such power to the courts. 173 In the early 
1960' s, the United States was experiencing a high tide of 
judicial activism under the leadership of the late Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, so it was not strange for the judges of 
Korea at the time to devoutly wish for the power of judicial 
review. 174 The Constitution of 1962 was a calm victory for 
the judiciary in this sense. 
In order to preserve judicial independence, and in view 
of earlier infringements on its independence from the 
outside, the procedure for appointing Justices was carefully 
concerned. The article 99 of the Constitution provided that 
"the Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President with 
the consent of the National Assembly upon the recommendation 
of the Justice Recommendation Council. .... Justices shall be 
appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Chief 
Justice with the consent of the Justice Recommendation 
Council. The Justice Recommendation Council shall be 
173 The National Assembly Library, 1 Records of Constitutional Amendment, 
197-217 (1967). 
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composed of four judges, two lawyers, one professor of law 
nominated by the President, the Minister of Justice and the 
prosecutor General." 175 Among nine, three of the Jus t ice 
Recommendation Council were appointed by the executive 
authorities. Judges other than Justices were appointed by 
the Chief Justice through the decision of the Supreme Court 
Justices Council. 
The Supreme Court was composed of the Chief Justice and 
no more than fifteen Justices. 176 When a law was raised a 
question of its constitutionality, a quorum of two-thirds or 
more of Supreme Court Justices must deliberate the matter, 
and a final decision would be reached by a two-thirds vote 
of Justices present. 177 However, the Supreme Court rejected 
this provision of the Court Organization Act as 
unconstitutional on the grounds that the "majority vote" 
rule should be considered a basic principle of court 
decision at all times, unless the Constitution provided 
otherwise. 178 
The "case or controversy 
review a law only "when 
174 
Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 313. 
175 
Const. (1962), art. 99(3). 
176 
" proviso that the Court 
its constitutionality is 
1 Const. Art 97(2) (1962). 77 Court Organization Act, art. 59 (1), Law No.51, amended on Aug. 7, 
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prerequisite to a trial," was constructed to mean that the 
judicial review system on the American model included 
procedure as well as content. 179 The phrase "case or 
controversy" is interchangeable with "a matter appropriate 
for judicial decision" as distinguished from disputes which 
are hypothetical, academic, or moot. 180 
In Choi Pyong-kil v. Central Election Managemen t 
Committee, 181 where the constitutionality of the Political 
Party Act and the Act for Election of National Assembly 
Members was challenged, the Supreme Court reasoned as 
follows: 
The object which the plaintiff seeks in this suit 
is presumed to be, in essence, a judgement of whether 
certain provisions of the law ci ted about are 
consti tutional. The plaintiff ci tes provisions from 
the Constitution, article 102. As long as the 
provisions concerned are not prerequisi te to deciding 
the case pending to determine before this court, it 
should be clear that the Supreme Court is unable to 
determine the constitutionality of these provisions. 
178 Kim Hee-won et al. v. Korea, Sup. Ct. Civ. Vol. 19(2), 110, 116-17 
(June 22, 1971). 
179 Yoon, supra note 19 at 160. 
180 Id. The Supreme Court stated that" [T] hrough under article 102 of 
the Constitution the courts exercise power judicial review of the 
constitutionality or legality of governmental acts and the Supreme Court 
reviews it with finality, as the article provides, such judicial review 
power, shall be exercised only when the constitutionality or legality of 
a legislation, decree, regulation, or disposition is prerequisite to a 
trial. The Supreme Court cannot, as the Constitutional Court could 
under the old Constitution, review just any law on request; it is 
authorized to review only laws that are involved in cases pending before 
a court. See Sup. Ct. dec., Mar. 14, 1966 (65 Cho 6); Sup. Ct. dec., 
July 28, 1966 (66 Ka ll). Reprinted in Yoon, supra note at 160. 
181 Choi Pyong-kil v. Central Election Management Committee, 16 Sungu 
[Election Cases], 1, 3-4 (Sup. Ct.)., reprinted in Tscholsu Kim, Wihon 
POmnyul Simsa Chedoron [A Study of Judicial Review], 338-68 (1983). 
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Accordingly, this court dismisses the suit without 
deciding on the constitutionality for lack of standing. 
As Professor Yoon indicated, the decisions of the 
Supreme Court seemed consistent with their United States 
counterparts in spite of the differences in language. 182 It 
was only natural because South Korea adopted the American 
style judicial review. In the United States, the 
requirement of a case or controversy is a constitutional 
limitation to basic judicial power of the federal courts. 
The technical requirement of "judicial litigation" is 
understood to be inherent in the concept of judicature 
itself. 183 Therefore, it was natural that as long as the 
Supreme Court had the power of judicial review, this 
requirement should be applied to the court's review of 
legislation. Nevertheless, the intent of article 102 of the 
Constitution that "when its constitutionality lS 
prerequisite to a trial,' there is to be a stress on 
Similarities in procedure between the Korean judicial review 
system and the American system. 184 
182 
Yoon, supra note 19 at 161. 
Id., at 162. 
184 1-d 
. Japan also adopted the American system under article 81 of 
Japan's constitution, where such an expression is not provided; hence, 
there has been a dispute about the requirement of case and controversy. 
The Japanese Supreme Court held that the courts have power to determine 
only a concrete legal dispute but not an abstract issue dealing with the 
COnstitutionality of law. See, Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Minshu 783 (Sup.Ct., 
Oct. 8, 1952). About Japanese judicial review, see D. Henderson, 
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Regarding the effect of the Supreme Court's decision, 
no specific provisions have been laid down, nor have the 
courts made their position clear. There are instances in 
which lower courts have used the expression "null and void 
. t' l' ,,185 on account of unconstltu lona lty. In its single 
decision of this kind, the Supreme Court simply declared 
that the law in question was "unconstitutional" and that "it 
would be proper not to apply it. ,,186 
The prevailing view in Korea is that a law declared 
unconstitutional is not rendered null and void retroactively 
or prospectively; the effect of unconstitutionality lS 
limited to denial of the application of the law in question 
to the party or parties concerned. The rationale for such 
restricted application is that, unlike the constitutional 
court or constitutional committee under a continental system, 
Korean courts are primarily concerned with deciding cases, 
and are not empowered to nullify laws enacted by the 
legislature. According to critics, this line of argument 
will lead to an unfair administration of justice, 
Japanese Judicial Review of Legislation: The First Twenty Years, 43 
Washington Law Review, 1005-1030 (1968). 
185 Seoul District Civil Ct., dec., 67 Ka 12829 (May 30, 1968). 
Reprinted in Yoon, supra note 19 at 162. 
186 
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disparities in application of laws, and will undermine their 
'l't 187 stabl l y. 
Judicial review by the courts, encouraged by a 
successful history in the United States, was launched with 
the expectation that certain politicized issues would be 
subj ect to litigation. Wi th the power of judicial review 
shifted to the ordinary courts, it was expected that thus 
would lead to a consolidation of constitutionalism in a land 
relatively new to democratic experiments. 188 After the 
Constitution of 1962 took effect in 1963, a number of 
statutes were challenged as unconstitutionality in the 
courts. Several statutes were held unconstitutional by the 
trail and appellate courts in the late 1960s. However, the 
Supreme Court was reluctant to hold acts of the National 
Assembly unconstitutional. The only case on which the 
Supreme Court of Korea has declared statutory provision 
unconstitutional was the decision on June 22, 1971, 
concerning the provision of the Government Tort Liability 
Act (1967).189 Since it was the first and last time that the 
Supreme Court of South Korea had held provisions of statutes 
187 
Kim, supra note 147 at 120-28. 188 
189 Yoon, supra note 19 at 164. 
KUkka Basabg Bub [The Government Tort Liability Act], Law No, 1899, 
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promulgated by the legislature unconstitutional until 1989, 
when the Constitutional Court established under the 
Constitution of Sixth Republic, it deserves more detailed 
analysis. 
Article 2(1) of the Government Tort Liability Act 
provided: 
The National or local government is liable for 
damage occurring by willful or negligent act of its 
officials employees.... However, if military servicemen 
or civilian employees of the armed forces should be 
killed or wounded while performing combat, drill or 
other duty, or while in barracks, ships, airplanes or 
other craft which are used for military purposes, and 
if they or their bereaved family are eligible for 
compensation by other acts such as pensions for the 
disabled or dependents, they cannot claim compensation 
under this law. 
Therefore, if a serviceman were killed during drill by 
a culpable comrade, his bereaved family would only be 
allowed a mili tary pension which paid less money than a 
money judgement by civil court in comparable situation. As 
a result, this provision was denounced as a violation of the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law and 
of the right to file a claim for tort liability of 
g')vernment. 
In 1968, two tribunals of Seoul District Court held the 
provision unconstitutional, and their decisions were upheld 
111 
by the Seoul High Court. The Government brought this action 
to the Supreme Court. Park's administration and the ruling 
Democratic Republican Party took this proceeding very 
seriously. A holding by the Supreme Court that the 
provision was unconsti tutional would be taken to mean a 
boost to judicial independence and a challenge against the 
regime. Moreover, in fact the maj or reason for the legal 
restriction on tort liability claims was to save the 
Government money. So Park's administration decided to save 
the provision. In July 1970, the Administration and the 
ruling party sponsored a bill to revise a provision of the 
Judiciary Organization Act of 1949. The bill finally passed 
the National Assembly and became effective from August of 
the same year. The sole purpose of the amendment of the 
Judiciary Organization Act was to add the following new 
provision: "For the Supreme Court to hold a statute 
unconstitutional, more than two-thirds of the Justices must 
be present and more than two-thirds of the Justices present 
must concur." 
On June 22, 1971, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 
eleven-to five, held the provision of Article 59 (1) of the 
JUdiciary Organization Act unconstitutional, and by a nine-
112 
to seven vote, it also held Article 2 (1) of the Government 
Tort Liability Act unconstitutional. The majority of the 
supreme Court held that because of the separation of powers 
principle enunciated in the Constitution, an exception to 
using the majority rule in deciding cases could be made only 
by the Constitution itself: thus Article 59(1) of the 
Judiciary Organization Act was unconstitutional. 19o In light 
of this view, the Court held it would decide the 
consti tutionali ty of the Government Tort Liabi Ii ty Act by 
simple majority rule. In addition, the Court held that 
Article 2 (1) of the Government Tort Liabili ty Act viola ted 
the equal protection of law clause and also constituted an 
unjustifiable deprivation of basic right. 191 
Under the fear of authoritarian regime like Park's, the 
decision was qui te notable. It was the first time that 
provisions of legislative regulation had been nullified by 
the Supreme Court. The legal communi ty including the bar 
and legal academia praised the Court's decision and expected 
the judiciary to be more active role to protect fundamental 
human rights against abuses of the Government. But 
reactions from the Government and the ruling party were 
-------------------------190 K' 
191 rlm & Lee, supra note 73 at 315. 
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quite different. 192 They denounced the judiciary as not 
understanding the situation of its own nation. 
However, except for the Government Tort Liability Act 
case, in fear of politicizing the judiciary, the Supreme 
Court maintained the self-restraint principle, as was seen 
in frequent reversals of lower courts' holdings of 
unconsti t utionali ty, and in its ready accommodation of the 
"political question" doctrine. If judicial review had been 
properly developed by the courts, and if decisions on 
constitutionality had been respected by the executive branch, 
judicial supremacy could have been established in South 
Korea. However, such a hope proved to be only a dream. 
Professor Bong Keun Kal, one of the framers of the 
Constitution of 1972, once argued that judicial review in 
the Third Republic was a complete failure because of the 
following reasons: first, a lack of historical background 
for judicial supremacy; secondly, the judges' lack of 
credibility or authority among the people; and finally, a 
192 By the Constitution of 1972, a Constitution Committee was given the 
Power of constitutional review, and President Park the power to 
renominate all judges. The shocking result of the renominating 
procedure was exclusion of the nine Justices of the Supreme Court who 
had held the article 2(1) of the Government Tort Liability Act 
Unconstitutional. See Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 315-16. 
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legal culture different from that of the United States. 193 
However, it is not difficult to reach a conclusion that 
professor Kal's theory is wrong. It is true that the 
success of judicial review in the U.S. has heavily relied on 
the "general caliber of its federal judges" 194 and on the 
common law tradition. However, the primary reason the 
failure of judicial review in the Third Republic was due to 
the nature of the military dictatorship. Park's regime 
could not tolerate the independent judiciary. Although 
judicial review was adopted in the Third Republic of Korea, 
it did not develop as hoped: the Park's administration was 
not will ing to respect the deci s ions of the courts, and 
judges were not independent. Furthermore, it should be 
recognized that judicial review in the Third Republic of 
Korea was ruined by the "Yushin" coup of 1972. 195 In these 
senses, the question of whether Korea's constitutional 
experience based on the U.S. constitutional principles was a 
success or failure might not be concluded at this point, and 
this controversial question has been still debating in the 
constitutional academia and politics as well. 
193 Bong Keun Kal, A Treaties on the Yushin Constitution 393-94 (1976). 
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c. Summary 
The Constitution of 1962 adopted a governmental system 
based on the U. S. constitutional principles. However, in 
practice Park's regime was not willing to respect the 
consti tutional principles and became authoritarian regime. 
This fact became one of the strongest arguments for so 
called the "cabinet system advocate," asserting that in 
American presidential system there has always been strong 
potential for a government to become authoritarian regime. 
The experience of judicial review during the Third 
Republic was unsatisfactory. The courts have many 
opportuni ties to review the consti tutionali ty of laws, and 
more importantly the lower courts occasionally made holdings 
of unconstitutionality. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
Supreme Court maintained the self-restraint principle, 
reversing the lower courts' decisions frequently, and in its 
ready accommodation of the "political question" doctrine. 196 
During the Third Republic, more constitutional review 
cases were brought before the courts. This demonstrates 
that the judiciary has the capacity for exercising restraint 
on government power, and it was true that several court 
decisions virtually heightened tension between the judiciary 
195 Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 316. 
1% 
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nd the executive toward the end of the Third Republic. 197 
as explained, the decision of the Supreme Court 
in 1971 had an enormous impact and brought big reaction from 
park's regime. 
Finally, it has been still in debate whether the 
adoption of the U. S. constitutional doctrines into Korea's 
constitution was a success or failure, even when considered 
without reference to the notorious "Yushin" coup. But, if 
the answer is "success," then a governmental syste~ with a 
presidency and judicial review can be readopted in Korea. 198 
E. The Forth Republic (1972-1979) Yu-Shin Regime 
1. Political Background under Park's Regime: 1962 to 
1972 
With some controls, massive government support, 
government economic success, and a proportional 
• representation system of 44 out of 175 seats, the Park's 
succeeded in engineering narrow election victories in 
1967, and 1971 . 
. 197 
Yoon, supra note 19, at 164. 
198 I d. 
It also controlled the National 
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Assembly with a minority of total votes in 1963 (32 percent) 
and 1971 (47.7 percent), achieving just over a maj ori ty in 
1967, after admitted illegalities. The proportional 
representation system not only cushioned government 
pluralities, it also gave military men without local 
political roots a chance to serve in the legislature. 199 
As indicated earlier, it has been essential for the 
political leaders in South Korea, particularly those who got 
their power through inappropriate or illegitimate way, to 
get a positive support from Washington. Not only was 
Washington maintaining a policy of equidistance between the 
Park's regime and the still active opposition forces, who 
were bolstered by renewed anti-government demonstrations by 
the students. 2oo Therefore, Park sorely needed the U.S. seal 
of approval to consolidate his power. Furthermore, in view 
of the pervasiveness of the perception of a ~threat from the 
north," military aid was especially crucial. If Park could 
not get it, South Korea would need someone who could: hence, 
as late as 1965, American leverage over South Korea seemed 
POwerful, and it was coupled with a cont inuing w ill to use 
it, if only on occasion, to moderate some of the regime's 
199 
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worst abuses against human rights and efforts to suppress 
pluralistic elements in society. 201 
The American involvement in Vietnam markedly changed 
Korean-American relations. The United States badly needed 
Korean combat forces in Vietnam beginning in late 1965. The 
American request for South Korea troops made the war a 
veritable heaven-sent opportunity for Park. He seized this 
opportuni ty, as well as American insistence upon Seoul's 
normalization of relations with Tokyo, to wring out of the 
United States everything that he could have hoped for as 
support. The results were dramatic. 202 
Through a series of polices and public and private 
utterances and gestures the United States made clear to 
Korean and the world that its earlier doubts about Park had 
dissipated and that American ties with South Korea were 
closer than ever. 
President Johnson visited Seoul in November of the 1966 
and "reaffirmed the readiness and determination of the 
United States to render prompt and effective assistance to 
201 
Cohen & Baker, supra note 117 at 175-74. 
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defeat an armed attack against the Republic of Korea, ,,203 a 
new rhetorical flourish that Koreans hopefully depicted as 
indication a stronger American tie. And, as early as July 
1965, the U.S. Commander in South Korea and Ambassador 
Winthrop Brown had jointly pledged that there would be no 
reduction in U. S. force levels on the peninsula. 204 The 
change of Washington's support for Park's administration put 
an end to the U.S. policy of maintaining equidistance 
between the party in power and its opposition. 205 
Washington's new-found enthusiasm for Park was also 
manifested in the language best understood by South Koreans 
anxious about their security military aid. It rose 
dramatically from the all-time low of 124 million dollars in 
1964 to a whopping 480 million dollars in 1969 and 556 
million dollars In 1971. 206 Whatever may have been the 
functional utility of such lavish spending by the United 
States, its symbolic significance was enormous. 
This change in Korea-U.S. relations elicited a reaction 
from North Korea that further strengthened Park's hand. The 
203 
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response of the North was to exacerbate the already tense 
situation on the Korean peninsula through a host of 
incidents that culminated in 1968 in the doomed commando 
attack upon the Blue House (President residency), the 
seizure of the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo, and the shoot-
down of aU. S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane. 207 
The advent of the Nixon and Ford Administrations only 
exacerbated the situation. When Washington ceased 
exercising the leverage over Seoul that it formerly employed 
to curb the worst abuses of South Korea's authoritarianism, 
it had done so on pragmatic grounds. The new Republican 
Administration, however, transformed this recent practice 
into a matter of high principle, invoking the shibboleth of 
"nonintervention in the internal affairs of another state" 
against Americans and Koreans who sought a return to the 
earlier U.S. practice of applying various pressures toward 
stimulating South Korea's rulers to grant their people 
certain minimal political and civil rights. This gave Park 
the clearest signal that he could move ahead in the early 
1970s with measures far more repressive than those he 
adopted during the first decade of his rule. Thus, two of 
207 Cohen & Baker, supra note 117 at 175. 
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the less well known casualties of the Vietnam War were 
democracy and human rights in Korea. 208 
As Dr. Gregory Henderson's description of Park's regime, 
the Park era saw "the rebirth of a kind of Japanese colonial 
style politics of firm, somewhat militarized control, 
decisive economic planning, widespread mobilization 
techniques, and political desiccation." 209 The National 
Assembly had chiefly censorial and limited consultative 
powers, but narrow legislative powers. 210 
2. Sixth Amendment: October 21, 1969. 
With a sufficient number of seats assured in the 
National Assembly, the ruling party undertook another 
constitutional amendment to authorize a third term for 
President Park Chung-Hee. Despite resistance from the 
oPposi tion, the amendment bill was passed In the National 
Assembly and was approved by a referendum. 211 The pretext of 
208 Cohen & Baker, supra note 117 at 175-74. 
209 
Henderson, supra note 102 at 33. 
210 Id. 
211 
Under the Constitution of 1961, in addition to the passage of 
National Assembly, referendum was masde a requirement for a 
COnstitutional amendment. Const., art. 112(1), amended in 1961. 
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the amendment was that the country needed a strong and 
competent leader in the interest of national security and 
economic growth. The opposition argument was that the 
ruling party was seeking a consolidation of dictatorship and 
its perpetuation. Members of the opposition party seated in 
the main hall of the Assembly building and protested against 
the amendment. 
Thereupon, the ruling party clandestinely called into 
session its members of the Assembly In another building 
across the street. It was at 2:28 AM on September 14, 1969, 
early Sunday morning. On hand were 122 legislators, more ':'.1 
, ,~ 
:",r 
than the required two-thirds, with some independents among 
them. The vote was taken and the amendment was carried 
without a dissenting vote; a subsequent referendum approved 
it by a maj ori ty vote of 65 percent. 212 Thus, without the 
participation of the opposition, a third term was made 
lawful for President Park. While the opposition were 
protesting in the Assembly building, the ruling party held a 
separate session in another building under heavy security. 
It was too late when the opposition members caught on and 
stormed into the session. Therefore, new Constitution gave 
Park a chance to get one more term for his presidency by 
212 
Wu Song, Hanguk Honbup Kaechongsa [The History of Korean 
COnstitutional Amendment], 282-283 (1980). 
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removing the third-term limitation. However, this still 
failed to sate Park's lust for unobstructed power even 
though he received a shock with Kim Dae-jung's great crowd-
getting popularity in the 1971 elections in which urban 
areas voted 51.4 percent for Kim (though Park took 51.2 
percent of the national vote). 213 
The process of Sixth amendment must be recognized as 
unconstitutional and inappropriate process because the 
ruling party changed the place for the vote without prior 
notice or agreement; the vote was taken on a Sunday, again 
without agreement to that effect: hence, it would have been 
null and void. 214 
3. Seventh Amendment (December 27, 1972) YuShin 
Regime 
a. The Constitution of 1972 
On October 17, 1972, President Park declared a state of 
emergency and martial law, and took extraordinary measures, 
including dissolution of the National Assembly and 
suspension of the political and civil rights of the people. 
213 Henderson, supra note 102 at 33. 
2H 
Yoon, supra note 19 at 103. 
124 
In a bloodless coup against his own constitution, he used 
the military forces against the National Assembly and other 
civilian centers, proscribed all politics once again, and 
lacerated the constitution with some seventy-two amendments 
- cutting away any remaining muscle the mangled legislature 
and judiciary still possessed. 215 
On October 27, a draft Constitution was promulgated by 
the Extraordinary Cabinet Meeting which was given 
legislature power. A draft constitution passed in a 
referendum on November 25, thus beginning the period of 
Fourth Republic. The Constitution of 1972 or the Fourth 
Republic is commonly referred to as "Yushin 
[Revitalization]" Constitution. This constitution 
ostensibly designed to accelerate reunification and to give 
constitutional backing to what was claimed to be a "Korean 
style democracy." 216 Dr. Gregory Henderson well described 
this constitution as follows: 
"This constitution also proved to be innovative 
insti tuting direct elections by an electoral college 
which Park headed and which then dutifully re-elected 
him on December 23, 1972, by a pyongyang-style term. 
Government control of the further-weakened Assemble was 
assured by the presidential appointment, via the same 
dutiful electoral college, of one-third of its members. 
Draconian 'Emergency Measures' then supplemented even 
215 
Henderson, supra note 102, at 33. 
216 
Yoon, supra note 19 at 103-4. 
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these taut controls, suppressing student movements, 
demonstrations or any criticism. From 1972 to 1975 
repression reached its highest point since the worst 
wartime colonial days. Park euphemistically called 
this monstrosity the 'Yushin' ('Revitalizing') reforms, 
a phrase which, not insignificantly, he drew from Meiji 
Japan. The economy had boomed, but politics, li ke a 
starved and frightened waif, quaked at the edge of a 
totali tarian precipice. ,,217 
h. Presidential Absolutism versus Nominal 
Judiciary and Legislature 
Therefore, the most unique characteristic of the 
Constitution of 1972 was concentration of powers In the 
President. The President was given powers to declare a 
state of emergency, to take extraordinary measures, and to 
dissolve 218 one the legislature. However, of the most 
bizarre characteristics of the Constitution was the 
presidential election process. The President was elected by 
the National Congress for Reunification, a specially 
organized group consisting of some 2,300 delegates, elected 
for a term of six years. The Delegates were elected by 
popular vote. They had to be at least 30 years old and had 
to be eligible to become members of the National Assembly.219 
217 
Henderson, supra note 102 at 33. 
218 
Honbup [Constitution], art. 53, 59, amended in 1972. 219 
Honbup [Constitution], art. 35 - 42, amended in 1972. 
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president was also empowered to appoint one-third of the 
Members of National Assembly upon approval of the National 
congress for the Reunification, to appoint the Chief Justice 
with the approval of the National Assembly, and to designate 
all other judges upon the recommendation of the Chief 
Justice. 22o 
Under the Constitution of the Forth Republic, the 
Supreme Court no longer had the power to determine the 
constitutionality of legislation. The Constitution 
Committee, which was identical to that of the Constitution 
of 1960, was resurrected and accorded the power of judicial 
review. 221 
The article 109 (1) of the Constitution provided that: 
The Constitution Committee shall judge the following 
matters: 
1. The constitutionality of a legislation upon the 
request of the court 
2. Impeachment 
3. Dissolution of a political party 
The new Constitution Committee was a standing 
organization with nine Justices to be appointed three each 
by the President, National Assembly and Chief Justice. 222 
The Justices were not allowed to join any political party 
220 
Honbup [Constitution], art. 40, 103, amended in 1972. 
221 
Kyu Ho Youm, Press Freedom and Judicial Review in South Korea, 30 
Stan. J. Int'l., 1, 6 (Winter 1994). 
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nor could they participate in any political acti vi ties. 223 
When the constitutionality of a legislation was a 
prerequisite of a trial, the trial court would request a 
decis ion of the Committee through the Supreme Court, and 
would judge according to the Committee's decision. 224 The 
courts still had the power to review the constitutionality 
or legality of lower laws such as decrees, administrative 
order or dispositions, when their constitutionality or 
legality was a prerequi si te to a trial. 225 In order to hold 
a law unconstitutional, the concurrence of two-thirds was 
required. 226 
During the 1972 to 1980, the Committee did not make a 
single decision on constitutionality. The Committee on its 
own initiative had no power to review a law for its 
constitutionality but had to await request from the Supreme 
Court for such review. During the about period, there were 
altogether 19 requests for constitutional review addressed 
to the Supreme Court but not a single case reached the 
222 Honbup 
223 
[Consti tution] , art. 109 (2) , (3) , amended in 1972 . 
224 
Honbup [Constitution] , art. 110 (2) , amended in 1972 . 
225 
Honbup [Constitution] , art. 105 (1) , 109 (1) , amended in 1972. 
226 
Honbup [Constitution] , art. 105 (2) , amended in 1972 . 
Honbup [Constitution] , art. 111 (1) , amended in 1972. 
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constitution Committee, because the Supreme Court held all 
the laws involved to be constitutional. 227 
c. Denial of Fundamental Human Rights 
An initial reading of the Yushin Constitution seemed to 
suggest support for many basic human rights. The Charter II 
of the Constitution titled "The Rights and Duties of 
Citizens" opened with a ringing declaration that "all 
citizens shall be assured dignity and value of human beings, 
and it shall be the duty of the State to guarantee such 
fundamental rights of the people to the utmost.,,228 A number 
of specific guarantees were qualified on their face. 
Freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association were 
promised "except as provided by laws," and "the right to 
association, collective bargaining, and collective action of 
workers shall be guaranteed wi thin the scope defined by 
law. ,,229 Laws restriction all freedoms and rights might be 
enacted "when necessary for the maintenance of nation al 
security, order, or public welfare.,,23o This provision, so 
called "provision of general restriction of fundamental 
227 
Yoon, supra note 19 at 166. 
228 
Honbup [Constitution], art. 8, amended in 1972. 
229 
Honbup [Constitution], art 8 & 29, amended In 1972. 
230 
Honbup [Constitution], art 32 (2), amended in 1972. 
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rights," is designed to expand the constitutionally 
permissible limits of restricting basic rights through 
"1 " 231 aws. It is noteworthy that the Yushin Constitution 
does not retain its predecessor's provision that even a law 
restricting liberties and rights in the public interest 
cannot be constitutionally valid if it infringes "the 
essential substances of liberties and rights (Article 32(2) 
of the pre-Yushin Constitution) " Moreover, whenever the 
president merely "anticipated" a threat to the national 
security or public safety and order, the Constitution 
authorized him to take 'emergency measures' to "temporarily 
suspend the freedom and rights of people prescribed in this 
Constitution" and disallowed any judicial review of 
presidential actions. 232 And, in similar circumstances, the 
Constitution also authorized the president to declare 
martial law and take special measures suspending basic 
rights. 233 
231 
The terms "laws" herein denotes statutes passed by the legislature 
and meeting the requirements of generality and specificity. 
232 Honbup [Constitution], art. 32(2) & (4), amended in 1972. 
233 
Honbup [Constitution], art. 54(1) & (3), amended in 1972. 
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d. The Yushin System 
Drafters of the 'Yushin' Constitution tried to defend 
it by pointing out that it had certain similarities to the 
De Gaulle Constitution of France, arguing that the 
constitution was in fact sufficiently democratic in 
principle. They also argued that both constitutions were 
designed to cope with crises such as a modern state might 
face and that to this end the government machinery, 
particularly the presidential power, were strengthened, and 
the parliamentary process was streamlined. 234 Although it 
was true that the Yushin constitution adopted the French 
style of presidential system, in practice under Park's 
regime, this constitution became the worst constitution of 
modern Korean history. The regime used this constitution as 
means for their political weapon in order to suppress its 
political opposition and pro-democracy movement. 
Like the previous process of constitutional amendments 
(except for Third Amendment), this Constitution was not a 
product of legitimate process already provided by the 
existing Constitution. Instead, the existing Constitution 
was suspended by emergency decree (the Martial Law), and 
deliberations on amendments were done in secret. The 
234 Bongkun Kal, Yushin Honbopron [Yushin Constitutional Law], 276-80 
(1976). 
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Emergency State Council proposed and passed the draft. 
Without any public hearing or open debate the amendment was 
put to a referendum, while all political activity was 
suspended. Therefore, there was no wonder why the Yushin 
regime could be sustained only by a series of extraordinary 
measures prohibiting any political activities for or 
discussing the revision of the Yushin Constitution. 235 
The most distinctive constitutional doctrines 
originating from the United States Constitution, 
presidential government based on the separation of powers 
and the doctrine of judicial review, were thrown out of the 
consti tutional system of Korea by the "Yushin" Reforms. 236 
The primary purpose of the "Yushin" Reforms was to make 
possible President Park's stay permanent tenure in off ice. 
The Yushin was an "unfortunate and shameful episode" for 
most of Korean people. 237 
All in all, like American observers noted, the 
historical situation under the Yushin Regime might be 
characterized as: (1) state officials' arbitrary violation 
of the integrity of the person outside the judicial system; 
235 Kim & Lee, supra note 73 at 318. 
236 Id, at 319. 
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(2) arbitrary manipulation of the judicial system for 
purposes of political repression; and (3) restraints and 
denial upon freedoms and fundamental human rights. 238 
The Yushin Regime continued until the assassination of 
President Park in October 1979; the period between 1972 to 
1979 can be viewed as the "Dark Age" of constitutionalism in 
the recent history of Korea. 
G. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1980-1987) 
1. The Transition from Park to Chun 
October 26, 1979, President Park was shot and killed by 
Kim Chae-kyu, Director of the Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency (KCIA) at a dinner party, putting an end to Park's 
lifetime presidency. The nation was stunned but calm. 
Interestingly, after assassination the atmosphere in South 
Korea was relatively liberal. 
According to a national survey by the Social Science 
Research Institute of Seoul National Uniyersity - the first 
poll of its kind since 1972 72.8 percent of the 
237 Id. 
238 Cohen & Baker, supra note 117 at 177. 
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respondents felt that "democratization" was more important 
than "economic development." That Korean people could 
sustain a democracy was the belief of 89.2 percent. 
"Expansion of human rights and freedom" was regarded as the 
most important aspect of political development by 23.3 
percent, "strengthening national security" by 20 percent, 
"social justice through fair distribution" by 15.4 percent, 
and the independence of the legislature and judiciary by 12 
239 percent. 
Even President Choi Kyu-ha, who was Prime Minister at 
the time of the assassination succeeded Park, agreed that 
the Constitution had to be amended and promised that he 
would promote freedom. On 7 December, he rescinded 
Emergency Decree No.9, the 1975 presidential decree banning 
all criticism of the Yushin Constitution, and released 68 
political prisoners held under it. In addition, on November 
26, the National Assembly established the Special Committee 
for Constitutional Revision. However, this is not to say 
that all restrictions on public debate was removed. 
That liberal atmosphere, unfortunately and 
unanticipatedly, had been gone when the Commander of the 
Defense Security Command, Major General Chun Doo-hwan staged 
239 
Dong-A Ilbo [Dong-A Newspaper], Jan. 1, 1980 1. Reprinted lD id, at 
189. 
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a coup against his commanding officers on December 12, 1979, 
placing the Army Chief of Staff under arrest. On the night 
of 12 December 1979, General Chun took several thousand 
troOPs from the area between Seoul and the Demilitarized 
Zone and used them to stage an intra-military putsch, which 
resulted in several deaths and the arrest of between 30 and 
40 senior generals, including the martial-law commander, 
Chung Sung-hwa, who was accused of complicity in the 
assassination of Park. 24o Indeed, the troops were under the 
operational control of the United States-Republic of Korea 
Combined Forces Command formally under the authority of 
General John Wickham, the highest ranking U. S. Off icer in 
Korea. 241 However, he apparently had no foreknowledge and 
was reportedly furious about this violation of the chain of 
command. It was generally recognized that the 12 December 
I 
action [so called "12.12 Satae"] was the first step in an 
attempt by Chun to move into the place of President Park. 
During the early months of 1980, many groups made 
proposals for constitutional revision. Most drafts called 
for a parliamentary form of government and strengthened 
protection for fundamental human rights. 
240 Cohen & Baker, supra note 117 at 190. 
241 I d. 
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On March 13, 1980, 
Government established the Advisory Committee for 
constitutional Revision in the President's office. Public 
debate was vigorous and was widely covered by the press, 
despi te the fact that the nation had been placed under a 
limited form of martial law after the assassination. From 
late March, demonstrations and mass assemblies were held 
throughout the nation demanding political freedom and 
democracy. 
During this period, three major political figures 
emerged in opposition. One was Kim Dae-j ung, who had run 
against Park in the 1971 election and became well-known 
internationally in 1973 when he was kidnapped from Tokyo and 
nearly killed by the KCIA. Kim had spent most of time since 
1973 in prison or under house arrest. His political and 
civil rights remained suspended until 29 February 1980. 
Another was Kim Young Sam, who as head of the New Democratic 
Party (NDP) played a major role in the events preceding 
Park's assassination. The third was Kim Jong Pil, who was 
the planner of the 1961 coup, the founder of both KCIA and 
the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), and a major figure of 
the Park years. 242 
2q2 These so called "Three Kims" has been the most influential political 
figure since 1970s. Kim Young Sam was elected the Fourteenth President. 
Kim Dae jung is the current President and Kim Jong Pil is the Prime 
Minister under Kim Oae Jung's administration. Interestingly enough, the 
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After "12.12 Incident," students and intellectuals 
feared that continued martial law and slowed down pace of 
constitutional revision might well write another chapter in 
the thick volume of obstructions and frustrations to Korean 
243 democracy. Their fear mounted on April 14, 1980 when 
General Chun made himself National Security Planning Agency 
(old KCIA) Director while retaining, apparently illegal, the 
Defense Security Command. Beginning of May, campus 
demonstrations escalated. Students called for an end to 
martial law; the dismissal of Chun, President Choi, and 
Prime Minister Sin Hyun-hwak; the prompt drafting of a new 
consti tution; and early elections. However, Chun and his 
followers responded with Martial Law Decree No. 10 on May 17, 
1980. 244 
Under this decree, all political activity was 
prohibi ted, the National Assembly was dissolved, censorship 
was imposed on the press and media, all colleges and 
universities were closed, strikes were banded, and it was 
oPposition candidate's election slogan was the "Liquidation of the 
period of Three Kims.N However, the Three Kims's influence on Korean 
politics still has been powerful and enormous. 
243 Henderson, supra note 102 at 34. 
244 Ironically, two day before this declaration of expanded martial law, 
Prime Minister issued a special appeal to the students, asking for time 
and promising to take their demands into consideration, and the students 
responded by calling off demonstrations and on May 16 they were back in 
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forbidden to be absent from work without a good reason. 245 
Kim Dae-jung and many of his followers were arrested; and 
Kim Young Sam was placed under house arrest. Public 
discussion of political issue, including a new constitution 
and election, ceased. 
On May 18, 1980, massive demonstrations by students and 
other citizens erupted in Kwangju, a city of 800,000 in Kim 
Dae-jung's home province in southwestern Korea. This 
"Kwangju Riot,n now officially named "Kwnagju Pro-Democratic 
Movement,n were then repressed by special forces that Chun 
had trained for brutal warfare. During the ten days before 
the Army retook the city, the citizens broadcast appeals for 
the United Sates mediation, but the U.S. Department of State 
did not respond. 246 By official count, 191 people were 
killed, including 23 soldiers and 4 police officers; 122 
persons wounded and 730 slightly 247 were were injured. 
Responsible private estimates, however, put the number of 
classes. More details about this story, see Cohen & Baker, supra note 
117 at 188-96. 
245 For the full text of the Martial Law Decree in Korean, see Yonhap 
Tongsin [Korean Associated Press], 559 (1981). For summaries and 
partial translations in English, see Amnesty International, Republic of 
2
Korea: Violations of Human Rights, 7 (1981). 
46 
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Cohen & Baker, supra note 117 at 193. 
47 M' lnister of Defense, Report on the Kwangju Incident to the National 
Assembly National Defense Committee (June 7, 1985). Reprinted in Donald 
N. Clark, ed., The Kwnagju Uprising: Shadows over the Regime in South 
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civilian dead as high as 1,200 with many more injured 
missing. Almost two decades after the events, the 
circumstances of the transfer of the operational control of 
the troops used in retaking Kwangju remained under dispute, 
and many critics continued to assert that the u.s. 
government shared in the responsibility for the suppressing 
there 0 248 
On May 31, a Special Committee for National Security 
Measures was established with a junta-like 31-member 
Mili tary-Ci viI ian Standing Committee behind it that, with 
subcommittees, made all key state decisions. On August 16, 
1980 President Choi resigned from the presidency, and on 
August 27, General Chun 000 Hwan was selected under the 
Yushin Constitution until an election could be held under a 
revised constitution. In his inaugural address he announced 
that a new constitution would soon be drafted. A 
government-appointed committee, working behind the scenes, 
deli vered the eighth revision of the constitution on 
September 29, 1980. It was approved in a national 
referendum under martial law and without debate or an 
alternative - on October 22, 1980. Compared to the hopes of 
Korea, 91 (1988); also see Amnesty International, Republic of Korea: 
Violations of Human Rights, 8 (1981). 
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eleven months earlier, it represented only a decidedly 
lukewarm improvement on the unparalleled rigors of the 
. Ct' t t' 249 Yush~n ons l u lon. 
2. The Content of Chun's Fifth Constitution 
In the Constitution of Fifth Republic a number of the 
worst features of the Yushin Constitution were removed, and 
it appeared to afford greater protection than the Yushin 
Constitution for some rights. 25o For instance, in Article 11 
habeas corpus and the exclusion of coerced confessions from 
evidence were guaranteed as they had been before the Yushin 
Constitution. 251 Freedoms of residence, occupation, 
correspondence, speech, the press, assembly and association 
are now guaranteed without "except as provided law" clause, 
though the needs of security and public welfare still permit 
ill-defined exceptions. 252 
The governmental structure under Chun Constitution was 
a modified presidential system. The Constitution contains 
new presidential provisions for an expanded seven-year term. 
248 Cohen & Baker, supra note 117 at 193. 
249 Henderson, supra note 102 at 35-6. 
250 Idi Cohen & Baker, supra note 117 at 197. 
251 Honbup [Constitution), art. 11(5), amended in 1980. 
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The president is allowed to serve only one such term and no 
amendment favoring the incumbent can be submitted. 253 
Amendments removing these barriers to another term are 
possible, however, under the real pretext of a force 
majeure. 254 The president continues to be elected indirectly 
by a "Presidential Electoral College" of 5,278 members. 255 
The president continues to have greater powers. Emergency 
powers are slightly reduced and require National Assembly 
concurrence but the martial law provisions remain the same 
as in the Yushin Constitution. Presidential appointive 
powers remain much the same as in former constitutions. 
The legislature remains weak but it has recaptured the 
abili ty to override a presidential veto by a two-thirds 
majority and to inspect state affairs and demand documents 
and witness. The Yushin Consti tution' s weakening of the 
judiciary essentially continues. The Constitution of Third 
Republic power to review the constitutionality of laws was 
not restored to the courts. The Constitution Committee was 
established to review the consti tutionali ty of laws upon 
submission by the courts. 256 
252 Honbup [Constitution], art. 13, 14, 15, 20 & 35, amended in 1980. 
253 Honbup [Constitution], art. 45 & 129(2), amended in 1980. 
254 Honbup [Constitution], art. 129(2), amended in 1980; also see 
Henderson, supra note 102 at 36. 
255 Honbup [Constitution], art 40 & 41, amended in 1980. 
256 Honbup [Constitution], art. 112, amended in 1980. 
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H. THE SIXTH REPUBLIC AND CURRENT CONSTITUTION 
1. The End of the Fifth Republic and the Journey to 
the Democratic Society 
After the National Assembly elections in February 1985, 
revision of the Constitution was the major political issue. 
One the most recognized expert of Korean politics, the late 
Dr. Gregory Henderson recalled this momentous transition of 
Korean democracy as follows; 
"An observer like myself, who has seen forty years of 
eight amended or recreated Korean constitutions, cannot 
help but remember the first one in 1948 with nostalgia. 
There lurked in it, for all its faults, a hopeful 
feeling that democracy would neither be too headlong-
embraced, as in 1960, nor too curbed and waylaid, as 
always since, but that it might in some way be truly 
sought. Somehow, between the extremes of a hard-line 
mili tary and students caught in passionate idealism, 
the thread of viable democracy, indeed, of political 
moderation itself, was lost for an entire 
generation. ,,257 
Dr. Henderson had seen the political changes after amendment 
of 1987 Constitution as follows; 
257 
"The political skies have been lightened by the June 29 
announcement but clouds still hang in them. A highly 
political people packed into tinderbox urban 
concentrations have yet to achieve the political 
identity they sought with an enthusiasm so 
wholehertedly in 1945; an identity which today should 
be a fit partner of their economic flair. A 
politically legitimate government has yet to be 
Henderson, supra note 102 at 40-42. 
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established. Further emotional political discontent 
may yet be rekindled. Such a rekindling is not the 
best builder of democratic stability. What will emerge 
from the passion, the repression, the turmoil of these 
months is not fully predictable. A further coup or 
assassinations, though their likelihood has been 
reduced, are not inconceivable. Yet, on the whole, 
hopes have revived. When a system of greater 
pluralism is forged, a representative system with some 
spiri t of compromise will grow to break the ancient 
vortex pattern which has so long defined Korea's 
poli tical life ; its advent will be as welcome as its 
delays in arrival have been prolonged. "258 
For the people of South Korea, 1987 was a year of 
momentous political changes. In June, millions of South 
Koreans participated in nationwide protests against the 
military dictatorship of Chun Doo Hwan. These massive 
protests erupted after President Chun announced to suspend 
debate over constitutional reforms concerning election of 
his successor as president. 
In the second general election on February 12, 1985 
during Chun's regime, the opposition parties won majority in 
the votes for the second time in modern Korean history 
(since 1948) . However, due to the "proportional-
representation system" in the General Election Law, the 
Chun's ruling party received 55 percent of control even 
thought they received only 35.4 percent at the popular vote. 
258 Id. 
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Under this "proportional-representation system." Most 
National Assembly members are popularly elected as 
representatives of local constituencies. The party winning 
the most local-constituency seats then receives a 
disproportionate "bonus" when a fixed pool of non-elective 
national constituency seats is distributed. The national-
constituency (NC) seats have been used to dispense patronage 
and also auctioned off to raise campaign funds even though 
the original purpose of NC was to give the social minority 
(ie., woman, member of labor unions and peasants and so on) 
an opportunity to be able to join the National Assembly. In 
1985, there were 92 NC seats and the ruling Democratic 
Justice Party (DJP) was allotted tow-thirds or 61 based on 
its plurality of local constituency (LC) seats. 259 The 
remaining 31 were shared among the opposition parties 
according to their LC seats. 
Opposition parties polled almost twice as many votes as 
the ruling DJP, despite formidable DJP advantages due to the 
Chun regime's command of local administration, the broadcast 
media, and vast financial resources. 260 The outcome 
reflected Chun's unpopularity and Korean people's desire to 
259 International League of Human Rights and International Rights Law 
Group, Democracy in South Korea: A promise Unfulfilled, 87 (1985) 
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reform their nation. It might also consider as an indirect 
referendum that revealed the illegitimacy of the Chun 
government that had been questioned since the inception of 
his regime. 
The leading opposition party that created in a very 
short time for the 1985 election by two long time dissents 
against military dictatorship, Kim Youngsam and Kim Daejung 
who both became the president, New Korean Democratic Party 
(NKDP) led to a gradual consolidation of an organized 
opposition and to growing popular support for constitutional 
revision. On 12 February 1986, the NKDP started out a 
nationwide campaign to collect 10 million signatures on a 
peti tion calling for a constitutional revision which would 
not only introduce direct presidential election but also ban 
military involvement in politics, restrict executive powers, 
enlarge legislative powers, abolish the proportional 
representation system, end censorship, and introduce 
stronger protections of political freedoms and other human 
rights. 261 However, Chun's regime responded by banning the 
campaign, arresting NKDP leaders, raiding the NKDP offices 
260 West & Baker, at 226. 
261 "NKDP: Leading Democratic Reforms in Korea" (undated pamphlet setting 
forth the constitutional reform program, on file at the Harvard Human 
Rights Yearbook). 
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to search for lists of petition signers, and escalating 
threats against Kim Dae Jung who was still under house 
arrest and other proponents of reform. 
Then NKDP with other opposition groups and human rights 
activities, which called non-governmental opposition 
organizations such as Mintongryun (the League 
Democratization and Reunification) and Minhwahyup 
of 
(the 
committee of Democratization), organized a series of 
rallies for the end of military government and 
consti tutional reform, in some cases attracting crowds of 
50,000 or more. Major student demonstrations against Chun 
dictatorship occurred through the year of 1986. Finally, 
the National Assembly set up a committee for negotiating 
constitutional revision in June 1986. However, the ruling 
DJP repeatedly rejected NKDP proposals to submit the direct 
presidential election question to a popular referendum. 
Instead, the DJP proposed a parliamentary system similar to 
that of Japanese which was unacceptable alternative to the 
oPposition. 
On 12 January 1987, President Chun in his New Year 
press conference warned the opposition that he would be 
compelled to make a "momentous decision" if an agreement 
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lei' 
were not soon reached on the issue of constitutional 
.' 262 
revl slon . Chun actually used this warning, "momentous 
decision," several occasions and it usually implied the 
declaration of the national emergency so that he could 
proclaim the martial law. However, at that time his threat 
did not much effect on Korean people who were eager to end 
the military dictatorship. Therefore, this announcement 
immediately provoked widespread public outrage and civil 
unrest. 
In the morning of January 18, 1987, Koreans were 
thrilled by a shocking news that a 21-year-old college 
student at Seoul National Uni versi ty, Chong-chul Pak, was 
torture-murdered during the interrogation at a cell of the 
Anti-Communist Bureau of the National Police at January 14 
(the news did not appear until January 18). Pak died while 
being subjected to "water torture" that was a simulation of 
drowning by repeatedly forcing the victim's head under water 
in an interrogation cell. Protests and memorial services 
were held through":-out the nation, and the NKDP, religious 
leaders, and human rights activists proclaimed February 7 as 
a nationwide day of mourning for Pak. 263 
262 
Korea Herald, 13 January 1987, p. 1 
263 West & Baker, 231. 
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On April 13, in response of growing peoples' criticism 
of his regime, Chun declared that he finally made his 
"momentous decision" that he mentioned at the press 
conference at January. At nationally televised press 
conference, Chun announced the so called "4.13 Hohunj ochi" 
(the decree of prohibiting amendment process) . He 
proclaimed that the "counterproductive debate" on 
constitutional revision would have to end and the next 
president would be elected under the 1980 Constitution 264 
because continuing debate would jeopardize "the two maj or 
national tasks of a peaceful change of government and the 
Seoul Olympics. 265 In his instance that the first peaceful 
transition of power in forty years was the most important 
precondition for accomplishing genuine democratic 
development. 
Despite rising protests, ex-general and DJP chairman 
Roh Tae Woo was officially nominated as the DJP's 
presidential candidate on 10 June. However, at the same 
date, the biggest nationwide protest, called "6.10 Peace 
264 West & Baker, 230. 
265 The Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists on 
21 April requested the government to explain the legal basis of the ban 
on debate, but no response was received, ICJ Report, pp. 19-20. 
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March for New Constitution, against Chun's regime occurred. 
The crowds turning out around the country were no longer 
composed entirely of young student demonstrators-there were 
middle-aged and elderly ci tizens, laborers, taxi drivers, 
and white-collar workers (got a nickname as Necktie Force 
because they wore neckties and they hardly joined protest 
before) . The government admitted using more than 350,000 
tear-gas grenades and canisters against civilians in June 
1987-more than were used in all of 1986. 266 
Gaston J. Sigur of the State Department of the United 
States government, came to Seoul and met with Chun and Roh 
and unlike past, he also met with the opposition leaders, 
Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, who at that time was under 
.... -------
house arrest. When he returned to Washington, he called for 
a political compromise, release of political prisoners, an 
end to preemptive arrests, and government tolerance of 
peaceful demonstrations, pointedly stating: "Military steps 
offer no solutions. ,,267 
At last, on 29 June 1987, DJP's presidential candidate, 
Ro~h Tae Woo, responding to immense public pressure, 
266 Physicians for Human Rights, "The Use of Tear Gas in the Republic of 
Korea: A Report by Health Professionals," (1987), reprinted in West & 
Baker. 
267 Korea Weekly Report 6. 13 (June 29, 1987). 
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announced his eight suggestions including accepting direct 
presidential election later called "6.29 Declarations" 
(however, the opposition called "6.29 Surrender"). In this 
"Epoch-Making Eight-Point Reform' included the following 
concessions: 
1) Prompt constitutional revision 
presidential elections before February 1988. 
with direct 
2) Campaign-law revisions to "ensure maximum fairness 
and justice" in the presidential elections. 
3) Release of political prisoners, except those guilty 
of treason or serious criminal offenses, and restoration of 
Kim Dae Jung's civil and political rights. 
4) Effective guarantees of basic human rights and an 
extension of habeas corpus. 
5) A free press. 
6) Autonomy for local governments and universities. 
7) Cessation of harassment of and restrictions on 
political parties. 
8) A nationwide campaign against corruption and crime. 
Roh offered to resign his chairmanship of the DJP if 
President Chun refused to endorse his proposals. On 1 July, 
Chun announced his agreement. 
In the result of the declaration, the number of the 
protests remarkably decreased and the political parties 
organized a committee for the constitutional revision. On 
September 17, the committee reached agreement for the new 
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draft and the National Assembly approved the draft 
consti tution almost unanimously (254 yeas and 4 nays) on 
October 12. The new Constitution of the Republic of Korea 
was finally approved in a referendum on October 25, by more 
than 92 percent of valid votes. The first election under 
the new Constitution was held on December 16, 1987 and then 
Roh Tae Woo defeated a divided opposition with a plurality 
of 36.6%.268 Therefore, the new president Roh Tae Woo 
whose admistration was considered as the government of the 
first peaceful transition of power and more legitimate 
government than previous one was inaugurated at February 
1988 and Koreans hope to enjoy more freedom and democracy in 
near future. 
B. SIGNIFICANCES OF THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION 
In all of the previous events of constitutional changes, 
except for the Constitution of the Second Republic, have 
been recognized as the illegitimate and undemocratic process 
268 Results of the Presidential Election of December 16, 1987: 
Poh Tae Woo (Democratic Justice Party) 
8,282,738 votes (36.6%) 
Kim Young Sam (National Unification and Democracy Party) 
6,337,681 votes (28.0%) 
Kim Dae Jung (Party of Peace and Democracy) 
6,113,375 votes (27.0%) 
Kim Jong Pil (New Democratic Republican Party) 
1,823,067 (8.1%) 
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those events always accompanied with illegitimate 
upheaval such as military coup and the main 
purpose of those changes was to prolong the presidential 
term in office in order to continue their illegitimate 
government. Furthermore, because of those unusual 
conditions (even some cases martial law enforced during the 
amendment proceeding) , the legislature never had an 
opportuni ty to function as a forum for responsible· debate. 
Therefore, the legitimacy of the government had been always 
a crucial political question among those period and many 
Koreans were opposed to their legitimacy. However, since 
the 9th Amendment was accomplished through government-
opposition collaboration for the first time in Korean 
constitutional history and approved in a referendum as 
provided in the existing constitution, the current 
Constitution has more legitimacy than does any earlier 
consti tutions. 269 
The current Constitution also has many significances in 
addition to the legitimacy issue. First, it strengthens the 
power of legislature which used to be relatively weaker than 
the executive power and sometimes even ignored its power by 
269 Yoon, at 106 
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president. Secondly, individual rights are further 
protected with number of addition in~ew C~nstitution, for 
example, the most significant improvements are in the areas 
of criminal procedure and the freedom of expression (Article 
20, 21 and 26). Thirdly, the power of judiciary is also 
strengthen in the new Constitution. The judiciary used to 
be called the "servant of the executive" because the 
authoritarian government abused the judiciary and even 
interrupted trials in order to award the judgment for their 
sake. Finally, more importantly, the new Constitution 
articulates the establishment of the Constitutional Court 
for judicial review. In the previous constitutions, even 
though the constitutions prescribed judicial review systems 
in one form or anther, varying from the European style to 
American style, the judicial review system has not received 
the full attention, which has been recognized the most 
useful safeguard for the democracy. 
In these views described above, Korean people finally 
can realize and enjoy the very precious democratic 
principles such as the separation of powers, independence of 
the judiciary, free speech, judicial review and so on. I 
will discuss how the current Constitution guarantees these 
153 
democratic values as well as how American constitutional 
doctrines influences into the new Constitution. 
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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN KOREA 
A. The Origin of the Judicial Review System 
Judicial review, in its original North American sense, 
is the power of courts to decide upon the constitutionality 
of legislative acts; in other words, the judicial control of 
the consti tutionali ty of legislation. 270 It has been said 
that judicial review is the most distinctive feature of the 
consti tutional system of the United States of America, and 
it must be added that it is the most distinctive feature of 
almost all constitutional systems in the world today. 271 
Although judicial review of legislation has been considered 
one of the main contributions which the constitutional 
system of the United States gave to the political and 
constitutional sciences,272 this American system of judicial 
review is not the only one that exists in present 
constitutional law. According to professor Brewer-Carias' 
methodology of judicial review in the current world, there 
are three different systems of judicial review, namely 
American or diffuse system, the Austrian or concentrated 
system of judicial review, originally established in the 
270 Brewer-Carias, supra Note 1, at 1. 
271 E. S. Corwin, JUDICIAL REVIEW, in Encyclopedia of the Social Science, 
Vol. VIII, 457, (London, 1932). Reprinted in Id. 
272 , 
. Brewer-Carlas, supra note 1, at 3. 
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1920 Austrian Constitution and the mixed systems, mainly 
Latin American, with the main features of both the American 
and Austrian systems. 273 
The distinction between the American and the Austrian 
systems of judicial review is based on the judicial organs 
that can exercise the power of constitutional control. 274 
The American system entrusts that power to all the courts of 
a given country and it is for this reason that the system is 
considered to be a decentralized or diffused one. 275 On the 
contrary, the Austrian system entrusts the power of control 
of the consti tutionali ty of laws either to one existing 
court or to a special court, and it is therefore considered 
a centralized or concentrated control system. 276 There are 
also systems of control of the constitutionality of 
legislation which combine the diffuse system with the 
features of the concentrated system. 277 
The first part of this chapter describes the supremacy 
of the constitution that had offered main concept of the 
273 
274 
275 
276 
277 
Brewer-Carias, supra note 1, at 3. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id, at 4. Alternative terminology would call the systems 
"centralized" and "decentralized." Mauro Cappelletti, JUDICIAL REVIEW 
IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, 46 (1971). "The decentralized type gives the 
power of control to all the judicial organs of a given legal system ... 
The centralized type of control confines the power of review to one 
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judicial review since its foundation. The second part 
examines the original system of judicial review, which was 
established by the 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison (1 
Cranch 137). 
1. Constitution and Its Supremacy 
The whole possibility of judicial review of 
constitutionality is seen not only as the ultimate result of 
the consolidation of the 'rule of law,' but as integral part 
of the concept of the Constitution as a higher and 
fundamental positive law. One of the fundamental trends in 
modern Constitutionalism is the concept of the Constitution 
as a normative reality and not as an occasional political 
compromise of political groups, changeable at any moment 
when the equilibrium between them modifies itself. 278 In 
this sense, Constitutions become effective juridical norms 
which overrule the whole political process, the social and 
economic life of the country, and which give validity to the 
whole legal order. 279 In other words, if a constitution is 
to be seen as a real and effective norm, it must contain 
rUles applicable 
Single judicial organ." 
278. rd. at 95. 
directly 
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to state organs and to 
individuals. 280 The constitution was originally a 
fundamental law limiting state organs, and declaring the 
fundamental rights of individuals, as a political consensus 
given by the people themselves and therefore directly 
applicable by the courts. 281 The adoption of this concept in 
continental Europe, as a result of the French Revolution, 
was later modified by the monarchical principle that turned 
the concept of the Constitution into a formal and abstract 
code of the political system, given by the monarch and not 
to be applied by the courts. 282 Nevertheless, in the 
European continental legal system the concept of the 
Constitution has changed and is again closer to its original 
conception as an a higher law with norms applicable to state 
organs and to individuals, judged by the courts. In this 
later sense one can consider a statement from the United 
States Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles (356 U.S. 86, 
(1958)) 
279 
280 
281 
282 
The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn 
adages or hollow shibboleths. They are vi tal, living 
principles that authorize and limit governmental powers 
in our nation. They are rules of government. When the 
constitutionality of Act of Congress is challenged in 
this Court, we must apply those rules. I f we do not, 
the words of the Constitution become little more than 
Corwin, supra note 8, at 95. 
Id. at 96. 
Brewer-Carias, supra Note 1, at 96. 
Id. 
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good advice. 
In contemporary constitutional law and in relation to 
judicial review, this judicial control of the constitution 
is essentially possible when a constitution exists as a real 
norm enforceable by the courts, but moreover when it has 
supremacy over the whole legal order. 283 This supremacy of 
the constitution over the other rules of law, and 
particularly over Acts of legislature, implies that the 
constitution is the supreme norm which establishes the 
supreme values of a legal order. This position of supremacy 
can be taken as the parameter for the validity of the 
remaining legal rules of such a system. 284 
2. The American System of Judicial Review 
In the United States we can in a sense say that the 
consti tutional adj udication institution has been developed 
as an arbitrator in dispute resolution between federal 
government and state government. 
The legislative history of the first Judiciary Act, the 
state ratifying Conventions, and the Philadelphia Convention, 
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provide evidence that the framers clearly intended to 
empower the Supreme Court by assigning it the responsibility 
of supervising the federal system. The first Congress 
granted the Supreme Court the appellate jurisdiction 
necessary to adequately address the Court's responsibility. 
Many of the powers granted to the Supreme Court by Congress 
were founded on the idea of a federal judicial arbiter, this 
was accomplished because many of the state ratifying 
conventions understood and accepted this concept. The result 
of the 1786-1789 period is that both schools of thought had 
accepted the Supreme Court as the arbiter in federal-state 
relations. 285 
Federalism in the U.S. has been developed primarily by 
the Supreme Court in the interpretations of the commerce 
clause and the 10th Amendment. The commerce clause 
contributed a basis for extending federal power, while the 
10th Amendment contributed to the limitation of the 
extension of federal power and the protection of state power. 
To date, there really have been many decisions on 
federal and state power. The decisions have depended on the 
283 
284 
Brewer-Carias, supra note 1, at 97 
Id. 
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I,'; 
poli tical and historical situations of the times, and are 
ample reflections of their economic backgrounds. As a whole, 
there have been two main streams in the decisions. 286 
When Alexis de Tocqueville visited America and 
described the political system of the United States more 
than 150 years ago, he considered the way the Americans had 
organized their judicial power to be unique in the world. 287 
He specially pointed out that 'that immense political power' 
of the American courts 'lies in this one fact': "The 
Americans have given their judges the right to base their 
decisions on the constitution rather than on the laws. In 
other words, they allow them not to apply laws which they 
consider unconstitutional." 288 Following the same idea, he 
said: 'if anyone invokes in an American court a law which 
the judge considers contrary to the Constitution, he can 
refuse to apply it.' 289 
The judicial authority to enforce the constitution 
285 On historical background, see JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT 
AS FINAL ARBITER IN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1789-1957, 16-17 (1958). 
286 For more detailed information on these cases, see JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER 82-102 
(1992); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76-168 (7th ed. 
1991) . 
287. A. de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, reprinted in Brewer-Carias, 
supra note 1, at 136. 
288. Id. 
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against unconstitutional acts is conventionally traced to 
Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison 
and its claim that the written constitution is included 
within that law for which it is "the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is." 290 The 
ultimate and necessary foundation upon which judicial review 
rests is the belief that the constitution is the supreme 
expression of the people's will. 
Chief Justice John Marshall claimed in Marbury v. 
Madison that the judiciary was intended, and by its nature 
was singularly equipped, to say just what the law is 
whether subordinate or fundamental. Thus, in the case of 
final pronouncements, the Supreme Court, and only the Court, 
can, ought, and must speak as the oracle of the 
Constitution. 291 The conclusionsof that case were based on 
two main arguments, first, the supremacy of the constitution 
as a fundamental law to which all other laws must be 
submitted; and second, the power and duty of the courts to 
interpret the laws and not to apply laws repugnant to the 
289 Id. 
290 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. (A Cr.) 137, 177 (1803). 
291 Albert P. Melone & George Mace, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 4 (1988). 
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't t' 292 COnstl u lOn. This fundamental duty of the American 
courts has been clearly summarized by the Supreme Court in 
united States v. Butler with the following words: 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land 
ordained and established by the people. All 
legislation must conform to the principles it lays down. 
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in 
the Courts as not conforming to the constitutional 
mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only 
one duty - to lay the article of the Constitution which 
is invoked beside the Statute which is challenged and 
to decide whether the latter squares with the former. 
All the Court does, or can, is to announce its 
considered judgement upon the question. The only power 
it has, if such it may be called, is the power of 
judgement. This Court neither approves nor condemns 
any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult 
office is to ascertain and declare whether the 
legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention 
of, the provisions of the Constitution; and, having 
done that, its duty ends. 293 
As a result of federal system, three branches of judicial 
review have been distinguished in the United States: a 
national judicial review, referring to the power of all 
courts to pass judgement upon the validity of acts of 
Congress under the United States Constitution; federal 
judicial review, referring to the power and duty of all 
Courts to prefer the United States Constitution over all 
conflicting state constitutional provisions and statutes; 
292 E. S. Corwin, MARBURY V, MADISON AND THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 
12 Mich. L. Rev. 538 (1914), Reprinted at Brewer-Carias, supra note 1 at 
137. 
293, 297 U,S, 1 (1936). 
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" .; 
and a states' judicial review, referring to the power of 
state courts to pass judgement upon the validity of acts of 
the state legislatures under the respective state 
constitutions. 294 
In the United States there is no special judicial body 
empowered to decide upon the constitutionality of state acts. 
Thus, all the courts, state courts, federal courts and the 
Supreme Court have the power of judicial review of 
constitutionality, and none of them have their jurisdiction 
limi ted in any special way at allover the decision of 
consti tutional questions. 295 General original jurisdiction 
in the federal judicial system in the United States is 
vested in the district courts which are a large number of 
tribunals of territorial competence located throughout the 
country, generally coinciding with the territories of the 
states. The jurisdiction of these district courts extends 
to numerous types of controversies. It is in the course of 
controversies that constitutional issues may be raised. 
The federal judicial districts are organized into 
larger judicial units known as circuits, and in each of 
294 
295 
Corwin, supra note 8, at 457. 
Brewer-Carias, supra note 1, at 138. 
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these there is one court of appeal. These courts of appeal 
do not have original jurisdiction and are strictly appellate 
tribunals, with very extensive jurisdiction derived from the 
fact that all the final decisions of the district courts may 
be appealed to them. 
Judicial review in the United States is truly judicial 
in that it is carried out by organs of the judicial branch. 
It is courts doing what courts always do: determining what 
the law is and in the process applying the applicable 
hierarchy of law. This is in contrast to some systems where 
the organs of constitutional review, while insulated from 
the political branches, are not called courts, even if 
called courts, are not thought of as part of the ordinary 
judiciary. 296 This characteristic of judicial review in the 
Uni ted States has been described as a political function 
that has been "carefully disguised" behind the "fiction" of 
Courts determining the law. 297 
296 William Burnham, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 314 (1995). See Mauro Cappelletti, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 141-143 (Oxford U. 1989). 
297. Id. 
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B. History on Judicial Review System in Korea (1948 to 
1987) 
Since the establishment of the first modern Constitution in 
1948, Korea has undertaken judicial review in one form or 
another, varying from the European style to American style, 
or from the diffuse system of judicial review to the 
concentrated system of judicial review. Since each 
amendment has concentrated primary on the term of the 
presidency or the type of government, the judicial review 
system has not received the full attention it deserves. 298 
In practice, the constitutional review or judicial review in 
Korea had been dormant until late 1980s. During the 40 
years of Korean constitutional history, the Supreme Court or 
the Constitutional Committee had reviewed less than ten 
cases. 299 
The first Constitution of 1948 authorized a 
Constitutional Committee to review a statute "[w]henever the 
298 Dae-Kyu Yoon, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 151 (1990). 
299 For the twelve years of the First Republic (1948-60), the 
Constitutional Committee reviewed only seven incidents. Because of the 
short history of the Second Republic, the Constitutional Court did not 
have any opportunity to review the case. However, during the Third 
Republic (1962-71) when American style judicial review system was 
adopted, the Supreme Court struck down two statutes and these two cases 
had been only cases that the Court declared the unconstitutionality of 
the challenged statutes. During the Forth (1972-1980) and Fifth (1980-
1987) Republics, when the Constitutional Committee had the power of 
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decision of the case depends on the determination of the 
constitutionality of the law." 300 The Constitutional 
committee (Honbop Wiwonhoe) was a combination of German and 
French practices. 301 Under the article 81, the jurisdiction 
of the Committee was limited to legislation, while the 
supreme Court had the power to review of the 
constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, 
regulations or dispositions in accordance with the 
provisions of legislation. Only the courts, not executive 
organs on national or local level, had the power to request 
a review. 302 The review of the Committee commenced only when 
the constitutionality of a law was "prerequisite to a 
trial. " 303 The Committee consisted of the Vice President, 
fi ve Supreme Court justices, and five lawmakers. 304 A two-
thirds majority was required to declare a law 
unconstitutional. 305 
jUdicial review, the Committee had no constitutional review case. Also 
see, Ahn, Supra Note , Kim Supra note, Youn Supra note 
300. HONBOP [Constitution] art. 81 (1948), translated in supra note 5, at 
4. 
301 Yoon, supra note 139, at 153. 
302 HONBOP [Constitution] art. 81 (2) (1948). 
302 HONBOP [Constitution] art. 81 (2) (1948). This requirement of 
"prerequisite to a trial" is generally understood to be the Korean 
equivalent of "case and controversy" in the American Constitution. See 
Young Sung Kwon, HONBOPHAK WOLLON [Treaties on Constitutional Law] 627-
28 (1981). Reprinted in Yoon, supra note 139, at 153. 
304. HONBOP [Constitution] art. 81 (3) (1948). 
305. HONBOP [Constitution] art. 81 (4) (1948). 
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In its II-year history the Constitution Committee 
reviewed only seven cases altogether. Thus the Committee's 
performance was not as active as it might have been. The 
student Revolution of April 19, 1960, led to the fall of the 
First Republic, actually a prolonged dictatorship, which was 
replaced by the Second Republic. The Constitution of the 
Second Republic (1960-61), which was designed to prevent 
abuse of political power and protect civil liberties to a 
greater extent than that of the First Republic, 306 provided 
for the Constitution Court as a standing body with nine 
judges. The Constitution Court was an attempt to eliminate 
the political problems that had undermined the operation of 
the Constitutional Committee under the First Republic. 307 
Differences between the Constitution Committee and the 
Constitutional Court were: 1) while the Constitution 
Committee operated on an ad hoc basis, the Constitutional 
Court was a permanent organ; 2) political neutrality was not 
required or expected from political appointees to the 
Consti tution Committee, but members of the Constitutional 
Court were not allowed to engage in political activities; 3) 
since the Constitutional Court was composed of members who 
306 Yoon, supra note 139, at 156. 
307 Dae-Kwon Choi, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE 222 
(1976) (unpublished, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California 
(Berkeley) ) . 
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were qualified as judges, its orientation was judicial 
rather than political. 308 The Constitutional Court had the 
power to review the constitutionality of a legislation 
wi thout a sub judi ce case. This abstract control of laws 
was characteristic of the new judicial review system. When 
a case was pending before a court, the parties as well as 
the court could request judicial review of a statute by the 
constitutional Court, regardless of whether the 
determination of its constitutionality was a prerequisite to 
trying the case. 
For fear that former high officials of the previous 
government whose civil rights were suspended might be 
prematurely reinstated, the government delayed 
implementation of the Constitutional Court Act until April 
17,1961. 309 Ironically, the entire Constitution was short-
lived, as the military overturned the government the 
following month by a coup, and the Constitutional Court had 
no opportunity to function at all. 310 
The Third Republic (1962-72) adopted the American style 
of judicial review system-or so called the diffuse system 
308 Yoon, supra note 139, at 157. 
309 Tcholsu Kim, HYUNDAE HONBOPRON [Modern Constitutional Law] 869 
(1979) . 
310. Yoon, supra note 139, at 158. 
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where the Supreme Court has the power of judicial review. 
Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 provided: 
(1) The Supreme Court shall have the power to make 
final review of the consti tutionali ty of legislation 
when its constitutionality is prerequisite to a trial; 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to make 
final review of the constitutionality or legality of 
administrative decrees, regulations or dispositions, 
when their constitutionality or legality is 
prerequisite to a trial. 311 
The expansive judicial review authority of the Supreme Court 
under the Constitution of the Third Republic led to what one 
commentator has termed "j udicial supremacy" in Korea. 312 
However, it was not clear whether judicial review was also 
granted to lower courts. In 1966, however, the Supreme 
Court ruled that "all the courts have the power to determine 
the unconstitutionality of a legislation regardless of the 
level of the court. Yet only the Supreme Court can make a 
final decision about the constitutionality.,,313 
During the Third Republic, more review cases were 
brought before the courts as the Supreme Court assumed the 
final authority for constitutional review. This was a 
development that served to demonstrate that the courts were 
significantly capable of exercising restraint on government 
311 HONBOP [Constitution] art. 102 (1962), translated in LAWS OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 1, 24 (Korean Legal Center, 1969). 
312. Choi, supra note 149, at 222. 
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powers. 314 During this period, the Supreme Court struck down 
two statutes: Article 59(1) of the Judiciary Act and Article 
2(1) of the Government Tort Liability Act. 315 
Under the Constitution of the Forth Republic (1972-80), 
the Supreme Court no longer had the power to determine the 
constitutionality of legislation. The Constitution 
Committee, which was identical to that of the 1960 
Constitution, was resurrected and accorded the power of 
judicial review. 316 The article 109 (1) of the Constitution 
of the Fourth Republic provided that: 
The Constitution Committee shall judge the following 
matters: 
1. 
the 
2. 
3. 
The constitutionality of a legislation 
request of the court; 
Impeachment; 
Dissolution of a political party. 
upon 
The new Constitution Committee was a standing organization 
with nine members to be appointed three each by the 
President, National Assembly and Chief Justice. The members 
were not allowed to join any political party nor could they 
313 Yoon, supra note 139, at 159 (citation omitted) . 
314 Yoon, supra note 139, at 164. 
315 These two statutes were only two occasions that the Court declared 
the unconstitutionality. However, after the Constitution of the Third 
Republic took effect, a number of statutes were challenged their 
constitutionality such as the Anti-Communist Law of 1961 and the 
National Assembly Election Law. Furthermore, several statues were held 
unconstitutionality by the lower courts in the late 1960s. More details, 
See, Kim & Lee, 
316 
. Youm, supra note 5, at 6. 
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participate in any political activities. When the 
constitutionality of a legislation was a prerequisite of a 
trial, the trial court would request a decision of the 
committee through the Supreme Court, and would judge 
according to the Committee's decision. 317 The courts still 
had the power to review the constitutionality or legality of 
lower laws such as decrees, regulations or dispositions, 
when their constitutionality or legality was a prerequisite 
to a trial. 318 In order to hold a law unconstitutional, the 
concurrence of two-thirds (six or more members) was required. 
During the 1972 to 1980, the Committee, though a 
permanent organ, did not make a single decision on 
constitutionality. 319 The Committee on its own initiative 
had no power to review a law for its constitutionality but 
had to await request from the Supreme Court for such review. 
During the above period, there were altogether 19 requests 
for constitutional review addressed to the Supreme Court but 
not a single case reached the Constitution Committee, 
because the Supreme Court held all the laws involved to be 
constitutional. 320 
317 
318 
319 
320 
HONBOP [Constitution] art. 105 (1972). 
HONBOP [Constitution] art. 105 (2) (1972). 
Yoon, supra note 139, at 166. 
Id. 
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The Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1980-87) 
provided for judicial review similar to that under the 
Fourth Republic, with the only difference residing in the 
condi tions governing requests for review. Article 108 of 
the Constitution of 1980 established that: "When the 
constitutionality of a law is a prerequisite to a trial, the 
court, if it construes that the law at issue runs counter to 
the Constitution, shall request a decision of the 
Constitution Committee, and shall judge according to the 
decision thereof. ,,321 Thus, the court possessed the initial 
power to rule on the consti tutionali ty of a statute being 
subj ected to trial. If the court held the statute to be 
constitutional, there would be no further judicial action by 
the Constitution Committee. 322 As long as the new 
Constitution has recreated the Constitution Committee of the 
Fourth Republic without any attempt at activating it, it 
would be difficult to expect a more active role than before 
on the part of the Committee in reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws. 323 The Committee had reviewed no 
legislation at all during its existence. 
321 
322 
HONBOP [Constitution] art. 108 (amended 1980) . 
Youm, supra note 5, at 6. 
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C. INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 
1. United States 
The most dazzling jewel in the judicial crown of the U.S. is 
the revered and often controversial U. S. Supreme Court. It 
is the sole court mentioned specifically in Article III or 
in any part of the Constitution. All other federal courts 
have been created by statute. In the U.S., constitutional 
questions are brought up as a subj ect matter of general 
civil, criminal and administrative cases and judged together 
with the accompanying issues of the case. Thus eventually, 
Constitutional Law comes to work as a judicial norm in all 
kinds of courts. It is therefore false to say that the U.S. 
Supreme Court is the only institution of constitutional 
adjudication. The Supreme Court, more precisely, has the 
right of final authoritative interpretation. 
In the U.S. Supreme Court, there are no special inner 
organizations or procedural regulations concerning judicial 
review. The Supreme Court simply administers the process of 
judicial review according to the provisions that prescribe 
its jurisdiction and its general procedures. 
323 Yoon, supra note 139, at 168. 
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The Supreme Court of the u.s. is composed of one Chief 
Justice and eight Associate Justices. 324 Ranging from five 
to eight Justices in the first eighty years of its history, 
the Court has remained at nine ever since the first term of 
President Grant in 1869. 325 This odd number makes it 
unlikely that tie votes will occur. When a tie vote does 
occur, the decision of the lower court from which appeal has 
been taken to the Supreme Court is affirmed. 
Tenure of the Justices is not fixed, thus they can hold 
an office for life, unless they are removed due to 
impeachment or conviction. 326 Therefore, mandatory 
retirement at a certain age does not exist. Detailed 
provisions concerning the retirement of the justices are 
324 Art. 1. of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. 
325 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS l77 (5th ed. 1986). The Court 
has continued with nine Justices since 1869. Prior to this time, its 
membership was fixed by Congress, and comprised five in 1789, six in 
1790, seven in 1807, nine in 1837, ten in 1863, and eight in 1866. 
Recently there has not been a big argument about the number of Justices 
in the u.S. Supreme Court, but rather some arguments concerning the 
desirable number of judges at the federal appellate court level. Compare 
Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, 
at 52 (insisting upon expansion of the numbers) with Gerald B. Tjoflat, 
More Judges, Less Justice, ABA. J., July 1993, at 70-73 (objecting to a 
numerical increase for several reasons). 
326 See ABRAHAM, supra note 311 at 44. "In accordance with constitutional 
requirements, impeachment for 'Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors' may be [initiated] by a simple majority of the members 
of the House of Representatives, there being a quorum on the floor. 
Trial is then held in the Senate, which may convict by a vote of two-
thirds of the members of the Senate present and voting, if a quorum is 
present." rd. 
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found in Articles 371 to 376 of the Judiciary and Judicial 
procedure Act. Essential to the independence of the 
judiciary is the security of tenure, particularly in the 
case of appointed judges. 327 The splendid rhetoric, 
"judicial independence," would be mocked and derided without 
the armor of "a long term of office, preferably life, 
adequate remuneration, and stringent constitutional and/or 
statutory safeguards against removal. ,,328 
"The President shall nominate, and, by and with the 
advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint Justices of 
the Supreme Court." 329 When the office of Chief Justice is 
vacant, the President may appoint a Chief Justice among the 
existing Justices filling that vacancy with a new Justice, 
or can appoint a new Chief Justice directly from the outside. 
The latter has been the common choice. 
327 Life tenure would provide "that independent spirit in the judges ... 
essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty." Charles J. 
Cooper, The Federal Judiciary, Life Tenure, and Self-Government, 4 
Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 500, 501 (1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Besides, 
"Life tenure would place the judges 'in a situation altogether 
unprecedented in a free country,' rendering them independent in the 
fullest sense of the word. There is no power above them, to control any 
of their decisions." Id. (quoting Brutus, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, 
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 407, 418 (Herbert J. Storing 
ed., 1981). 
328 Id , at 41. 
329 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 
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The formal legal procedure for the appointment of 
Justices is as follows: 
First, the President designates and proclaims a justice 
nominee and notifies the Senate. The Senate Judiciary 
committee decides whether or not to approve the nominee. If 
the committee disapproves after screening the fitness of the 
nominee, the nomination is rejected. If the committee 
approves, it is transmitted to the plenary session. The 
Senate decides by majority vote whether or not to confirm. 
While the legal process of appointing Justices is 
comparatively simple, gaining legitimacy for appointments is 
not. Ensuring democratic values in appointments is achieved 
by understanding the doctrine of democracy and demonstrating 
the level of American democracy. This effort is made through 
a hearing, testimony, and investigation, which is done 
during the approval procedure but can be made outside of 
these official procedures as well. 
Efforts outside of the official process are usually 
made by so-called unofficial participants. These unofficial 
participants are generally divided into three groups. The 
first consists of the American Bar Association (ABA) and 
legal professional groups, the second consists of interest 
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groupS and pressure groups outside of law circles, and the 
last is comprised of the Justices of the u.s. Supreme Court 
themselves. These unofficial participants are involved in 
the whole process of judicial appointments in diverse ways. 
First, the President not only listens to the opinion of 
staff and law officers who assist him in the White House, 
but also refers to the information and materials that are 
collected by the FBI and the opinions of politicians. These 
sources are used in various ways based on the style of the 
President. Once a nominee is designated and proclaimed by 
the President, various kinds of citizens' groups and 
pressure groups that have an interest in the appointment 
develop lobbying activities to voice their opinions. 
At this stage, the Standing Committee of the Federal 
Judiciary, affiliated with the ABA, also launches a 
comprehensive evaluation operation of the nominee. It 
collects extensive data for judging the fitness of the 
nominee and brings out the results of its analysis in its 
opinion. Even though there have been differences according 
to the President's political style and methods of dealing 
with the Senate, ABA opinions have been influential in the 
President's nominee withdrawal and the Senate's approval 
procedures. Because these procedures present themselves as a 
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living example of democracy in practice, they show various 
aspects of how political powers are arranged and what the 
poli tical situations are at a given time. Therefore, the 
appointment procedure cannot be fixed in a definite form, 
and is arguably complicated. Political parties play an 
important role in these procedures. When the President is 
of one party and the Senate majority is of the other party, 
Justice appointments must be a compromise between the two 
parties. 
Nonetheless, all of these procedures can be summarized 
as an effort to have a sincere Justice for the people. The 
U.S. method of judicial appointment is becoming a good model 
for securing legitimacy and democratic justification in 
composing constitutional adjudication institutions. 
The U.S. Constitution says nothing about qualifications 
of the justices. To date, around forty of the Justices had 
not had a legal professional career at the time of their 
appointment, although all the Justices had been lawyers. In 
the past, political figures were appointed as Chief Justice 
and Justices, but since the 1970s, there has been a tendency 
for these positions to be filled by judges of the lower 
courts. Many of the Justices come from distinguished 
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families. More recently, more of them have come from 
prestigious schools such as Harvard, Yale and Columbia. 33o 
Ultimately, we can say that qualifications of the 
Justices actually become clear during the nomination 
procedure by the President and approval procedure by the 
senate. No legal qualifications exist; rather factual 
democratic procedure dominates the appointment procedure. 
Each Justice's own sense of value and view of life exert a 
large influence upon his or her adjudication. 
2. Korea 
Generally speaking, at the time the U.8. Constitution began 
to have an effect on Korea, the American-educated elite came 
back to Korea and began to contribute to the formulation of 
Korean Constitutional Law. Due to the numerous Koreans that 
have studied in the U. 8., the transplantation of the U. 8. 
system into Korea cannot be neglected. The present Korean 
Constitution has the Korean Constitutional Court as its 
consti tutional adj udication institution, which can be said 
330 COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS & ITS JUSTICES 1790-1991 278-
81 (1992). 
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to have been created to some degree under the influence of 
the u.s. 
The Constitutional court has nine justices including 
one Chief Justice like the United States Supreme Court. 331 
The right of appointment is given to the President like the 
united States, but the selecting process is different from 
the United States and, at least, closer to that of the U.S. 
in that a special non-standing committee is not established 
for the nomination. Basically, the nine justices are 
nominated three each by the President, National Assembly and 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 332 
The Chief Justice has the same rights as the other 
Justices in the adjudication process. He represents the 
whole court and directs the Court's administration. He 
should be appointed not by the Assemblies but by the 
President. However, he should be appointed from among the 
judges and he is the only one who should get the concurrence 
of the National Assembly in appointment. 333 
331 S. Korea Const. Art 111, § 2. 
332 d 
"Of the adjudicators [referred] to in Sec.2., three shall be selecte 
from among persons chosen by the National Assembly, with the remaining 
three to be selected by the Chief Justice." S. Korea Const. Art 111, § 2. 
333 "The head of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed by the 
President from among the adjudicators with the concurrence of the 
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In the tenure of judges, Korea has both tenure and age 
limits unlike the United States. The tenure office of judge 
is six years and the age limit is sixty-five for Justices 
and seventy for the Chief Justice. 334 As in Germany, 
Justices are automatically retired upon reaching the age 
limit even though it is before the completion of their term 
of office. 
The qualifications of the Korean Justices are specified 
in relatively detailed legal and constitutional provisions 
which are very similar to those of Germany. The Justices 
should have qualifications to be a judicial officer 335 and 
are appointed among persons who are more than forty years 
old and who have worked more than fifteen years in one of 
the following jobs: Judge, public prosecutor, lawyer, legal 
work in a national organization (national and public 
corporations government-invested corporation) with lawyer's 
license, and law professors at an accredited law school with 
a lawyer's license. 336 This means that a law professor, even 
with many years of teaching and research experience, cannot 
National Assembly." Id. at Art 111, § 4. 
334 art. 7 KCCC 
335 See S. Korea Canst. art. 111 § 2. 
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a Justice unless he passes the national judicial 
. t' 337 Th f examlna lon. ere ore, in the composition of the KCC, law 
participation cannot be found at all so far. 
law professors do not take the national judicial 
338 
exam. 
A Justice cannot hold other offices during the tenure. 
He or she cannot serve concurrently as a congressman, civil 
servant or consultant executive in a corporation or private 
organization, and cannot manage his own business for 
profi t. 339 
336 See art. 5. § 1 KCCC. 
337 The lawyer's license is granted to the person who has completed a two 
year training program at the Judicial Research and Training Institute 
(JRTI) of the Supreme Court after passing the national judicial exam in 
Korea. The Lawyer Act provides for the qualifications of lawyers as 
follows, "Any person who is a national of the Republic of Korea and who 
falls under any of the following Subparagraphs shall be qualified as a 
lawyer: 1. Person who has passed the Judicial Examination and completed 
the required course of the Judicial Research and Training Institute; and 
2. Person who has the qualifications for judge or public prosecutor." 
Lawyer Act, art. 4. 
338 See Chang Soo Yang, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Korea, 25 
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 303, 306 (1993). "Nearly all students in Korea 
who want to be a law professor prefer to study abroad after graduation 
rather than enter JRTI (Judicial Research and Training Institute) for 
the apprenticeship and apply for the national bar examination .... Only 
four university professors are qualified as a lawyer." Id. 
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D. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONTITUTIONAL COURT 
1. Foundation of the Constitution Court 
With the Constitution of the Sixth Republic, judicial review 
has resurrected. The Constitution Court first adopted in the 
1960 Constitution has been reinstated. Article 113 (3) of 
the Constitution provided that the organization, function 
and other necessary matters of the Constitutional Court 
shall be determined by statute. 340 In order to draft the 
constitutional court act, the Ministry of Justice formed a 5 
member task force composed of working staffs from the Court, 
the Ministry of Legislation, and the former Constitutional 
Committee on November 5, 1987. 341 After examining many 
issues, including whether the subject matter of 
constitutional complaint should include ordinary. court's 
judgments, the task force decided to exclude ordinary 
court's judgments in its proposal on December 18, 1987, and 
completed the first draft around early January of 1988. 342 
In the month of January 1988, the Ministry of Justice as 
well as private organizations of public law scholar held 
339 Art. 14 KCCC. 
340. Honbop 
341. Constitutional Court, The First Ten Years of The Korean 
Constitutional Court (1988-1998), December 2001, 
<www.ccourt.go.kr/english/decision03.htm> 
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series of seminars and public hearings to resolve the 
unsettled issues. The main issue was whether ordinary 
court's judgments should be challengeable on constitutional 
complaints. Discussions clearly divided two opposite 
opinions: legal experts from academia and litigation 
attorneys asserted the necessity of including such 
jurisdiction343 and however, the judges otherwise argued that 
it was too early to accept such power to Korean 
Constitutional Court. A task force committee member Judge 
Lee Kang-kuk argued against the inclusion for the following 
two reasons; 
342 Id. 
First, the West German model of constitutional court, 
especially, the system of constitutional complaint, is 
extremely rare worldwide. To introduce it into Korea, a 
country with completely different social and political 
backgrounds, carries a risk. Secondly, the West German 
Federal Constitutional Court is an integral part of the 
judiciary along with the Supreme Court, and is a 
genuine j udicial institution composed only of federal 
judges. In Korea, the judicial power belongs to the 
ordinary courts headed up by the Supreme Court, and the 
Constitutional Court stands independently of these 
courts and its members are merely required to have the 
qualification of a judge but not to be a career judge. 
Subj ecting judgments of ordinary courts to the 
challenges on constitutional complaint means that the 
Constitutional Court exercises the judicial power, and 
resul ts the creation of the fourth court higher than 
the Supreme Court. 344 
343. Id. Attorneys Choe Kwang-ryool, Lee Sang-kyu, Kim-sun, and scholars 
Lee Kang-hyuk, Gye Hee-yul, Kim Nam-jin, etc., acknowledged the 
necessity to include while the ordinary courts opposed the inclusion. 
344, Id. 
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Furthermore, because of the unstableness of the 
Consti tutional Court or the Constitutional Committee which 
comes and goes during the previous amendment, it is 
inappropriate to subject the decisions of such powerful 
entity to review of the Constitutional Court. 
However, for the other side, Attorney Sang-kyu Lee 
argued that the most crucial goal to have a constitutional 
court must be the safeguard for the fundamental human rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution. For archiving this goal, 
all the acts of all the three branches must be subject to 
review through the constitutional complaint process. If 
ordinary courts' judgments are completely excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the constitutional complaint process, they 
constitute a sanctuary free from the checks of the principle 
of separation of powers. 345 Other legal experts emphasized 
the importance of understanding the intent behind the entire 
constitutional amendment and especially the intent behind it 
provisions concerning the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court. 346 This new constitution was the 
product of the long struggle for Koreans' pro-democratic 
movement 
345 
346 
Id. 
Id. 
and therefore it must reflect the will to 
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strengthen the powers of the Constitutional Court and the 
independence of the Judiciary which were being too passive. 
Professor HUh-young who was influenced by German 
constitutionalism during his study in Germany and also known 
as one of the most notable constitutional law scholars 
asserted that the scope and subject matter of constitutional 
complaint must be established in the perspective of 
obtaining the effectiveness of the protection of basic 
rights. He argued that all constitutional institutions are 
ultimately established for the purpose of realizing the 
values of the basic rights and therefore have no power to 
justify their acts violating these values. 347 Therefore, 
even judgments of the ordinary court must receive 
constitutional evaluation through the constitutional 
complaint process lest they go against the correct 
interpretation of the Constitution or are based on an 
incorrect interpretation violative of the spirit of the 
Constitution. 348 
Based on these discussions and despite the demands from 
the legal scholars, the Ministry of Justice drafted the bill 
and announced its intent to legislate in early May, 1988 and 
347 
348 
Id. 
Id. 
187 
it excluded ordinary courts' 
constitutional complaint process 
judgments 
but 
from 
allowed 
the 
a 
consti tutional complaint against the court's denial of a 
party's motion for constitutional review of a statute. The 
Korean Public Law Association and the Korean Bar Association 
maintained that ordinary courts' j udgments themselves must 
be included. 349 
In the mean time, the Administration and the - ruling 
party decided that it would be more desirable for the new 
bill to be submitted in form of a parliamentary legislation 
by a political party since it was aimed at protection of 
basic rights. Therefore, the ruling party took over the 
draft of the Ministry of Justice and after several revisions 
submitted it to the National Assembly on July 4. Three 
opposition parties also submitted their own bill on July 18, 
incorporating substantially from the Korean Bar 
Association's proposal. The ruling party's bill provided for 
only four full-time Justices including the President of the 
Constitutional Court and excluded ordinary courts' judgments 
from the subject matter of the constitutional complaint 
process but instead allowed a constitutional complaint 
349 Id. 
188 
against the court's denial of a party's motion for 
constitutional review of a statute. However, the opposition 
parties' proposal provided that all nine Justices were full-
time, the jurisdiction included ordinary courts' judgments 
in the constitutional complaint process, and even allowed 
direct petition for constitutional adjudication if 
exhaustion of all appellate processes were to result in 
irreparable injury. 
The Third meeting of the Judiciary Committee of the 
143rd Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly on July 
21, 1988 reviewed the two proposals and decided to form a 
five-member review sub-committee for more effective review 
of the proposals. The sub-committee was composed of two 
ruling party members and three opposition party members. The 
sub-committee reviewed the two proposals until July 22 and 
rejected both in favor of a new proposal, which was 
submitted to the Plenary Session as the Judiciary 
Committee's proposal. It incorporated mainly the elements of 
the ruling party's proposal. As a result, six out of nine 
justices were full-time, and ordinary courts' judgments were 
excluded from the constitutional complaint process. The new 
proposal was passed without any objection at the 5th meeting 
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of the Judiciary Committee on July 23 and then at the Second 
plenary Session of the 143rd Session of the National 
Assembly. The bill was sent to the Administration on July 27, 
1988, was promulgated as Act No. 4017 on August 5, and went 
into effect on September 1. The official commentary on the 
current Constitution states: 
The principle of the separation of the legislative, 
executive and judicial powers is basic to modern 
constitutional democracy. The amended Constitution is 
thus designed to assure that the president will not 
have excessive power, as he did so often in the past.. ... 
Any citizen who feels the State has abused his rights 
can petition the Constitution Court for rectification ..... . 
The independence of the judiciary is stringently 
safeguarded.... . The creation of the Constitution Court 
is intended to more effectively preserve and defend the 
Constitution, while avoiding the politicization of 
courts of law due to their involvement in 
consti tutionali ty controversies. 350 
Needless to say, the establishment of the Constitution Court 
has taken a great attention from not only the drafting 
committee but also from legal academia. In addition to the 
establishment of the Court, however, for this amendment 
Korean people finally began to believe that this change has 
paved the way for easier access to constitutional 
adjudication. It also has been discussed on adopting the 
so-called American style of the constitutional review that 
350 Korea Overseas Information Service, Supra Note at 48-50. 
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had exercised such a review in the period of the Third 
Republic (1962-71) during the drafting. However, since a 
number of influential Korean public law experts had 
undertaken advance studies in Europe, particularly in 
western Germany, structures of judicial review based on 
German and Austrian models has been their alternatives to 
the so-called American system. 351 Moreover, Korea is not a 
federal state like America, and the judiciary hierarchy is 
organized in a unitary system of three levels-district 
courts and family courts of first instance, high courts, and 
supreme courts. 352 
2. The Jurisdiction of the Constitution~l Court 
The two main jurisdictions of the Constitutional Court are 
its power to adj udicate the consti tutionali ty of statutes 
and constitutional petitions. The Court also has 
jurisdictions over impeachment, the dissolution of political 
parties, and competence disputes between the state organs. 
351 West & Youn, Supra note at 77. 
352 (1) District courts and family courts of first instance (subdivided 
into single-judge and collegiate trial divisions, also containing 
appellate divisions which hear appeals of cases decided by single 
judges); (2) High courts (hearing appeals de novo from administrative 
agency decisions and from collegiate divisions of district courts); and 
(3) Supreme Court (hearing appeals from high courts and appellate 
di visions of district and family courts, and exceptional appeals from 
courts of first instance). See Court Organization Act, Law No. 51 of 
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Article 111 of the current Constitution provides; 
(1 ) The Constitution Court shall adjudicate the 
following matters: 
1. The constitutionality of a law upon the request 
of the courts; 
2. Impeachment; 
3. Dissolution of a political party; 
4. Disputes about the jurisdictions between State 
agencies, between State agencies and local 
governments and between local governments; and 
5. Petitions relating to the Constitution as 
prescribed by law. 
(2) The Constitution Court shall be composed of 
adj udicators qualified to be court judges, and 
shall be appointed by the President. 
nine 
they 
(3) Among the adjudicators referred to in Paragraph (2), 
three shall be appointed from persons selected by the 
National Assembly, and three appointed form person 
nominated by the Chief Justice. 
(4) The head of the Constitution Court shall be 
appointed by the President from among the adjudicators 
with the consent of the National Assembly.353 
Among the above competencies, concrete judicial review is 
the very thing that has been directly affected by the United 
States. Concrete judicial review is the only and 
representative competence of constitutional adjudication 
which has continuously existed since the first republic in 
Korea. Actually, when enacting the Korean Constitution of 
the first republic, provisions on concrete judicial review 
Sept. 26, 1949, as last amended by Law No. 4017 of Aug. 5, 1988. 
353. Korean Overseas Information Service, CONSTITUTION: THE REPUBLIC OF 
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were adopted that had been present since its drafting-stage 
without an objection. 
When we think that the device of judicial review is the 
invention of the u.s. Supreme Court built up by the 
precedent of Marbury v. Madison (1803) and spread to the 
other countries including Germany in the early twentieth 
century, the influence of the U.S. experience becomes more 
understandable. 
Even though Korea has received some elements of 
judicial review from Germany, it can be said that in a wide 
sense these factors were originally modeled on the U. S. , 
even if received via Germany. Among the factors, some have 
been transformed into the Germanized style. Admitting the 
general effect over the individual effect as the force of 
ruling "against the Constitution" can be offered as a 
typical example. Of course, Korea admits the general effect 
li ke Germany, 354 but, as stated before, because of the 
principle of stare decisis in the U. S., the U. S. reaches 
KOREA 36 (1987). 
354 See art. 47 KCCC. A law or legal provision declared to be 
unconstitutional loses its force. However, the point of time when the 
provision loses its force is different between Korea and Germany. In 
Germany the unconstitutional provision becomes naturally void from the 
beginning (ex-tunc Wirkung). In Korea the unconstitutional provision, 
unless being criminal law provision, loses its force from the day of 
ruling unconstitutional. See art. 47 § 2 FCCC. 
193 
nearly the same result as having a general effect when we 
see it on the whole. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has an exclusive first instance 
jurisdiction over a conflict between two or more States, and 
has a non-exclusive first instance jurisdiction over 
litigation in which a foreign ambassador is a party and 
conflicts between the United States and a state. With the 
exception of these limitations, the Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction. 355 The appellate jurisdiction has 
relatively more importance and actually more cases than the 
other. The interpretation and application of the 
Constitution is judged mostly in appellate cases. 
Concerning judicial review, there are occasions when 
the consti tutionali ty of laws and ordinances is reviewed 
under appellate jurisdiction by the litigant's appeal and 
directly reviewed under the certiorari issued to aU. S. 
Court of Appeals or State Supreme Court upon the litigant's 
applica tion. 356 Issuing of a writ of certiorari is subject 
to the discretion of the U.S. Supreme Court. The court that 
reviewing the certiorari should send all the records of the 
355 See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994). 
356 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1994). 
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litigation to the u.s. Supreme Court. In this judicial 
review, the court does not necessarily review only whether 
the norm (law, administrative order etc. ) is 
unconstitutional or not. The Supreme Court may reach a final 
decision in the case or may remand to a lower court which 
will reach a final decision in the light of the Supreme 
Court decision on the question of the constitutional law 
raised. The unconstitutionality of an administrative order 
and administrative measure is reviewable as well. 
a. Review of the Constitutionality of Legislation 
Pursuant to Article 111 (1) 1 of the Constitution and 
Article 41 of the Constitutional Court Act, the 
Constitutional Court can adjudicate on the constitutionality 
of a law upon the request of ordinary courts. However, this 
power of constitutional review coexists with the Supreme 
Court's power to adjudicate the constitutionality of 
presidential decrees, ministerial ordinances and other forms 
of administrative regulations. The Constitutional Court 
renders judgment on the constitutionality of a statute only 
upon the request of the court with original jurisdiction 
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over the case and in this process, the Supreme Court 
channels the request. Article 107 of the current 
constitution provides: 
(1) When the constitutionality of a law is at issue in 
a trial, the court shall request a decision of the 
Consti tution Court, and shall judge according to the 
decision thereof. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to make a 
final review of the constitutionality or legality of 
administrative decrees, regulations or actions, when 
their consti tutionali ty or legality is at issue in a 
trial. 357 
Under this system of concrete norms control, when the 
constitutionality of a statute or statutory provision forms 
the premise of a case pending in an ordinary court, the 
ordinary court where raises the issue of the review can 
request the Constitutional Court to adjudicate on the 
constitutionality of that statute or that statutory 
provision. Such power of norms control may, however, become 
easily ineffective because its exercise is premised on an 
ordinary court's request. Our constitutional history already 
witnessed the near demise of constitutional adjudication 
systems in the past due to the inactivity of ordinary courts 
in exercising their request powers. Article 68 (2) of the 
Consti tutional Court Act is an institutional response to 
that weakness: a party to a trial can obtain constitutional 
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review of the statute at issue without request of the court 
with original jurisdiction over the case, by filing a 
constitutional complaint when its motion for constitutional 
review is denied by its original court. 358 
The Constitution requires that all questions of the 
constitutional validity of legislation be submitted to the 
Constitution Court. The request for judicial review may be 
made by the trial court on its own or at the request of the 
party involved. When denied the referral of a 
constitutional question by the trial court, a party can 
pursue two additional ways for judicial review. The party 
may either raise its original question about the 
constitutionality of the law on appeal to a higher court, or 
may petition directly to the Constitution Court. 359 Unlike 
the United States Supreme Court, which exercise discretion 
in choosing cases to review through the use of writs of 
cert iorar i, the juri sdiction of the Constitution Court of 
357 HONBOP, art. 107 
358 Article 68 (2) of Constitutional Court Act provides that "If a 
request made under Article 41 (1) for adjudgment on whether the law is 
unconstitutional or not, is rejected, the requesting party may request 
an adjudgment on constitutional petition to the Constitutional Court. 
In this case, the party may not request again an adjudgment on whether 
it is unconstitutional or not, for the same reason in the legal 
prodedure of the case concerned." 
359. Id, art 68 (2). 
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Korea is mandatory. 360 The Court's jurisdiction, however, 
is invoked only when the regular courts request review of 
the constitutionality of legislation. In other words, it is 
essential that the constitutionality of a law be formulated 
as a concrete issue or controversy for the Court to have 
jurisdiction. 361 
Referral of constitutional questions may be made by 
trial courts at the request of a party or sua sponte. The 
decision whether to refer the constitutional question relies 
on preliminary determinations by the court that (1) the 
consti tutionali ty of a particular law is doubtful, and (2) 
the final judgment in the case will be predicated on an 
application of that law, or if only a portion Df the law is 
of doubtful constitutionality, of the doubtful portion. 362 
b. Impeachment 
The second jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is to 
review the impeachment case. The current Constitution gives 
the National Assembly the power to initiate the impeachment 
process through indictment in Article 65 (1) and grants the 
Constitutional Court the power to adjudicate on the merits 
360 
361 
Youm, supra note 5, at 9. 
Id. 
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the impeachment in Article 111 (1) [2]. 
Under Article 65 of the Constitutional Court Act, the 
president is subject to impeachment by a two-thirds majority 
vote of the National Assembly for violations of the 
constitution or other laws. Other officials are subject to 
impeachment by a simple majority vote. The Act also 
provides that the Constitutional Court may suspend an 
impeachment proceeding if a criminal action is pending. 363 
If the impeached official resigns before judgment, the 
Consti tutional Court dismiss the case as moot. 364 It also 
provides that a judgment of impeachment shall not exempt the 
accused from civil or criminal or other liabilities. 365 
Since the inception of an independent Impeachment Court 
during the 1st Republic, impeachment, though changing in 
forms, has made it possible to discipline high officials and 
others whose status are constitutionally protected and are 
outside the reach of an ordinary legal or personnel 
proceeding when they violate the Constitution and 
statutes. 366 The current Constitution grants the impeachment 
power for prosecution and indictment to the National 
Assembly and that of adjudication to the Constitutional 
362. West & Yoon, Supra note 
363 CCA, Art. 51. 
364 Id. Art. 53 (2). 
365 Id. Art. 54 (1). 
at 89. 
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court. Impeachment is by nature not a criminal proceeding 
but a disciplinary one. 
For the first time in Korean constitutional history, 
the incumbent President has been on impeachment trial. In 
12 May 2004, the National Assembly passed an unprecedented 
motion to impeach President Roh Moo-hyun. A total of 193 
opposition lawmakers voted in favor of the impeachment 
motion, which was filed for Roh's alleged violation of 
election law. T he numb e r exceeded the 181 v 0 t e s ,or two-
thirds of the 271 incumbent lawmakers, needed to suspend the 
president's powers. 367 Roh, who became the head of state in 
a surprise election victory 13 months ago, has been relieved 
of his presidential powers after he received the official 
impeachment notice from the Assembly, Prime Minister Goh Kun 
began to act on Roh's behalf for up to six months. The 
Constitutional Court has 180 days to review the motion and 
rule on whether to uphold the impeachment motion, with a 
majority decision by the nine judges determining Roh's 
political future. 
367 Korea Times, March 12, 2004. 
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c. Dissolution of Political Parties 
The institution of dissolving political parties functions as 
a means to defend or struggle for the basic order of free 
democracy. Introduced first by the 2nd Republic Constitution 
(Art. 13 (2) and Art. 83-3), it has been maintained till now 
though governed by different entities. Article 8 (4) of 
the 9th Amended Constitution provides that "if the purposes 
or acti vi ties of a political party are contrary to the 
fundamental democratic order, the Government may bring an 
action for its dissolution in the Constitutional Court, and 
the political party shall be dissolved in accordance to the 
decision of the Constitutional Court." The power to bring 
the dissolution action is granted to the Administration 
while the ultimate decision is made by the Constitutional 
Court. Since a political party serves an important political 
role in a democratic state, it is protected by a procedural 
and substantive privilege not granted to other organizations, 
and it can be dissolved only by the decision of the 
Constitutional Court. 
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d. Competence Dispute 
competence dispute is aimed at facilitating the operation of 
state agencies by clarifying the scope and nature of powers 
allocated to them and protecting the normative force of the 
consti tution by maintaining the checks and balances. The 
9th Amended Constitution grants the Constitutional Court the 
power to adjudicate competence dispute between state 
agencies, between a state agency and a local government, or 
between local governments. The Constitutional Court Act 
allows the petition for a competence dispute proceeding to 
be brought only when the respondent entity's action or non-
action violates or has a clear danger of violating the 
rights of the petitioning entity. 
e. Constitutional Petitions 
More importantly, the current Constitution recognizes the 
power of the Constitution Court to adjudicate "Petitions 
relating to the Constitution as prescribed by law. If 368 
Article 68 of Constitution Court Act provides two kinds of 
constitutional petition procedure as follows: 
368 HONBOP CHAEPANSOBOP [Constitution Court Act], Law No. 4017 (1988), 
art 68 (1), translated in I CURRENT LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, at 91-
13 (1997). 
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(1) Any person who is infringed his fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution due to exercise or non-
exercise of the public power, may request to the 
Constitutional Court an adjudgment on constitutional 
petition excluding a trial of the court: Provided, That 
if any relief process is provided by other laws, no one 
may file a constitutional complaint without having 
exhausted all such processes. 
(2) If the motion made under Article 41 (1) for 
adjudication on constitutionality of statutes is 
rejected, the party may file a constitutional complaint 
with the Constitutional Court. In this case, the party 
may not repeatedly move to request for adjudication on 
the constitutionality of statutes for the same reason 
in the procedure of the case concerned. 369 
This constitutional provision enables citizens who feel that 
their rights have been violated to petition the Constitution 
Court directly for rectification. 37o The Constitution Court 
Act of 1988 provides matters necessary for the organization 
and operation of the Constitution Court and the procedure 
for its adj udement. 371 As for the procedure for judicial 
review, the Constitution Court renders judgment on the 
constitutionality of a statute upon the request of the court 
wi th original jurisdiction over the case. 372 If the request 
is made by court other than the Supreme Court, it is 
referred through the Supreme Court to the Constitutional 
369 HONBOP, art. 68 
370 Youm, supra note 5, at 8. 
371 HONBOP JAEPANSOBOP [Constitution Court Act] , Law No. 4017 (1988) , 
art 1. 
372 HONBOP JAEPANSOBOP [Constitution Court Act] , Law No. 4017 (1988) , 
art 41 (1) . 
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373 Court. 
Constitutional petition is aimed at protecting people's 
basic rights from exercises of governmental power and allows 
them to petition for constitutional review of those 
exercises of governmental power. It is recognized in various 
forms in Germany and other countries with independent 
constitutional courts. Constitutional complaint serves both 
a subj ecti ve function of providing relief to individuals 
whose rights are infringed and an obj ecti ve function of 
checking unconstitutional exercises of governmental power 
and thus upholding the constitutional order. Aside from the 
ordinary, remedial form of constitutional petition, the 
Constitutional Court Act adds the element of objective norms 
control (a constitutional petition brought under Article 68 
(2) of the Constitutional Court Act to request review of a 
statute), unique only to the Korean system. 
In a landmark decision of 1990 and one of the most 
controversial cases, the Constitutional Court affirmed that 
the Constitutional Court possessed concurrent jurisdiction 
to review the consti tutionali ty of enforcement regulations 
notwithstanding the provision of Article 107 (2). 374 In 
373 Id, art 41 (5). 
374 Oct. 15, 1990, 89 HonKa 178, 2 KCCR 365. 
Explanation of Abbreviation and Code for Constitutional Court's Cases is 
as follows: 
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this case, a petition was field to challenge the 
consti tutionali ty of the Judiciary Agent's Act Enforcement 
Regulation promulgated by the Supreme Court under the Act. 375 
The petitioner claimed that the Supreme Court, in its 
administration of licensing procedures for paralegal 
professional, know as BobMuSa (the Certified Judicial 
Scrivener), gave discriminatory advantages to court clerks 
and employees of the public prosecutor's offices over 
individuals who gained their experience working for private 
lawyers. 
As Mentioned earlier, article 107 (2 ) of the 
Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has the power 
of final review over the consti tutionali ty of rules and 
regulations. It only means that, when a trial depends on 
KCCR : Korean Constitutional Court Report 
KCCG : Korean Constitutional Court Gazette 
Case Codes 
- Hun-Ka : constitutionality case referred by ordinary courts according 
to Article 41 of the Constitutional Court Act 
- Hun-Ba :constitutionality case filed by individual complainant(s) in 
the form of constitutional complaint according to Article 68 (2) of the 
Constitutional Court Act 
- Hun-Ma : constitutional complaint case filed by individual 
complainant(s) according to Article 68 (1) of the Constitutional Court 
Act 
- Hun-Ra : case involving dispute regarding the competence of 
governmental agencies filed according to Article 61 of the 
Constitutional Court Act 
For example, "96Hun-Ka2" means the constitutionality case referred by an 
ordinary court, the docket number of which is No. 2 in the year 1996. 
375. Law no. 1333 (April 25, 1963) (last amended by Law no. 3828, art. 
4 (2 ) (Ma y 12, 1 98 6) ) . 
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the constitutionality of rules or regulations, there should 
be no need for the issue to be referred to the 
constitutional Court but, unlike statutes, it should remain 
wi thin the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and therefore 
subject to its final review. However, the provision does not 
apply to a constitutional petition filed on grounds that 
basic rights have been violated by rules and regulations 
themselves. The 'governmental power' subject to 
consti tutional adj udication, as in Article 68 (1) of the 
Constitutional Court Act, refers to all powers including 
legislative, judicial and administrative. Statutes enacted 
by the legislature, regulations and rules promulgated by the 
executive, and rules made by the judiciary may directly 
violate basic rights without awaiting any enforcement action, 
in which case they are immediately subject to constitutional 
adjudication. 
Article 107 (2) of the Consti tution gives the Supreme 
Court the final authority on constitutionality of the rules 
and regulations that form the premise of a trial. Whether it 
can be interpreted to give the Constitutional Court a review 
power on rules and regulations has been debated. Finally 
the Constitutional Court ruled that, for the purpose of 
206 
maintaining consistency in interpreting the Constitution, 
its jurisdiction naturally encompasses the right to 
adjudicate enforcement regulations issued pursuant to 
376 
statutes. This decision made it clear when rules and 
regulations directly violate people's basic rights, their 
constitutionality is reviewed by the Constitutional Court, 
and upon that premise, invalidated a provision of the Rules 
of the Supreme Court for the first time in Korean 
consti tutional history. 377 
Immediately after the announcement of the decision, the 
Supreme Court officially obj ected to it by publishing the 
Constitution Research Group of the Ministry of Court 
Administration's report on rules and regulations review. The 
gist of the report is that Article 101 of the Constitution 
identifies the Supreme Court as the highest court overseeing 
the judiciary while Article 107 (2 ) gives the Supreme Court 
and other ordinary courts the exclusive power to review non-
statutory inferior laws such as rules and regulations. The 
report went on to argue that it is possible and also 
necessary to first challenge the rules and regulations that 
directly infringe upon basic rights in judicial review of 
administration, in order to satisfy the rule of exhaustion 
376 Ahn, Supra note 56, at 96. 
377 Id. 
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of prior remedies. Therefore, the report pointed out, if the 
Consti tutional Court were to review rules and regulations, 
exercise of such power must be preceded by an organization 
and structure that can sustain such exercise. 
Responses from the academia and law practitioners were 
mixed. Some supported the view of the Supreme Court while 
the majority supported the Constitutional Court's decision. 
Supporters of the Court's decision argued that the converse 
of Article 101 (2) mandates, if rules and regulations do not 
form the premise of a trial, their review must be left with 
the Court. They also argued that the term 'final' in Article 
107 (2 ) describes the Supreme Court's position in the 
hierarchy of the ordinary courts' system, not any final 
review power it has over its relationship with the 
Constitutional Court. Others noted contradictions in Article 
107 (2) that the provision intended for review of laws 
covers administrative actions, which are not laws, while 
failing to mention local government laws such as ordinances 
and rules. They argued that it should not be treated as 
absolute, and should be revised or repealed through 
consti tutional amendments. On the Supreme Court's position 
that the rules and regulations, which directly infringe on 
basic rights, are essentially administrative actions and 
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therefore can be subject to ordinary judicial review, some 
argued that not all such rules and regulations are action-
like, and many of them may infringe through their norm-like 
aspects. Professor Ahn summarized this debate as follows: 
The stand-off between the two high courts of Korea is 
not likely to be easily resolved, and there is no 
easily discerned line of demarcation between them. One 
may legitimately argue that the Supreme Court is in a 
superior position to the Constitutional Court. The 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has a constitutional 
power to nominate three of the nine justices of the 
Constitutional Court. And the Supreme Court has 
unchallengeable power to control and administrate the 
national judiciary. On the other hand, the 
Constitutional Court is a peak without a visible 
pyramid to administer. Functionally, however , it has 
final say on the meaning of the "supreme" law of the 
land. Additionally, popular support for this new 
institution is much stronger than the other, older 
judicial body, with its unpopular history. 378 
Former Justice Byun Jung-soo who wrote the opinion of this 
case recalled his decision in his memoir describing how 
difficult to make the final decision for this case. 
According to his book titled "BopJungYeoJung" ("The Journey 
to the Court": My Memoir of the Days in the Constitutional 
Court), there had been enormous obstacle and interruptions 
from the Supreme Court, the media, and as legal academia as 
well as lobbies from judges and politicians. Furthermore, 
during the discussion with justices, most justices were 
378 Ahn, Supra note 56, at 96. 
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opposed to his opinion, and particularly the justices who 
were appointed by the Supreme Court strongly raised the 
issue that his decision would led to a disparagement from 
the Supreme Court and given such power to the Constitutional 
Court exceeded its authority described in the Constitution. 
Furthermore, those justices demanded Chief Justice to 
postpone the pronouncement of the decision. Knowing this 
and being afraid of the possibility of dismissal of the case, 
Justice Byun leaked such confidential information to the 
press. It turned out bigger than he expected. Korean news 
media began to question the conspiracy between the Supreme 
Court and the Constitutional Court and this news had taken a 
great attention. Finally, as Justice Byun intended, the 
Constitutional Court ruled and pronounced its decision. 
Justice Byun recalled as follows: 
"I tried so hard to persuade my colleague in order to 
declare the unconstitutionality. When the National 
Assembly found that I gave the press the confidential 
information, they even tried to impeach me. However, 
this decision has a great valuable meaning in terms of 
ending the Supreme Court's dominated power in the 
judiciary, confirming that the Constitutional Court 
has the power to review of constitutionality of 
administrative decrees, regulations or actions. ,,379 
Compared to the debates during the time of the decision, 
379 Byun Jung-soo, BobJungYeoJung ("The Journey to The Courts: My Memoir 
of the Days in the Constitutional Court"), 213 (1997). 
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most legal scholars now agree to this landmark decision and 
therefore, the Constitutional Court's power to review has 
been extended to all of the statutes, administrative decrees, 
regulations and governmental actions or non-actions if those 
laws and governmental actions or non-actions infringe the 
fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
3. Statistical Review of the Constitutional Court Case 
From September 1988 to December 31, 2003, the Constitution 
Court had disposed of 8,978 cases out of 9,558 cases 
legitimately filed with the Court. The records are made up 
wi th 472 reviews of consti tutionali ty of legislation and 
9,066 constitutional petitions. 38D 
As of May 1995, the Constitution Court had disposed of 
42 cases referred by the ordinary courts for ruling on the 
constitutionality of legislation. The total number of cases 
referred amounted to 290, however 92 referrals were 
subsequently withdrawn, and 20 cases remained pending. 
Constitutional review of legislation wound up with 32 
declaration of unconstitutionality, 1 decision of 
unconsti tutional in part, 3 decisions of inconsistent with 
380 Sang-Hie Han, SOUTH KOREA, in ASIA-PACIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL YEARBOOK 
237, 246 (Saunders & Hassa11 ed., 1996). 
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constitution and 6 decisions of Constitutional on condition 
of proper interpretation. 
Case Statistics of the Constitutional Court 
of Korea 
Constitu- Im- Disso1u-
Type Total tiona1ity lPeach- tion of a 
of Law1 ) ment Political Party 
Filed 9558 472 
Settled 8978 434 
Dismissed by Small 3335 Benches 
Unconstitutional 249 83 
Unconformable 
to 74 25 
Constitution 
Unconstitutional, 
in certain 44 15 
context 
Decided Constitutional, 
by in certain 28 7 
Full context 
Bench Constitutional 755 186 
Annulled 198 
Rejected 2947 
Dismissed 97l 19 
Miscellaneous 4 
Withdrawn 373 99 
Pending 580 38 
As of Dec 31, 2003 
Compe- Constitutional 
tence Petitions 
Dispute Sub- §68 §68 
total I II 
20 9066 7897 1169 
16 8528 7497 1031 
3335 3229 106 
166 34 132 
49 10 39 
29 6 23 
21 21 
569 3 566 
2 196 196 
6 2941 2941 
6 946 835 111 
4 3 1 
2 272 240 32 
4 538 400 138 
Records against constitutional petitions show 20 
declarations of unconstitutionality, 4 decisions of 
inconsistent with Constitution, 3 decisions of 
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-
unconsti tutional in part, 2 decisions of constitutional on 
condition of proper interpretation, 29 grants of petition, 
77 confirmation of constitutionality, 966 dismissals for 
lack of jurisdictional prerequisites, 421 dismissals on the 
merits, 109 voluntary withdrawals of the parties and 395 
cases remained pending. 
4. Modified Forms of the Constitution Court Decision & 
Standards of Review 
The Justices of the Korean Constitution Court have adopted 
the German practice of issuing judgments in several forms 
that dispose of constitutionality problems without actually 
invalidating legislation. 381 The modified forms of decisions 
are designed to avoid total invalidation of the statute in 
those cases where the Constitutional Court found it to be in 
violation of the Constitution. These are employed in order 
either to give deference to the legislature's policy-making 
privilege or to avoid the vacuum in law that would probably 
result from total invalidation. Since modified forms of 
decisions are not expressly provided either in the 
Constitution or in the Constitutional Court Act, their legal 
381 James M. West & Dae-Kyu Yoon, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: TRANSFORMING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE VORTEX? 40 Am. 
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grounds and legitimacy were weak and controversial in the 
beginning. However, before the end of its first year of 
operation, the Constitutional Court recognized the necessity 
of such special forms of decisions and firmly established 
their legitimacy by the end of the First Term of the Court 
in 1994 despite strong dissenting opinions throughout those 
decisions where the Court adopted those modified forms of 
decision. 382 
a. The Decision of Nonconformity to the 
Constitution (or inconsistent with the Constitution) 
A judgment that a law is unconstitutional immediately 
entails that the statute is null and void, and all state 
organs bound to implement the decision with prospective 
effect from the date of the Constitution Court judgment. 383 
A judgment that a law is "inconsistent with the 
Consti tution" does not entail its nullity, however such a 
judgment constitutes a signal to the executive and 
legislative branches that the legislation in question must 
be modified in the near future to address a serious 
J. Compo L. 73, 99 (1992). 
382 Justice Byun always wrote the dissenting opinions in those decisions. 
See Supra note 335, at 372. 
383. HONBOP JAEPANSOBOP [Constitution Court Act], Law No. 4017 (1988) art. 
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consti tutional defect. 384 
Generally, the Court stated that nonconformity decision 
is a possible form of decision when the statute in question 
has not only unconstitutional but also constitutional 
aspect s, and that the pr imary rationale for thi s special 
form of decision is respect for the policy-making privilege 
of the National Assembly. 
In September 1989, the Constitutional Court first 
delivered "the decision of nonconformity to the 
Constitution" ("nonconformity decision") in the National 
Assembly Candidacy Deposit case where it reviewed the 
provisions of the Election of National Assembly Members Act 
that specified the candidates' obligations to make election 
deposit (1 KCCR 199, 88Hun-Ka6, Sep. 8, 1989). In this 
case, the Court stated that there is a general need for 
"nonconformi ty decisions" because a simple choice between 
unconstitutionality and constitutionality prevents the Court 
from taking a flexible and resilient approach to a 
reasonable interpretation of the laws that regulate the 
complex social phenomena; it may cause the vacuum in or 
confusion about law, destabilizing the legal system; and it 
47 (2). 
384. West & Yoon, supra note 173, at 100. 
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can restrict the legislature's policy-making privilege. 385 
The Court made it clear that this nonconformity decision is 
simply a mutated form of the decision of unconstitutionality 
provided in Article 47 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act; 
and therefore naturally has the binding force on all other 
state institutions. 
Justice Byun Jeong-soo dissented to the modified form 
of decision, arguing that the Court can rule only on the 
issue of constitutionality, and the ruling should become 
immediately effective; and the Court cannot arbitrarily 
decide on the effective periods of its ruling. Justice Kim 
Chin-woo also dissented, arguing that an unconstitutional 
statute can remain effective only under exceptional 
circumstances in which the vacuum in law implicates a threat 
to national security, and that the Act must be voided on the 
date of the ruling in this case. 
While the two decisions on election deposits maintained 
the legal effects of the unconstitutional laws until they 
were revised, another kind of nonconformity decision did 
not: in the Industrial Dispute Arbitration Act case (CC 
1993.3.11, 88Hun-Ma5), the Court delivered an "unqualified 
decision of nonconformity to the Constitution that 
385 Web. 
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immediately suspended application of the statute at issue 
and compelled the legislature to take necessary actions by a 
fixed point in time after which the statute would become 
void. In other words, the law prohibiting every collective 
action of all civil servants is invalid. However, there are 
several ways of curing such unconstitutionality. The 
legislature has wide discretion in policy-making in terms of 
deciding, for instance, the range of the types and the ranks 
of civil servants to be allowed to take collective action, 
and is therefore in a better position to determine the most 
desirable way of remedying unconsti tutionali ty. The Second 
Term Court has continued to deliver a number of 
nonconformity decisions in order to secure the stability of 
the legal system by way of granting provisional validity to 
the unconstitutional laws. In particular, a great number of 
nonconformity decisions has taken place in the field of tax 
law because it requires legislature's policy considerations 
more than other fields of law: for example, the equity 
between tax-payers and tax-defaulters and the shortage of 
revenue. 
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b. Decisions of Limited Unconstitutionality or 
Constitutionality 
Another modified form of the decision - "constitutional on 
condition of proper interpretation"- is familiar to American 
jurists in a different terminology used when a statute is 
facially constitutional yet unconstitutional "as applied.,,386 
In a 1989 decision, the Court, in a constitutional 
complaint challenging Article 32-2 of the Inheritance Tax 
Act, issued a decision of limited constitutionality for the 
first time, using the expression "[the law] is not 
unconstitutional as interpreted. fl. in a language that 
has been accepted as standard on this issue. It explained 
that, although the statute in question had unconstitutional 
aspects, if it could also be interpreted in ways consistent 
with the Constitution, the Court could deliver "the decision 
of consti tutionali ty /unconsti tutionali ty as interpreted or 
applied" as could be naturally be derived from the doctrine 
of preference for constitutionality in statutory 
interpretation (CC 1989.7.21, 89Hun-Ma38). Specifically, in 
expressing his concurring opinion of this case, the first 
President Cho Kyu-kwang elaborated that if the text and the 
legislati ve intent of the statute has room for both the 
386 West & Yoon, supra note 173, at 100. 
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decisions of constitutionality and unconstitutionality, the 
Court must choose the preferred, constitutional version of 
the statutory interpretation. In doing so, the Court can use 
both "unconstitutional as interpreted" and "constitutional 
as interpreted" as proper forms. As the two forms are 
different only in expression but the same in essence and for 
all practical purposes, the choice between them is merely a 
matter of choosing the appropriate means. 
The fir s t deci sion using the form of "[ the law J is 
unconsti tutional as interpreted" is the Notice of Apology 
case in April 1991 in which the unconstitutionality of 
Article 764 of the Civil Act was considered (CC 1991. 4 .1, 
89Hun-Ma160) This case fully adopted the reasoning of 
President Cho Kyu-kwang in the above case. 
The stance on the decision that "unconstitutional as 
interpreted" and the "constitutional as interpreted" are not 
different in nature has remained unchanged. The choice 
depended on appropriateness of the means in that it depended 
only on whether the Court wanted to uphold or exclude a 
particular interpretation of the statute (CC 1992.2.25, 
89Hun-Kal04; 1994.4.28, 92Hun-Ka3). 
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On December 24, 1997, the Court took an extraordinary 
step of striking down the Constitutional Court's judgment on 
the grounds that the Supreme Court's judgment def ied the 
binding force of the Constitutional Court's previous 
decision of limited constitutionality, and applied the 
unconstitutional aspect of the statute. The Court 
unambiguously ruled that, aside from a decision of 
unqualified unconstitutionality, other decisions such as 
"unconstitutional as interpreted" , "constitutional as 
interpreted" and "non-conforming to the Constitution" were 
all, in principle, decisions of unconstitutionality and thus 
have the binding force provided in Article 47 (1) of the 
Constitutional Court Act. It also confirmed that 
"unconstitutional as interpreted" and "constitutional as 
interpreted" are the flip sides of the same coin and have 
the same effect of partially invalidating the law in 
question (CC 1997.12.24, 96Hun-Ma172, etc.) 
In reviewing the consti tutionali ty of Article 7 (1) of 
the Registration, etc. of Periodicals Act, the 
Constitutional Court found the Act unconstitutional as 
interpreted (CC 1992.6.26, 90Hun-Ka23) This decision showed 
that review of a statute constitutes an indirect review of 
regulations enforcing that statute. 
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Item 7 of Article 7 (1) of the Registration, etc. of 
Periodicals Act states that the periodical publishers "shall 
equip with related facilities designated by the presidential 
decree". Item 3 of Article 6 of the regulations, promulgated 
through the presidential decree to implement the Act, stated 
that the publishers should have ownership of such related 
facilities. The Court ruled that the statutory provisions 
were void insofar as they were to be interpreted as 
requiring publishers to own those facilities. Note that this 
decision reviewing the statute accomplished constitutional 
review of the regulations. In outlawing a particular version 
of interpretation of a statute, it also outlawed the 
regulations promulgated with that interpretation in mind. 
The Constitution grants the power of constitutional review 
of regulations to the ordinary courts while endowing the 
Consti tutional Court with that of statutes. Therefore, the 
Constitutional Court's indirect review of regulations, first 
recognized in this case, hints at a probable jurisdictional 
conflict with the Supreme Court. 
This conflict finally occurred with a constitutional 
1 ' t (CC 1995 11 30 94Hun-Ba40, etc.) on Article 23 comp aln . . , 
(4) of the Income Tax Act (Act No. 3576, Dec. 21, 1982). 
This Article provided that the transfer value for the 
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purpose of transfer gains taxation should be the transfer 
price. Item 1 of Article 45 (1 ) provided that the 
acquisition cost as a necessary expense deductible from the 
transfer value should be calculated using the standard land 
value at the time of the acquisition. However, both 
provisions had provisos that if the presidential decree 
stated otherwise, both the transfer value and the 
acquisi tion cost could be determined by the actual rather 
than the standard land prices. The Constitutional Court 
ruled that these provisos would lose their validity if 
interpreted in such a way as to allow the Administration to 
apply the actual prices when the tax based on them exceeded 
the tax based on the standard land value. In fact, the 
presidential decree implementing this Act had prescribed 
that when the estimated tax based on the actual land price 
was more than the tax based on the standard land price, the 
actual price could be applied in calculating the tax. 
Therefore, this case 
Constitutional Court's 
virtually resulted in 
review of the regulations. 
the 
The 
Supreme Court regarded this decision as usurping their power 
of constitutional review of regulations, and went on to deny 
its binding force, stating that it was at most, an advisory 
opinion. The Supreme Court upheld its own judgement in 
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conflict with the Constitutional Court's decision (the 
supreme Court Decision 1996.4.9, 95Nul1405) The claimant 
won the suit in the Constitutional Court but was denied 
redress by the Supreme Court. 
It has been argued that the Supreme Court went too far 
when it defied the Constitutional Court's decision. It is 
true that Article 107 (2) grants the Supreme Court the 
authority to review the constitutionality of rules and 
regulations. However, it is equally true that the 
Constitutional Court was granted the statutory review power, 
and the invalidation of the regulations in the case above 
was merely a by-product of this statutory review. Therefore, 
if the Supreme Court 
significance and the 
had correctly understood 
necessity of "the decision 
the 
of 
unconstitutionality as interpreted," it would not have 
regarded the Constitutional Court's decision usurpation of 
its own power. 
Furthermore, as our Constitution restructures the 
framework for constitutional adj udication by setting up a 
new specialized court for that function, the Supreme Court's 
ultimate power to review rules and regulations will 
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inevitably be adjusted to fit this new framework. For 
instance, if the Constitutional Court invalidates a statute 
on the grounds that it violated the rule against blanket 
delegation, all regulations based on the original statute 
will be voided irrespective of the Supreme Court's will. In 
addi tion, the constitutional complaint process now allowed 
the Constitutional Court to review the rules and regulations 
that were directly infringing upon people's basic rights 
even without any administrative action based on that rule or 
regulation. In short, the power to review constitutionality, 
di vided between the Consti tutional Court and the ordinary 
courts, will work properly only under the two institutions' 
common understanding that evaluation of a statute inevitably 
influences the validity of the regulations promulgated to 
specify the contents of that original statute. 
C. Standards of Review 
Before exploring the Constitutional Court's decisions, I 
introduce the standards of review which the Court applies. 
The following standards of review have been employed by the 
Constitutional Court. 387 
387 
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(1) The rule against excessive restriction 
(2) The Principle against arbitrariness 
(3) The principle of clarity of law 
(4) Prohibition of blanket delegation 
(5) The principle of statutory taxation and equal 
taxation 
(6) Protection of expectation interest (protection of 
confidence in law) 
(7) Due process of law 
Article 37 (2) of the Constitution prescribes the principle 
of prohibition of excessive restriction by stating that "the 
freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by law 
only when necessary for national security, the maintenance 
of law and order or for public welfare." The same article 
further states that "even when such restriction is imposed, 
no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be 
violated." Therefore, even when compelling state interest 
warrant limitations on individual rights, the "essential 
content" of the freedom or right should be preserved. This 
article has been recognized as the safeguard for the 
fundamental rights as well as a pretext for the neglect 
these rights. Therefore, the Constitutional Court also 
seems to use this standard for its review the case. 
For the first standard as described above, the Court 
explains as follows: 
In reviewing the consti tutionali ty of 
governmental actions restricting basic 
especially liberty rights, the Court has 
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those 
rights, 
usually 
employed the rule against excessive restriction as the 
standard. This principle of proportionality, instead of 
creating substantively different levels of scrutiny, 
provides a unified standard under which the 
relationship between the legislative end and its means 
is scrutinized in three different aspects 
(appropr iateness, necessity, and proportionali ty in 
narrow sense or balance) and which is applied to every 
restriction of liberties to demarcate and balance 
between the public interest and the liberty. 
Restriction of liberties by public authorities 
satisfies the principle of proportionality only when it 
is (a) aimed at a valid purpose (legitimacy of the 
end); (b) reasonable as a means chosen by the state to 
achieve and promote such purpose (appropriateness of 
the means); (c) the least restrictive among all equally 
effective options (necessity of the means or the 
doctrine of the least restrictive means); and (d) on a 
relationship of proportionality when the importance of 
public interest and the degree of infringement are 
balanced (proportionality in the narrow sense or 
balance) ...... 
However, this kind of standard of review has different 
senses from that of the United States Supreme Court. Since 
unlike the US Supreme Court the Constitutional Court barely 
tries to apply the terms of standard of review and further 
never explicitly creates or forms the standards of review, 
it is not necessary to use such terminology. The above 
description was published by the Constitutional Court itself. 
It seems that the Court unnecessary and illogically tried to 
transform so called three-tier standard of review system in 
the Uni ted States Supreme Court to Korean Constitutional 
Court where the justices more willingly tries to employ the 
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standard from the constitutional text itself. The justices 
never explici tly mentioned their intention to employ the 
three standard review of the United Supreme Court. However, 
in a 1991 decision, the dissenting opinion indicated that 
necessity of the application of a double standard for 
judicial review of legislation. 388 
388 June 3,1991,89 HonMa 204,3 KCCR 268,276. 
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V. PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 
A. Unending Issue of Constitutional Law of Korea: 
System of Government 
Through revi s ions of the Korean cons tit ut ions during la st 
four decades, which governmental system would accept for the 
next regime had always been a hot issue and this issue has 
been still discussing and crucial among the political 
parties as well as among the public law experts. All of 
those revisions, except of those of 1960 and those in the 
current Constitution of 1988, established grounds for 
extending the term of an incumbent president or provided ex 
post facto justification for military coup. 
A half century ago, a German-born American scholar, 
Karl Loewenstein, warned that the presidential governmental 
system would hardly work outside the United States and most 
Korean constitutional scholar favor this idea. 389 His 
warning turned out true in South Korea. The presidential 
system in South Korea was the "kiss of death" for Korean 
democracy.390 
Except for a short interruption during the Second 
Republic where a parliamentary cabinet system was adopted, 
389 Karl Loewenstein, The Presidency Outside the United States: A Study 
in Comparative Political Institutions, J.Pol., Aug. 1949, at 447-96. 
390. Ahn, Supra note .. 
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presidential system has been the rule throughout the entire 
period of the republican history of South Korea. Another 
key factor has been the method of the presidential election. 
During the constitutional revision, which election process, 
namely, direct election and indirect election, would be used 
has always been the crucial issue. Whether the president 
should be elected by a direct popular vote or by some 
indirect method has been the single most critical issue both 
in public view and in the political arena. On almost every 
occasion, a change from one to the other has been followed 
by a public disturbance. 
B. The Early Adoption of American Style of Presidency 
As discussed above, the original draft for the First 
Constitution was adopted the cabinet system of government. 
However, because Syngman Rhee's personal ego and desire to 
become the powerful leader in a newly formed nation and 
relatively more influenced by American favor, the 
presidential system with indirect election system was 
adopted. Being afraid of loosing his power through the 
indirect election which was held by the Congress, Rhee and 
his followers amended the constitution for adopting the 
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direct popular vote. After the amendment, Rhee was elected 
for his second and third terms in 1952 and 1956, by a direct 
vote of the people. 
During the Third Republic, born under the martial law, 
General Chung-Hee Park who had the power through the 
military coup in 1960 was elected President three times, in 
1963, 1967 and 1971 by a direct popular vote. However, 
during the period of the notorious "Yusin Regime," an 
institution called the "Sovereign People's Council for the 
Unification of Korea,' symbolically the highest body of the 
government, elected him twice more to the presidency in 1972 
and 1978. Because the presidential election during this 
period held in a sport event arena like indoor stadium, this 
indirect election was named "Stadium Election" by the 
opposition. 
Under the Constitution of Fifth Republic, Chun Doo-Hwan, 
another former general who became the political leader of 
South Korea through illegitimate political process against 
his higher authorities following the tragic death of 
President Park Chung-Hee, was indirectly elected by an 
electoral college for a single seven-year term. 
The current Constitution of 1988 returned to direct 
presidential election that was the top request of Korean 
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people during the nation-wide protest at June 1987, reducing 
the term from seven to five years, and barring him from re-
election. President Roh Tae-Woo, Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-
Jung and the incumbent President Roh Moo-Hyun were elected 
under this system. The current Constitution without any 
amendment during last four different presidencies has been 
recognized new experience for Korean people. 
As discussed above, the presidential government was not 
the first preference of the Korean people. It has been 
strongly suspected that it was the result of a 
recommendation of the United States Military Government in 
Korea and its Korean aids. Even though the USMGIK had 
strongly recommended adoption of the American style of 
government, the critical factor in Korea's adoption of 
presidential government was Dr. Syngman Rhee's strong 
personality. 391 However, the Constitution of the First 
Republic also carried several features of a cabinet system 
because it represented a compromise between President Rhee 
and the opposition who preferred the parliamentary 
government or it merely misunderstood the American 
presidential system as professor Ahn Kyong-Whan explains as 
follows: 392 
391 
392 
Kim and Lee, Supra note 50 at 177 
Ahn, Supra note 56 at 378 
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Notwithstanding its appearance in the document, the 
true nature of the presidential election in America 
should be characterized as "direct election." For all 
practical purposes, the electoral college does not have 
independent power to elect a president of its own 
choice. This seemingly clear fact was not well known 
in Korea. Many Korean politicians were confused, and 
some distortions by a few pro-government academics 
provided false justification for that confusion. 
Considering the suspicious conspiracy a in the beginning of 
the Korean constitutional history and continuous 
undemocratic revisions, all the controversies surrounding 
the methods of presidential election were mainly caused by 
public suspicion that any change were a mere pretext for an 
ulterior motive to prolong the incumbent president's or the 
ruling party's power. 393 
C. Problems in Current Presidential System 
Although Korea has adopted the presidential system 
originated from American constitutionalism, the 
constitutional powers vested with the president widely 
exceed the scope of its American counterpart. 394 An 
essential attribute of American presidentialism is a system 
based on the separations of power. For example, the right 
of the Congress to present a bill and the presidential right 
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to veto are sysmmetrical. 395 The United States Constitution 
is a document characterized by balance which has been 
maintained throughout the constitutional history of America. 
However, on the other hand, presidential ism in Korea has 
been a symbol of the supremacy of the President. 
Under the Constitution of Forth Republic, the President 
was vested with almost omnipotent powers, including the 
right to dissolve the National Assembly, to declare martial 
law, and to take any measure suspending even the most 
fundamental constitutional rights of the people. It is 
generally recognized that this Constitution of the "Yusin 
Regime" was modeled following the French Constitution of the 
Fifth Republic in 1958, commonly known as "De Gaulle 
Constitution." Although the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic sought more relaxed presidential powers, it still 
recognized the modified presidential system with its 
supremacy. In response to strong criticism from the 
opposition, the Chun's regime justified its governmental 
system with naming "New Presidential System" or "Korean 
Style of Presidential System" which was only known as the 
only pretext for his undemocratic regime. The presidential 
system under the Forth and Fifth Republic must be recognized 
393 
) 94 
Id. 
Id. At 99. 
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as an undemocratic system even though the systems were 
provided by written constitution because it violated the 
principle of democratic constitutionalism which is the 
separation of powers. The President had excessive powers 
over the judiciary and legislature. The President could 
control the other branches at his will. During those 
periods, the legislature was criticized as a mere voting 
machine for the president and the independence of the 
judiciary only existed in the text book. 
However, since Korean people called for the democratic 
change during the drafting period, the current Constitution 
accepted their demands and removed many undemocratic 
provisions in the previous constitution. Under the current 
Constitution, the President's powers have been reduced and 
the legislature and judiciary were given more powers. 
Despite those changes, however, the President still has 
relati vely more power than those of the President of the 
Uni ted States. Except for the appointment of the Prime 
Mini ster, the President has unbridled power to appoint and 
dismiss cabinet members at his will. 396 The position of 
395 Id. 
396. Article 86 (1) of the Constitution states: "The Prime Minister shall 
be appointed by the President with the consent of the National 
Assembly." It is unclear whether the removal of a prime minister is 
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Prime Minister was originally introduced in Korea as a 
compromise between the American advisors and Korean 
intellectuals who favored European parliamentary system. 397 
Furthermore, all major bills are prepared by the Executive 
and reviewed in the Party-Administration Coordination 
Committee before being presented to the Legislature. 
subject to the same consent requirement. However, in practice, the 
President never asked the National Assembly on such consent and 
therefore, the National Assembly's consent on new prime minister usually 
regards as the consent on the removal of the former prime minister. 
397. Loewenstein, Supra note 
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VI. THE INTERPREATATION AND APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS IN KOREAN COURTS 
A. Ratification of Major International Human Rights 
Covenants 
In April, 1990 South Korea ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)398, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) 399, and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 4oo • Since 
Article 6 (1) of the Constitution provides that "treaties 
duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and 
the generally recognized rules of international law shall 
have the same effect as the domestic laws of the Republic of 
Korea," the Covenant has the same effect as domestic laws 
without the enactment of separate domestic regulation. 
The United Nations had adopted these Covenants in 
December 1996 and the Covenants entered into effect in 1976. 
398 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 003 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A.Res. 2200, U.N. 
GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 
[hereinafter ICESCR]. 
399 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;G.A.Res 2200, U.N.GAOR, 21 st 
Sess., Supp. No, at 52, U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
400 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
302-46; G.A.Res. 2200, U.N.GAOR, 21st Sess., Sup. No. 16 at 59, U.N.Doc. 
A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Protocol]. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL 
TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 
1992, at 114, 123, 154, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/11, U.N. Sales No. 
E.93.V.1l (1993). 
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Needless to say, these covenants were drafted to embody the 
ideals enumerated in 
Declaration of Human 
the U.N 
Rights. 
Charter 
These 
and Universal 
covenants have 
influenced the world community as core international norms 
and universal standards for the protection of human rights 
along with other regional human rights instruments such as 
the European Convention for the Protection 0 Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. 
South Korea's ratification of the Covenants and 
Optional Protocol has opened new era for human rights 
protection and promotion for Korean people. Before the 
current administration, South Korea had been viewed in the 
international community as a Nation which does not respect 
human rights. Renowned human rights experts and 
international non-government organizations such as Amnesty 
International, the International Commission of Jurists, and 
the International League for Human Rights have expressed 
concern about human rights infringements in South Korea. In 
their reports, Korean citizens have experienced illegal 
arrests and detentions, torture, imprisonments resulting 
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from unfair trials, unexplained disappearance, and deaths 
form unknown causes. 401 
The fact that a State has become a State Party to human 
rights covenants, however, does not guarantee that the 
status of human rights in that State will improve 
immediately. Numerous countries have signed the Covenants 402 , 
yet it is unclear whether ratification in many of these 
countries has resulted in greater respect for human rights. 
In fact, signatories may not be making the continual and 
adequate effort to extend fundamental freedoms and basic 
rights as required by their domestic laws and the Covenants. 
For some countries, ratification may simply be a pretense of 
performing the responsibilities required in the 
401 See ARTICLE 19 WORLD REPORT 1988, at 149-53 (Kevin Boyle ed., 1988); 
ASIA WATCH ET AL., FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
(1988); Jerome A. Cohen, Arms Sales and Human Rights: The Case of South 
Korea, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 255 (Peter G. Brown & 
Douglas MacLean eds., 1979); FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 
DIVISION ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND THE 
O.S. RESPONSE 219-37 (1978); HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA, supra note 8; 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, TO THE PRECIPICE AND BEYOND: A 
REVIEW OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, JANUARY 1986-
JULY 1987 (1987); INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL 
HOMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH KOREA: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED 
(1985); INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW GROUP, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (1983); GILBURT 
O. LOESCHER & ANN D. LOESCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL CRISIS (1978); A. 
GLENN MOWER, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 137-49 
(1987); STEPHEN A. OXMAN ET AL., SOUTH KOREA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
EMERGING POLITICS (1987); James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The 1987 
Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial 
Independence, 1 HARV.HUM.RTS.Y.B. 135 (1988); WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE 
185-88 (Charles Humana comp., 3d ed. 1992). 
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international community, while in reality their citizens may 
still be suffering from severe infringements of the human 
rights guaranteed by the Covenants 403 • Therefore, a country's 
ratification of the Covenants does not automatically 
guarantee human rights protection. 
In the case of South Korea, in July 1991 the government 
submitted its initial report 404 to the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) in accordance with article 40 of the ICCPR. The report 
was examined by the HRC in July 1992 and will be discussed 
in Part I of this article. While reviewing the issues 
discussed in the report, bear in mind that the initial 
report will become a model for all future reports submitted 
to international human rights bodies. 
Under article 40 of the ICCPR, the State Party 
undertakes to submit reports on the measures it has adopted 
402 As of December 1991, there were 100 State Parties to the ICESCR and, 
as of July 1992, 111 State Parties to the ICCPR. 
403 Many countries ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
but have failed to live up to its provisions. Ratification was a 
propaganda ploy which, to some extent, masked the large-scale fraud 
which the governments perpetrated among their peoples in giving lip 
service to human rights. See International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations of the 
United States Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1991) [hereinafter 
Hearing] (statement of Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs) . 
404 Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 40 
of the Covenant: Initial Reports of State Parties Due in 1991; Addendum, 
Republic of Korea, U.N.GAOR, Hum.Rts.Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/Add.1 
(1991) [hereinafter Initial Report]. 
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which give effect to the rights recognized in the ICCPR and 
demonstrate the progress it has made in granting its 
citizens the enjoyment of those rights 405 . The reports should 
indicate the factors and difficulties affecting the 
implementation of the ICCPR406 . The State Party is required 
to submit an initial report within one year of ratifying the 
ICCPR and subsequent reports every five years thereafter. 
The HRC reviews the reports and transmits appropriate 
comments to the State Party407. The rules of procedure and 
practice of the HRC provide that the Committee review takes 
place in a public meeting with the representatives of the 
State Party408. 
405 "The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit in 
conformity with this part of the Covenant reports on the measures which 
they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of 
the rights recognized herein." ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 16 (1) . 
406 Theo Van Boven, The International Systems of Human Rights: An 
Overview, in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING 8, 80, 81, U.N.Doc. 
HR/PUB/91/l (1991) [hereinafter MANUAL ON REPORTING]. 
407 Id. at 80. 
408 rd. at 121-22. In its review of State reports, the Human Rights 
Committee is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial body. Its role is 
not to pass judgment on the implementation of the provisions of the 
ICCPR in any given State. The main function of the HRC is to assist 
State Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the ICCPR, to make 
available to them the experience the HRC has acquired in its examination 
of other reports, and to discuss with them any issue related to the 
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B. The Interpretation on International Human Rights 
Covenants in Korean Courts 
1. Relationship Between Domestic Laws and the ICCPR 
respect to inquiries made by the HRC aimed at 
delimi ting the relationship between domestic law and the 
ICCPR, the Korean government stated: 
Since Article 6(1) of the Constitution of South Korea 
provides that '[t]reaties duly concluded and 
promulgated under the Constitution and the generally 
recognized rules of international law shall have the 
same effect as the domestic laws of the Republic of 
Korea, ' the Covenant, which was ratified and 
promulgated by the Government with the consent of the 
National Assembly, has the same effect as domestic laws 
without the enactment of separate domestic regulation. 
The Korean government has concluded that the 
Constitution does not conflict with the Covenant 409 • 
The South Korean government's confirmation that, under 
the Constitution the ICCPR has the same effect as domestic 
laws and does not require enabling legislation, implies that 
the ICCPR applies directly to domestic cases 410 • The South 
Korean government's apparent acceptance of the ICCPR's 
enjoyment of rights enshrined in the ICCPR in a particular country. 
409 Initial Report, supra note 363, at 2. By the same token, the 
government delegate stated that Korea had acceded to the ICESCR and 
ICCPR in order to solidify the protection of human rights in Korea and 
to join the international effort to promote human rights. "All the 
rights provided for in the Covenant were guaranteed by the Constitution, 
which stipulated that all treaties duly concluded and promulgated should 
have the same effect as domestic laws. Together, the two instruments 
formed the cent [er)piece of human rights law of the Republic." 
CCPR/C/SR.llSO, supra note 27, at 2-4. 
241 
direct applicability contrasts with the U. S. position that 
the provisions of articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are 
not self-executing411 • 
Looking only at the application of the ICCPR, the South 
Korean government's interpretation seems more positive than 
410 LAWYERS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY & NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN 
KOREA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH KOREA 7 (1992) [hereinafter COUNTER REPORT] . 
411 A U.S. representative has stated: 
At this time, I would like to stress [that] the substantive provisions 
of the Covenant should be declared to be nonself-executing--this would 
mean that the Covenant provisions, when ratified, will not, by 
themselves, create private rights enforceable in U.S. Courts, it could 
only be done by legislation adopted by the Congress. Since existing U.S. 
law generally complies with the Covenant, we do not contemplate 
proposing implementing legislation. 
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing Before 
the Comm. on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 102d Cong., 
1st Sess. 9, 15 (1991) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Richard 
Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rig~ts and Humanitarian 
Affairs) . 
In opposition to this view, the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York argues: A declaration that the covenant is not self-executing, 
and would require separate legislation specifically implementing its 
provisions, would severely undermine the significance of ratification by 
further postponing the practical effectiveness of the Covenant until 
after another series of legislative actions. The Covenant does not 
require that treaties be implemented by legislation before they become 
U.S. law. The question of whether the parties to a treaty intended 
specific provisions to be self-executing has long been treated as a 
question for judicial interpretation and has turned largely on the 
specificity of the treaty language and its amenability to self-execution. 
The interpretive question of which provisions of the covenant are 
intended to be self-executing should be left to the courts, as in the 
case of other treaties, and should not be the occasion for yet another 
delay in making those parts of the Covenant which are obviously intended 
to be self-executing immediately binding on courts and government 
officials. 
Id. at 76. 
The government of South Korea made reservations regarding self-execution 
of the ICCPR under articles 14(5), 14(7), and 22. See ICCPR, supra note 
2. In opposition to this, the Korean Bar Association submitted an 
opinion calling for the withdrawal of those reservations. See Hyun-Suk 
Yoo, Kukje Inkwon Kyuyak-kwa Popyool Samu [International Human Rights 
Covenants and Legal Affairs], 169 INKWON-KWA JUNGUI [HUM. RTS. & JUST.] 
98 (1990). 
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that of the United States, given that there is little 
difference between the contents of the relevant articles in 
the two countries' Constitutions 412 • When asked as part of 
the HRC review whether the ICCPR could be nullified by 
subsequent domestic legislation, the South Korean government 
delegate answered that: 
[M]any members had asked about the relationship between 
the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the 
Covenant. Under [A]rticle 6(1) of the Constitution, the 
Covenant had the same effect as domestic law. He [the 
delegate] could not accept the claim that the 
guarantees contained in the Covenant might be 
overturned by subsequent domestic legislation, since 
such a suspicion underestimated the Republic of Korea's 
commi tment to human rights and the increasing public 
awareness of the rights enshrined in the Covenant, 
thanks to the Government's public awareness campaign413 • 
It is unlikely, however, that a government delegate's 
commi tment to uphold the ICCPR has any legal meaning or 
binding effect on government authorities or the courts. 
Rather, this statement suggests that the ICCPR is not 
superior to domestic legislation (laws enacted by the 
412 "Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and 
the generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same 
effect as the domestic laws of the Republic of Korea." KOREA CONST. ch. 
I, art. 6(1). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and 
all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
413 U.N.GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., 1154th mtg. at 3, D.N.Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR.1154 (1992) [hereinafter CCPR/C/SR.1154) (statement of Mr. 
Kook Hyun Yoo) . 
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National Assembly or administrative agencies). In principle, 
subsequent domestic legislation may supersede the ICCPR 
where there is a conflict 414 I f such is the case, the 
significance of South Korea's ratification of the ICCPR will 
diminish markedly. 
With respect to an individual's access to domestic 
courts on the basis of the ICCPR, the South Korean 
government delegate commented: "[ I] f an individual claimed 
that his rights under the Covenant had been infringed, the 
court would normally rule on the basis of domestic 
legislation; in the rare cases where that was not possible, 
the Covenant could be invoked directly by the courts. ,,415 
2. Direct Applicability 
Again, because the two Covenants have been duly concluded 
and promulgated with the consent of the National Assembly as 
requi red by the Constitution 416 under Article 6 (1) they 
414 This is similar to the view that the domestic effect of the ICCPR is 
the same as laws enacted by the National Assembly. 
415 CCPR/C/SR.1154, supra note 372, at 3. 
416 Article 60 provides: 
The National Assembly shall have power to consent to the conclusion and 
ratification of treaties pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual 
security; treaties concerning important international organizations; 
treaties of friendship, trade and navigation; treaties pertaining to any 
restriction in sovereignty; peace [treaties]; [treaties] which will 
244 
"have the same effect as the domestic laws of the Republic 
of Korea." There is no dispute that the ICCPR directly 
applies to domestic cases involving human rights 
violations 417 Thus, as mentioned in the government's 
initial report, the ICCPR has been effectively incorporated 
into the domestic legal arena without the enactment of 
separate domestic legislation. Anyone whose rights under the 
ICCPR have been violated may directly invoke the ICCPR 
before a domestic court for damages or for cancellation or 
nullification of the State organ's acts. 
On the other. hand, Korean scholars generally believe 
that the ICESCR is not directly applicable to domestic 
cases 418 • They distinguish between the obligations of the 
government under the two Covenants: while the obligations of 
the government under the ICCPR must be carried out 
immediately after accession, those under the ICESCR are to 
be progressively reali zed wi thin the limitations of State 
Parties' situations and circumstances. 
burden the State or people with an important financial obligation; or 
treaties related to legislative affairs. 
KOREA CONST. ch. III, art. 60(1). 
417 See Choong-Hyun Baek, Kookje Inkwon Kyuyak-ui Pop-juk Uiui [The Legal 
Significance of the Ratification of International Human Rights 
Covenants], 21 JUSTICE 7 (1988); Jung-Bae Chun, Kukje Inkwon Kyuyak-kwa 
Hankook-ui Hyunsil [International Human Rights Covenants and the Reality 
of Korea], 140 POPJO CHUNCHU 75 (1992); Yoo, supra note 33, at 98-104. 
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It is doubtful that a clear distinction can be made 
between civil and political rights on the one hand, and 
economic, social, and cultural rights on the other; both 
categories of human rights are interdependent 419 
Nonetheless, rights under the ICESCR which shall be 
"progressively realized" are distinguishable from rights 
under the ICCPR which require "immediate" relief. The ICCPR 
rights were specifically developed to protect against direct 
intervention and oppression by state power 420 It is 
uncertain how a court, in interpreting the term 
"progressive," will consider factors, such as time, 
resources, and social circumstances, which affect the 
enj oyment of rights 421 • 
3. Hierarchy 
Where there are conflicts between domestic laws and the 
Covenants, which prevails? Three main views delineate the 
418 Baek, supra note 376, at 8; Yoo, supra note 370, at 100. 
419 See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2, 
28-45 (1989); Han S. Park, Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies, 
9 HUM.RTS.Q. 405 (1987). 
420 See Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 
HARV.HUM.RTS.Y.B. 77, 130-32 (1988). 
421 Similarly, direct applicability of the Social Charter, which 
parallels the ICESCR at the European Community level, is hardly 
recognized among the European countries. See A.PH.C.M. JASPERS & L. 
BETTEN, 25 YEARS: EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (1988). 
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opinions concerning the proper scope of domestic laws under 
Article 6 (1) of the Constitution which provides that 
"treaties shall have the same effect as the domestic 
laws. ,,422 
Under the first view, "domestic laws" in Article 6 (1) 
merely refers to laws enacted by the National Assembly. 423 
According to this view, because the domestic force of 
international laws (including treaties) is derived from the 
Constitution, they are inherently inferior to the 
Constitution. The status of treaties is identical to that of 
domestic laws enacted by the National Assembly. Thus, if 
domestic laws and treaties come into conflict with each 
other, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori 
applies. 424 
The second view distinguishes international norms, such 
as the Charter of the United Nations, from other treaties. 
The rank of the latter is the same as that of domestic laws 
enacted by the National Assembly. According to this view, 
because international norms are generally approved and 
respected in the international community, for domestic 
422 KOREA CONST. ch. I, art. 6(1) 
423 See Yong Song Kwon, HONPOPHAK WOLON [Principles ofthe Constitution] 170 (1990). 
424 Sun Tae Lee, South Korea: Implementation and Application of Human Rights Covenants., 14 
Mich.J.Int'1 L. 705, 726, 1993 
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purposes they should rank below the Constitution but above 
other domestic laws. 425 
According to the third view, if subsequent domestic 
laws come into conflict with the Covenants, the conflicting 
provisions of the domestic laws become invalid. This occurs 
not only because the provisions for the protection and 
promotion of human rights set forth in the Covenants are in 
accord with the Constitution, but also because the State 
Parties undertook the obligation to carry out the necessary 
legislative measures to protect the rights recognized in the 
Covenants. An infringement of the rights enshrined in the 
Covenants is regarded as a violation of the Constitution. 426 
The first view does not distinguish the Covenants from 
ordinary laws. Therefore, the application of the Covenants 
may be replaced by subsequent domestic laws. Even in this 
case, as the third view points out, obligations of the 
government under the Covenants should remain. For example, 
the government should take steps to adopt legislative or 
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the ICCPR as required by article 2(2). 
Moreover, the government must also submit reports to the HRC 
or the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 
425 LEE, Supra not 428 at 727 
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the measures it has adopted which give effect to the rights 
recognized or the progress made in the enjoyment of those 
rights. The first view does not reconcile the gap between 
the theoretical and actual obligations under the Covenants. 
This view also lessens the significance of accession to the 
Covenants ln the prevention of human rights abuses by State 
Parties. 427 
In the case of the second view, it is unclear whether 
the Covenants are within the scope of generally approved and 
respected international norms. Even if such is the case, 
according to this view the Covenants still rank below the 
Constitution. However, there are some rights under the 
Covenants, such as the inherent right to life,428 and special 
protection of working mothers and juvenile offenders, 429 
which are not specifically addressed in the Constitution. 
Because South Korea has expressed its comrni tment to such 
rights, the government should take necessary measures to 
protect them even 
426 LEE, Supra Note 427 at 727 
427 LEE, Supra note 427 at 727 
if they are not mentioned in the 
428 "Every human being has theinherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life." ICCPR, art. 6(1) 
429 The ICCPR's provision for juvenile offenders reads: (2)(b) Accuese juvenile persons shall be separated 
from adults and brought as speedily as possible adjudication. (3) The penitentiary system shall comprise 
treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and soCial rehabilitation. 
Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and 
legal status. ICCPR, arts. 10 (2)(b), 10 (3). 
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Constitution. Therefore, at least as far as such rights are 
concerned, the Covenants supplement the Constitution and, 
for these rights, there are no grounds with which to argue 
that the Covenants rank below the Constitution. Furthermore, 
the obligations of the government under the Covenants listed 
in the first· view still apply under the second view. 
From the foregoing commentary, one may conclude that 
Article 6(1) of the Constitution simply provides that 
international laws are, upon their ratification and 
promulgation under the Constitution, effectively 
incorporated into the domestic legal system without separate 
legislation, 430 and that the Article does not stipulate a 
hierarchy between domestic laws and the Covenants. In other 
words, "domestic laws" in Article 6 (1) of the Constitution 
lS a general term meaning "laws of South Korea," referring 
to the Constitution as well as to laws passed by the 
National Assembly. Thus, the Covenants cannot be superseded 
by subsequent domestic laws or other legislation. 
With regard to the relationship between the 
Constitution and the Covenants, attention should be directed 
to the special characteristics of the Covenants. Whereas 
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ordinary international laws and treaties usually deal with 
conflicts between different States, the Covenants endeavor 
to protect and promote the human rights of individuals and 
minorities 431 regardless of citizenship. The Covenants are 
the products not of negotiation between countries concerned 
about their national interests, but of universal ideals and 
common sense aimed at extending fundamental freedoms to 
people oppressed by state power. In this respect, the 
Covenants are distinguishable from other international 
treaties. Instead of the government of each State Party 
performing its obligations to governments of other State 
Parties, the Covenants create government obligations toward 
individuals. 
The obligations of the States under the Covenants are 
basically to individuals wi thin their borders, rather than 
to counterpart governments, although reports concerning the 
observance of the Covenants are submitted to international 
human rights bodies. Accordingly, with regard to the 
protection and promotion of human rights, the Constitution 
and Covenants are not positioned to conflict with each other. 
430 In this sense, it may be said that South Korea belongs to the group of "monist" countries which do not 
need a separate legislation or transformation procedure for the application of international law. See The 
European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights (Mirelle Delmas-Marty ed., 1992). 
431 "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." ICCPR, art. 27. 
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The Covenants simply complement the interpretation and 
implementation of the Constitution towards a more complete 
protection of human rights, and they provide international 
standards and precedents. Nevertheless, if under unpredicted 
circumstances a constitutional provision is interpreted so 
that it no longer protects human rights, the Covenants 
should be used to challenge that interpretation. 432 
1. Ordinary Court 
Since the ratification of the Covenants, no Korean court, 
including the Supreme Court, has decided a case on the basis 
of the Covenants. In several criminal cases, defendants 
indicated under the National Security Law and other laws 
argued that they were not guilty because such laws 
conflicted with the Covenants and were invalid, but the 
courts did not accept their arguments. The courts found the 
defendants guilty, but the courts did not indicate whether 
the laws at issue were contrary to the Covenants. Under 
Korean law, if a trial court refuses to rule on the basis of 
the Covenants despite the argument of the accused, no 
procedure is available to appeal and obtain an adjudication 
432 LEE, supra note 477 at 729. 
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on the basis of the Covenants. The defendant can only file a 
peti tion with the Constitutional Court insisting that the 
law in question is unconstitutional. Currently, the courts' 
view of the relationship between the domestic laws and the 
Covenants is unclear. It seems that the courts are reluctant 
to admit the Covenants as a source of law in domestic cases, 
probably due to their ignorance of international human 
rights law. 433 
2. Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court of South Korea (the Court) rules on 
the constitutionality of laws, regulations, and other 
administrative actions of government authorities upon 
peti tion by individuals or ordinary courts. In 1990, the 
Dong-A Ilbo, a defendant in a damage suit, was ordered by a 
civil district court to publish a notice of apology and pay 
damages to the plaintiff, whose reputation was damaged by an 
article appearing in a monthly magazine owned by the Dong-A 
Ilbo. In April 1991, the Court held that if article 764 of 
the Civil Code 434 is interpreted so that the Dong-A Ilbo must 
433 LEE, Supra note 477 at 735 
434 "The court may, on the application of the injured party, order the person who has impaired another's 
fame to take suitable measures to restore the injured party's reputation, either in lieu of or together with 
compensation for damages." KOREA CIVIL CODE art. 764. 
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acknowledge its transgressions in a newspaper, such a 
provision would unconstitutionally conflict with the freedom 
of conscience protected by Article 19 of the Constitution. 435 
The Court ruled that, although the monthly magazine's 
article published by the petitioner injured another person's 
reputation, the petitioner is not required to publish an 
apology against its conscience in addition to paying damages. 
Deciding the unconstitutionality of the compulsory apology 
on the basis of Article 19 of the Constitution, the Court 
referred to article 18(2) of the ICCPR as follows: 
Since the Constitution provides that all citizens shall 
enjoy the freedom of conscience, the freedom of 
conscience is protected as one of the fundamental 
rights.... The conscience that the Constitution 
stipulates covers not only the freedom of thought that 
does not allow for the state power to intervene in the 
ethical matters of the individuals such as the act of 
deciding between the right and wrong, or virtue and 
vice, but also the freedom of silence that is protected 
against coercion to express one's thoughts or ethical 
determinations. . .. This is derived from the will to 
protect more perfectly the freedom of spiritual 
activities which has become the root of democracy and 
has played a significant role in the development and 
improvement of human beings.... Furthermore, Article 
18(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights which our country ratified in 1990 
also provides that no one shall be subject to coercion 
which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice.... Therefore, the 
coerced apology, as it distorts and perverts one's 
conscience, is an unconstitutional restriction of the 
freedom of conscience which is one of the fundamental 
435 89 Honma 160 (Apr. 1, 1991) 
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spiritual rights 
Consti tution. 436 
to be protected under the 
This is the first ruling of the Court that referred to 
the ICCPR while ruling on the constitutionality of a 
domestic law. The Dong-A Ilbo case indicates that the Court 
can and should refer to the Covenants in all domestic cases 
which substantively involve infringements of human rights, 
even if the Court rules only on the basis of the 
Consti tution. 437 
On the other hand, in the Yoo Sang-Duk 438 case, the 
Court did not refer to the ICCPR. The petitioner, who was 
arrested for the violation of the NSL, argued: (1) during 
I communications between the petitioner and his counsel, the 
• 
officers of the National Security Planning Agency recorded 
the contents of their communications and took pictures; (2) 
the petitioner requested respect for the confidentiality of 
the communications with his attorney, but they did not stop 
recording; and (3) as a result, the petitioner's right to 
communicate with counsel guaranteed in Article 12(4) of the 
436 This ruling might indicate that the Covenants are superior to domestic laws legislated by the National 
Assembly. 
437 This is very similar to the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of the former Federal Republic of 
Germany. Under German Law, a law can be declared void solely on the basis of the Federal Constitution. 
The fundamental rights set forth in the Federal Constitution, however, must be interpreted with regard to 
the case law of the European Court Human Rights. See The European Convention For the Protection of 
Human Rights, 121-29 . 
438 91 Houma III (June 14, 1991). 
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Constitution 439 and article 14 (3) (b) of the ICCPR 440 was 
violated. 
The Court held that the recording and photographing by 
the officers of the National Security Planning Agency 
violated the petitioner's right under the Constitution to be 
assisted by counsel, but the Court was silent as to whether 
the ICCPR also prohibits such acts. As in the situation of 
the lower courts, this appears to be an example of the 
Court's unfamiliarity with the significance, effect, and 
contents of the Covenants. In this respect, it may be hasty 
to conclude that the Dong-A Ilbo case is a landmark decision 
that will be followed in the future. 441 
C. Summary 
Despite the ambiguity in the understanding and 
implementation of the Covenants, South Korea's ratification 
of the Covenants was a historic event in the enhancement of 
439 "Any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to prompt assistance of counsel. When a 
criminal defendant is unable to secure counsel by his own efforts, the State shall assign counsel for the 
defendant as prescribed by law." KOREA CaNST. ch. II, art 12(4). 
440 "In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following 
minimum guarantees, in full equality: ... To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defense and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing." ICCPR, art. 14(3)(b). 
441 LEE, Supra note 477 at 736. 
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~ human rights for a Korean people who continu?lly yearn for a democratic society. Given the Covenant's significant 
contribution to world peace and improvement of fundamental 
rights, powerful instruments are now available to help the 
Korean people bring their cases to the attention of the 
international community. Moreover, an independent source of 
law now exists which can be directly applied in the domestic 
arena as a supplement to the Constitution and domestic 
laws. 442 
Needless to say, however, each country must start by 
resolving human rights violations within its own territory. 
Article 10 of Korean Constitution provides that "all 
• citizens shall be assured of human worth and dignity and 
have the right to pursue happiness. It shall be the duty of 
the State to confirm and guarantee the fundamental and 
inviolable human rights of individuals. u443 
The role of international human rights bodies such as 
the HRC under the ICCPR, and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights under the ICESCR should be 
strengthened in order to monitor governments more 
effectively and to enforce the Covenants. Under Korean law, 
442Id. 
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the Covenants are duly incorporated into the domestic legal 
arena. The Covenants, therefore, should rank as a higher 
level and be directly applied to domestic cases with the 
fewest limitations possible. 444 
As far as the protection and promotion of human rights 
is concerned, domestic laws enacted by the legislature or 
other government authorities should not be obstacles. 
443 KOREA CaNST. ch. II, art. 10. 
444 LEE, Supra note 477 at 737. 
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~ VII. CONCLUSION 
During the past century, particularly after the opening 
of the Kingdom of Choson, the relationship between the 
Unites States and Korea has become more unique in many ways. 
Korea has in fact reaped more that a fair return from the 
Unites States for the benefits it has conferred on the 
Unites States. The benefit for the United States at the 
time, of course, was the opening of Korea. Among the 
Western nations that have tried to establish diplomatic 
relations with Korea in the late nineteenth century, the 
United States was the first to conclude a bilateral treaty. 
Both countries have undergone many changes during the 
past hundred years. After two world wars in the first half 
of the twentieth century, the United States became a 
superpower of the world and Korea emerged from the seclusion 
of the Hermit Kingdom to the experience of two republics. 
Formal relations between the United States and the Korean 
Kingdom were preceded by a stormy military confrontation, 
but the treaty establishing diplomatic relations was 
consummated in an amicable atmosphere. 
During the Japanese colonial rule for nearly four 
decades, only American missionaries, educators and 
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philanthropists maintained cultural ties with Korea, 
supporting at times the Korean struggle for independence. 
A formal treaty relationship was restored when Japan 
~ 1 was defeated and a government was reestablished in Korea, 
but the division of Korea forced the Unites States to 
recognize only the U.N. -sanctioned government in the 
southern half of the peninsula. The division eventually 
caused the United States to become engaged in a war in Korea 
to stave off communist encroachment from the northern half 
of the peninsula, communist forces that were supported by 
the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. The 
United States government still maintains troops to observe a 
precarious military demarcation line that divides the 
country, but the relationship between the Unites States and 
the Republic of Korea from the first to the fifth republics 
has been most cordial. Indeed, the Unites States has played 
an indispensable role in the emergence of the modern, 
developing Korea of today. 
Korea and the United States maintain an amicable 
political relationship and growing commercial activities as 
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envisioned in the original treaty of amity and commerce 
'f concluded at May 22, 1882. 
This exploration of America's influence on Korean 
constitutionalism from a historical perspective shows that 
models which treat traditional culture as the primary 
obstacle to constitutionalism in Korea require 
reexamination. 445 
Korean constitutional history since 1948 demonstrates 
an on-going crisis concerning the legitimacy of political 
power. This crisis is evident in the history of repeated 
constitutional revisions. Legal pretexts cannot provide 
_, legitimacy to authoritarian political power unless the law 
itself commands legitimacy through due process. 
In Korea, the turning point came in 1987, when, 
political leaders representing opposing groups agreed to 
revise the constitution. For the first time in Korean 
history, these leaders complied with popular demands for 
democratization. As a result, the constitution has begun to 
enjoy legitimacy. Although the 1987 Constitution opened the 
door for democratization form a legal standpoint, the public 
445 Dae-Kyu Yoon, New Developments In Korean Constitutionalism: Changes and Prospects, 4 Pac. Rim L. 
& Pol'y J. 395,417 (1995). 
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perception of those in power did not change until a civilian 
,~ 
j president took office in 1993. 
Korea is undergoing a rapid transformation in many 
ways: from an authoritarian society to a democratic one, 
from a non-litigious society to a litigious one, and from a 
country with a decorative constitution to a country with a 
working constitution. The Korean experience aptly shows that 
political changes precede legal changes. At the same time, 
recent judicial actions demonstrates that legal changes 
accelerate political changes. The increased significance of 
the market economy and of technology, combined with the 
" trends toward globalization and towards the free flow of 
information, does not allow any society to remain isolated. 
Cold war ideology based on a zero-sum mentality is outdated. 
These trends demand new ways of thinking. The law can no 
longer be a means or subdue the populace simply for personal, 
or interest-based, purposes. Rather, law should become a 
facilitator of mutual interest. 
With the launch of the 1988 Constitution and the 
Consti tutional Court" the legal life of the Korean people 
has dramatically changed. The Constitution has become a 
j 262 
if 
living document, and constitutional adjudication has become 
~ a mater of daily occurrence. 
., 
I 
The influence of the United States constitutionalism 
has been conspicuous in major civil rights law areas since 
1988. Such influence will increase in the future as Korea 
continues its journey toward full democracy and the rule of 
law, where the major dispute of society are expected to be 
resolved through an open and neutral forum of law. 
Under past dictatorial regimes the Constitution was a 
dormant document, but in substance it was deeply critical of 
established governmental practices. The Constitutional 
Court has been charged with reviving these legal ideas, but 
since its power to enforce its own judgment is very limited, 
it must rely for its authority on the coherence of the 
decisions it renders. The Court can function only on an 
assumption that law matters, and that the Constitution has 
ceased to be a repository of merely rhetorical rights, as it 
was in the years gone by. 
This century has seen Korea first colonized, then 
parti tioned and cast into the abyss of civil war. These 
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tragedies bequeathed a cruel legacy of polarized extremism 
~ and extra legal dictatorship. 
Considering all the factors implicated in domestic and 
international changes, the prospects for Korean 
constitutionalism are very encouraging. I f Korea does not 
keep up with these changes, however, it will fall behind its 
competitors. In the current favorable domestic and 
international environment, the firm determination of the 
Korean people is the only element required to achieve the 
fulfillment of constitutionalism. 
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